Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions by Brennan, Lorin
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 38 
Number 2 Symposium on Approaching E-
Commerce Through Uniform Legislation: 
Understanding the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act and the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act 
Article 8 
2000 
Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions 
Lorin Brennan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 459 (2000). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol38/iss2/8 
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 





1. CONTRASTING CONTRACT IMAGES .................................. 465
A. Imagining a Sale of Goods ............................... 465
B. Looking at a Software License .......................... 466
II. WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE ............................................ 469
A. Statutory Philosophies.: ................................... 469
1. Article 2 - A True Code ............................... 469
2. The Copyright Act - A Federal Scheme .......... 474
3. What Happens When They Meet? .................. 478
B. Article 2 vs. The Copyright Act ......................... 479
1. Statute of Frauds ....................................... 481
2. Contract by Shipment of Goods .................... 484
3. Contract Where Writings Conflict ................. 487
4. Interpretation Rules ................................... 490
5. Assignment of Rights and Obligations .......... 492
6. Basic Obligations of Parties ........................ 496
7. Duration of a Contract ............................... 502
8. Implied Warranty of Merchantability ............ 503
9. Sales on Approval ...................................... 508
10. Sales or Returns (Consignments) ................. 510
11. Importance of Title .................................... 511
12. Mandatory Transfer of Title ......................... 512
13. When Title Passes ...................................... 515
14. Revesting of Title Upon Rejection ................. 518
15. Rights of Seller's Creditors Against Goods Sold 520
16. Good Faith Purchaser For Value .................. 521
17. Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency 523
* J.D., 1978 Hastings College of Law; Member, California Bar. Mr. Brennan is a
principal in Gray Matter, LLC, a software development firm. He has been a consistent
observer at the meetings of the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act.
Duquesne Law Review
18. Buyer's Right to Inspect .............................. 525
19. Perfect Tender ........................................... 528
20. Buyer's Obligations for Rejected Goods .......... 529
21. Seller's Right to Resell ................................. 530
22. Buyer's Security Interest ............................. 532
23. Chart of Statutory Differences ..................... 532
C. Article 2 On Its Own Terms ............................. 534
1. A Computer Program is Not a "Good" .......... 535
2. A Software License is Not a "Sale" .............. 537
3. "Predominant Purpose" is the Wrong Test ...... 540
D. What Law if Not Article 2? .............................. 542
III. AUTHORITIES ASTRAY ................................................ 545
A. The Case Law ................................................ 545
1. Early Inapplicable Cases ............................. 546
2. Interim Wrong Reasoning Cases ................... 549
3. Later Circular Reasoning Cases ................... 566
4. Modern Right Reasoning Cases .................... 572
B. What Law If Not Article 2? - Revisited ............... 577
1. U CITA ? .................................................... 579
CONCLUSION ................................................................... 580
Unless the stock intellectual equipment is apt, it takes extra art
or intuition to get proper results with it. Whereas if the stock
intellectual equipment is' apt, it takes extra ineptitude to get
sad results with it.
Karl Llewellyn'
INTRODUCTION
In the tumultuous period between the Wars, Karl Llewellyn was
on a mission: to unhorse sales law. American sales law at the time
was mesmerized by images from an earlier agrarian age, of sales of
haystacks and horses, and of land conveyances that required
punctilious attention to the written word.2 These images, Llewellyn
argued, were inappropriate for sales of mass produced wares in an
emerging industrial economy. Instead, sales law should be treated
as a distinct field of law, part of the general law of contracts to be
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HAv. L REV. 873, 876
(1939).
2. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE LJ. 1341
(1948) ("There is apparently wide agreement that the law of sales, in particular, is hopelessly
behind the times. Horse law and haystack law are uneasily tolerated in the complex business
of mass production and national distribution.")
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sure, but with its own unique characteristics.3 The result of
Llewellyn's long struggle was, of course, the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), especially its crown jewel, Article 2.1
We are undergoing another change today, at least as profound as
the one Llewellyn faced. It is the transition from an industrial to an
information economy. Information is qualitatively different from
goods. It is an intangible, separate and apart from the physical
objects that contain it. This separate intangible interest can be
property in its own right, one whose legal contours are typically
determined, often preemptively, by federal law. 5  In sales
transactions, getting the goods is the essence of the deal. In
information transactions, using the intangible is the raison d'etre;
the physical container is an incidental.
6
Nowhere is this difference more apparent than in software. The
software industries are now among the fastest growing segments of
the economy. Indeed the copyright industries, of which the major
component is software, now exceed in size the manufacturing
sector.' Yet many courts and commentators still plod along, treating
software transactions as no more than a "sale of goods." As in
Llewellyn's day, the intellectual equipment has been inapt, and the
results sad.
8
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") has responded to this crisis. At its 1999 Annual
Meeting, the Conuissioners promulgated the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"), 9 a visionary statute that
3. Karl N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L REV. 723, 738 (1939).
4. References to Article 2 will be to the 1972 Official Text. For state adoptions and
variations, see Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service, State UCC Variations, State
Adoptions of Amendments.
5. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L &
PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990).
6. For further discussion, see Michael L Rustad, Commercial Law Infrastructure for
the Age of Information, 16 J. MARSHAU J. COMPUTER & INmO. L 255 (1997); Raymond T.
Nimmer, Article 2B: An Introduction, 16 J. MARsHAu J. COMPUTER & INFO. L 211 (1997).
7. STEPHEN E. SIWEK & GALE MOSTELLER, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE
1998 REPORT (1998). This Report was prepared by Economists Incorporated for the
International Intellectual Property Alliance, an alliance of copyright trade associations.
8. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law - What Law Applies to
Transactions in Information, 36 HOUSTON L REv. 1 (1999). Professor Nimmer was the
Reporter for UCITA.
9. See New Uniform Act Meets Immediate Needs of the Information Age (visited Jan.
3, 2000) <http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/UCITA.htm>. This August 2, 1999 Press Release
stated:
Information technology accounts for more than one-third of the nation's economic
growth and is the most rapidly expanding component of the U.S. economy. Until now
2000
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will modernize commercial law to deal with the new realities of
computer information licensing. Historically, intellectual property
law, especially copyright, has been its own unique little field, an
isolated pond in the larger sea of commercial law. When goods
transactions dominated the. economy, this separation was
understandable. It is no longer. With information moving to
economic center stage, it is critical for commercial law and
copyright to reach an accommodation. UCITA does that.
As Llewellyn learned, any effort to reconcile established law to
changed circumstances outrages elements of the old guard. 0 UCITA
gets it from both sides. Commercial law doyens maintain that old
Article 2 is good enough to deal with software transactions, so
UCITA is unnecessary." Copyright mandarins claim that federal law
there has been no law that provides clear, consistent uniform rules for the intangibles
of computer information transactions. To meet this need, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved at its 108th Annual
Meeting in Denver, July 23-30, a uniform law that provides fundamental rules for
licensing contracts between users and software vendors or vendors of information in
electronic form.
Id. An excellent review of the purposes and operation of UCITA is contained in a series of
Questions & Answers prepared by Professor Nimmer, the Reporter, and Carlyle Ring, the
Chairman of the UCITA Drafting Committee. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., and Raymond T.
Nimmer, Series of Papers on UCITA Issues (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.nccusl.org/
pressrel/UCITAQA.htm>. Copies of UCITA are available at <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/
ulc/ucita.htmn> (visited-Jan. 3, 2000). Much valuable information about UCITA is available on
Carol Kunze's Web Site, A Guide to the Proposed Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.2bguide.com/>.
10. Although the Code was first promulgated in the 1940s as a long-overdue reform, it
took almost twenty years for the entrenched interests in the legal establishment to accept it.
See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 86 (1977); see also Karl Llewellyn, Why a
Commercial Code? 22 TENN. L REv. 779 (1953). One is reminded how common it is for the
old guard to oppose new ideas. Max Planck, the founder of quantum mechanics, put it thus:
"A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see
the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up
that is familiar with it." MORPus KLINE, MATHEMATICS - THE LOSS OF CERTAINTY 88 (1980).
11. See, eg, Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B()oom of Products Liability
Theory In Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 CAL L REv. 271 (1999); Zachary M.
Harrison, Note, Just Click Here: Article 2B' Failure to Guarantee Adequate Manifestation
of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELT, PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 907 (1998);
Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing The Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L REv. 1405
(1994); David A. Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to
Computer Contracts, 14 N. KY. L REv. 277 (1987); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply, 35 EMORY LJ. 853 (1888); Note, Computer
Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MICH. L REV. 1149 (1979); Bonna Lynn Horovitz,
Note, Computer Software as A Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking A Byte
Our of the Intangibility Myth 65 BU. L REV. 129 (1985). Robert A. Holmes, Application of
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer Systems Acquisitions, 9 RuTGERs
COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 1 (1982).
Others disagree, believing that a new commercial code is needed for software transactions.
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prohibits the mass market licensing of software in any case, so
UCITA is unwarranted. 2 Each of these positions, of course, is made
See, e.g. Holly K Towle, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Comment on W(h)ither Warranty
(available on-line at <http://www.2Bguide.com/>, responding to Professor Alces) (visited Jan.
3, 2000); Micahel L. Rustad, Commercial Law Infrastructure For the Information Age, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L. 255 (1997) (discussing comparative advantages of Article
2B for information transactions); Comment, The Perpetuation of Litigation Within the
Commercial Industry: Soon Brought to a Screeching Halt, 16 J. MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER &
INFO. LAW 421 (1997) (arguing that the application of Article 2 to licenses is inappropriate and
endorsing Article 2B); Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes
& Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994) (responding to Professors
Benfield & Alces).
The American Law Institute ("ALI"), co-sponsor with NCCUSL of the Uniform Commercial
Code, has been particularly enamored of the Article 2 only approach. An example is a
Memorandum from Jean Braucher & Peter Linzer dated May 5, 1998 to members of the
American Law Institute for the 1998 Annual Meeting, criticizing Article 2B for, among other
things, not adhering close enough to Article 2. See Memorandum from Jean Braucher &
Peter Linzer to Members of the American Law Institute (memo dated May 5, 1998) (visited
Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.ali/Braucher.htm>. For criticism of the Braucher-Linzer Memo and
ALl position, see Jeff C. Dodd, Time and Assent In the Formation of Contracts: The
Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Information Contracts, 36 Hous. L REV. 195, 238-40 (1999).
The differences between NCCUSL and AL over UCITA became insurmountable, and
NCCUSL decided to promulgate UCITA as a uniform act without the ALI. See New Uniform
Act Meets Immediate Needs of the Information Age, supra note 9. AU's refusal to abandon
the proposition that Article 2 must apply to all software transactions makes reconciliation
doubtful.
12. See, eg, Michael J. Madison, Legal-ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital
Age, 67 FORDHAM L REV. 1025, 1123-25 (1999) (criticizing UCITA, then known as Article 2B,
but not Article 2); David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphis of
Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL L REV. 17 (1999) (criticizing Article 2B, but ignoring Article
2); Mark A Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL L REV. 111 (1999) (same; Article 2 ignored); Charles R. McManis, The
Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrapping') of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL L REV. 173
(1999) (discussing the "Article 2B threat" but ignoring Article 2); Apik Minassian, The Death
of Copyright: Enforceability ofShrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L Rev. 569
(1998) (ignoring application of Article 2 to shrinkwraps); Dennis S. Karijala, Federal
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L REV. 511 (1997) (arguing
copyright law preempts "commercialized" licenses under Article 2B, but not analyzing Article
2); David A. Rice, Digital Information as Property and Product: U.C.C. Article 2B, 22 U.
DAYTON L REV. 621 (1977) (ignoring Article 2); Mark A- Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL L REV. 1239 (1995) (analyzing proposed amendments to
U.C.C. but ignoring Article 2); David Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy:
Federal Preemption of Software License Provisions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U.
Prrr. L REV. 543 (1992).
Not everyone agrees. For other views, see Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Contract and Copyright
are Not at War: A Reply to "The Metamorphis of Contract Into Expand", 87 CAL L REV. 79
(1999); Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking the Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and
Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 827 (1998); Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The
License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B For Software and
Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 891 (1998); Case Note, ProCD Inv. v.
Zeidenberg and Article 2B: Finally The Validation of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 16 j. MARsHALL
J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L 439 (1997); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between
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to advance what are ultimately political, not legal, goals.13 This is
apparent from the fact those who object to UCITA have paid little
attention to whether the Copyright Act is compatible with current
Article 2.14
I propose to rectify that oversight here.
This article will show that major components of the Article 2
transactional model are incompatible with federal copyright law
when applied to software transactions. The inevitable conclusion is
that we must have a new commercial law to reconcile contract to
copyright in computer information transactions. There is no other
choice.
Images of typical transactions affect how we think about
appropriate legal rules. Part I therefore starts with contrasting
images for sales of goods and information transactions. Using this
imagery, Part II continues with a detailed review, section by
section, of those provisions of Article 2 that are inconsistent with
the requirements of the Copyright Act when applied to software
transactions. Not all sections of Article 2 are incompatible with the
Copyright Act, of course. But Article 2 purports to be a "true code,"
a preemptive, systematic and comprehensive enactment of an
entire field of law. The section argues that so many of its central
concepts are negated by the Copyright Act that the whole structure
no longer hangs together as a whole. Part III then analyzes the
decisions that claim that software transactions are within Article 2,
showing where they have gone astray. After asking the obvious
question: What law if not Article 2?, this part concludes that UCITA
is the best answer.
Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE LJ. 479
(1995) (arguing the benefits of licensing but suggesting greater judicial scrutiny of
shrinkwraps); Robert W. Gomulldewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass
Market Software License Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335 (1996); Richard
S. Stern, Shrink-wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or
Whistling In The Dark?, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. UJ. 51 (1985) (suggesting a federal
commercial code for software).
13. For a discussion of the politics surrounding UCITA, see Holly K Towle, The Politics
of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L REv. 121 (1999). The objections to UCITA by copyright
mandarins are often surrogates for positions taken in the international debate on the role of
copyright in a wired world. See Lorin Brennan, The Copyright Wars: The WIPO Treaties and
The New Information Economy, 2 PLI FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 623 (1998) available on-line at Carol A. Kunze, A Guide to the Proposed Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.2bguide.com/>;
see also Andrd Lucas, Intellectual Property and Global Information Infrastructure, 32
UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULLETIN 3 (1998).
14. A rare exception is PETER A. ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1994).
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I. CONTRASTING CONTRACT IMAGES
The way we view a situation - our stock intellectual equipment,
in Llewellyn's terms - can effect the conclusions we reach. At one
time, people looked at the sky, saw the sun move across the
heavens, and assumed that Earth was the fixed center of a
Universe around which all heavenly bodies revolved. Galileo
championed another image of planets revolving in elliptical orbits
around the Sun. 5 Our mental images effect our understanding.
What is our stock view of a typical software transaction?
A. Imagining a Sale of Goods
The usual image of a software transaction is a customer who
enters a retail store and acquires pre-packaged software with a
shrink-wrap license.' 6 The customer obtains a box, some instruction
manuals, and, oh yes, a diskette or CD that embodies the computer
program. This has all the look and feel of a "sale of goods," and
thus would seem to fall within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. In a more recent variant, the customer accesses a Web page,
clicks an "I Agree" icon in a dialog box containing a license, and
downloads (copies) the software. The click-on transaction looks a
little different because we are dealing with electrons moving over a
wire, but there is authority for the proposition that electricity is a
15. The discovery by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) of moons circling Jupiter shattered the
illusion that all Heavenly bodies circled a stationary Earth. For proclaiming the truth of the
Copernican solar vision, the cognoscenti condemned him as a heretic. For a history, see
MORRIS KUNE, MATHEMATcS - THE LoSS OF CERTAINTY chapters 1 & 2 (1980); for Galileo's part,
see GEORGIO DE SANTILANA, THE CRIME OF GALILO (1955).
16. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 12, at 111 n.15, arguing thus:
In the context of traditional mass-market transactions for software, the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the transactions strongly suggests that the transaction is in
face a sale rather than a license. There is no bargaining over license terms. The
purchaser (licensee?) commonly obtains a single copy of the software, along with the
documentation, in a box at a retail software store. The box contains a single price,
which the purchaser pays up front, which constitutes the entire payment for the
"license." The purchaser also pays sales tax on the "license." The license does not run
for a definite term and need not be renewed, but is perpetual unless terminated by
the vendor (something that almost never occurs) .... In light of these indicia, and
because most purchasers think they are "buying" a physical copy of a program,
almost all courts and commentators that have considered the issue have concluded
that a shrinkwrap license transaction is a sale of goods rather than a license, and is
therefore covered by Article 2 of the U.C.C.
Id. (citations omitted). In 1630, most people thought that Earth was the fixed center of the
Cosmos and almost all learned commentators who had considered the issue dutifully agreed.
Future generations can be grateful that "almost" did not include Galileo.
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"good,"17 so this seems to fit within the outer edges of the mold.
As the court in Advent Systems v. Unisys Corp.18 blithely put it:
That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual
property does not alter the fact that once in the form of a
floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible,
moveable, and available in the marketplace. 19
In other words, a computer program may start off as intangible
intellectual property, but once it is copied onto a floppy disc it
merges into the disc and becomes a tangible, physical "good."
Under this view all software transactions fit neatly into the, if you
will, Ptolemic world view of Article 2, where everything circles
around the fixed notion of a sale in goods.
It is a tidy and comforting notion - and spectacularly wrong.
It is as wrong as saying that the Sun revolves around a fixed and
immovable Earth because it looks that way. Indeed, the preceding
quotation is legal nonsense. The remainder of this article will
discuss in detail the reasons why. For now, let us take a moment to
set firmly in our minds the correct image for software.
B. Looking at a Software License
The most dramatic illustration of the error in the simplistic "sale
of goods" imagery is LINux, a fast-growing operating system that
many see as a competitor to Microsoft Windows. Linus Torvalds
created LINux with the help of other developers worldwide.20
Basically, LINUX emulates UNIX on the Intel chipset, making it
well-suited for Web based software. Like many other programs,
LiNUX is distributed under the "open source" GNU General Public
License.21 Because this license is critical to understanding how
17. See, e.g., Mancuso v. So. Cal. Edison Co., 232 Cal. App. 3d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. App. 1972). But c.f. Kaplan v.
Cablevision of Pennsylvania, Inc. 671 A.2d. 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding that the
transmission of cable television programming is not a "transaction in goods" under Article 2);
Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. App. 1972). See
generally Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Electricity, Gas or Water Furnished by Public Utility
as "Goods" Within Provisions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on Sales, 48 A.LR.3d
1060; RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105:158 (3d ed. 1991) (collecting
cases).
18. 925 F2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
19. Advent Systems, 925 F.2d at 675, discussed infra notes 437-65 and accompanying
text.
20. For further details on LINUX, visit the Linux Organization Web site at Linus Online!
(visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.linux.org/>.
21. See GNU General Public Licenses (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.linux.org/info/
Vol. 38:459
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LINUX is distributed, it is set out in full in the Appendix to this
article. It allows users to copy, modify, and redistribute copies of
LINUX without charge, provided that the supplier makes the source
code available and disclaims all warranties. The warranty
disclaimer is crucial because the creators of LINux do not support
the software - they let the users do that - and because they do not
want to be responsible for modifications by others. One of the
reasons for LINUX's popularity is precisely because it is open-source
software, which allows vendors to create add-on application
programs without being locked into a proprietary operating
system.
22
The Linux Organization makes LINUX available for downloading
from its site. It does not provide packaged copies to retail stores.
Third party vendors do that, such as Red Hat and Walnut Creek
Software. These vendors all use shrinkwrap licenses, as required by
their license from the Linux Organization. Some copies of LNux,
like mine, come with a full waiver of all warranties, but then my
price was under $20. Other vendors provide their copies at a higher
price, but they also offer limited support.23 What this means is that
when a customer acquires a packaged copy of LINux, two quite
separate legal events occur. The customer buys a copy of LINux
from a vendor; the customer also obtains a license from the LINux
organization to use the embodied computer program. This
separation is essential because the purveyor of the copy (e.g.,
Walnut Creek Software) is not the owner of the embodied
computer program (the Linux Organization).
Notice how this fact directly contradicts the image that a
computer program, when embodied in a floppy disc or other
medium, loses its separate identity and becomes a tangible "good."
The mere fact that Walnut Creek makes and distributes a copy
does not make LINUX the computer program "tangible, moveable
and available in the marketplace." LINUX, the computer program,
'still remains an intangible, copyrighted work. LINUX, the computer
program, has not moved from the Linux Web page even though it
gnu.html>. More details on the GNU General Public License are available on the Free
Software Foundation home page at Free Software Foundation (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://
www.gnu.org/fsf/fsf.html>.
22. For a discussion of open source licensing, see R. Gomulldewicz, How Copyleft Uses
Licenses Rights to Succeed in the Open Source Software Revolution and the Implications
for Article 2B, 36 Hous. L REv. 179 (1999) available on-line at http://www.2bguide.com/.
(visited Oct. 5, 1999); see also <http://copyleft.net>.
23. The GNU Public License authorizes licensees to charge for support if they wish.
2000 467
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was copied. If the copy made by Walnut Creek does not conform to
the requirements of the GNU Public License, then that copy is
unauthorized, its distribution infringing, and the copy is definitely
not available in the marketplace.
This difference is profound. The goods-centric image sees a
software transaction as a delivery of a this particular CD. It makes
the medium the message; the container the content; the CD the
computer program. The information-centric view sees just the
opposite. The essence of the transaction is the legal authorization
to use the program; the CD is just the means to enable that use.
One needs a jar to carry caviar, but that does not make the jar the
essence of the meal.
Look at LiNux. The particular CD I happened to get is nothing
special. In fact, the first thing I did was to use it to make a new
copy on my hard disc. Now I have two copies of LINuX. If this
particular CD was the end all and be all of the deal, then why
make two copies at all? The answer is simple: because the CD was
just a carrier vector for the real value in the deal, the computer
program. Now that it has done its job - enabled the use of the
computer program on my hard drive - what do I need it for? I
suppose I can keep it for back-up, along with scores of other old
floppies moldering in the garage. Or I could throw it away. So
what? I can always download another copy from the LINUx Web
site. I may do that anyway as new upgrades of LINUx appear. For
computer information, the copies are only enablers, a means to an
end not an end in themselves, no more important to using the
information than a ticket stub is after you enter the theater. Is
watching a movie a sale of goods because you buy a ticket?
This brings us to the basic idea of what we mean by a "software
transaction." It is one in which a licensor authorizes or restricts the
use of a computer program. The transaction can include providing
a copy, but this is not necessary. When a licensee downloads, say,
a copy of LINUX directly from the Web site, the Linux Organization
is not itself making a delivery so much as it is authorizing the
customer to effect a self-delivery by making a copy. On the other
hand, a copyright owner may elect merely to sell copies and rely
solely on the provisions of copyright law to control uses. Nintendo
and Sega do this by selling game cartridges. As no license is
involved, these are not software transactions under this definition
(although they may be for other purposes).
All of the discussions about Article 2 and UCITA come down to
the image one has about a retail transaction for LNUX Is it a sale
Vol. 38:459
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of goods with an incidental authorization to use the embodied
computer program? Or is it a license of information with incidental
delivery of a physical copy to enable its use? If you see only the
former, then you naturally think a computer program is no different
than a toaster, and that information transactions orbit a fixed and
immovable Article 2. If you see the latter, however, then you
understand that information transactions travel in different orbits.
Let us see why the law demands the latter view.
II. WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE
Article 2 contains a statutory model for a sale of goods. The
Copyright Act creates exclusive property rights in copyrightable
works. This Part examines what happens when they collide in
software transactions. The first section sets forth the different
statutory philosophies. The second section compares the major
default rules in Article 2 with the requirements of the Copyright
Act to show how these philosophies lead to widely varying results.
Based on this analysis, the third section returns to basics, asking
whether a computer program is a "good" and whether a software
license is a "sale." It concludes that, even under Article 2's own
definitions, they are not.
To avoid confusion in the statutory references, in what follows
"Article" will refer to provisions in Article 2, and "Section" to those
in the Copyright Act.
A. Statutory Philosophies
1. Article 2 -A True Code
It has been argued that the Uniform Commercial Code is more
than a mere statute - it is a code.24
Although the terms "code" and "statute" are often used
interchangeably, there is a vast difference between them. A
"code" is a preemptive, systematic and comprehensive
enactment of an entire field of law. It is preemptive in that it
24. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 1-102.1 (West 1999)
for an extensive argument of this position; see also William D. Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1992 U. ILL L REV. 291; Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its
Cause and Cure, 70 YALE LJ. 1037, 1043 (1961) (discussing the distinction between "statute"
and "code"); but see John E. Murray, Jr., The Article Two Prism: The Underlying Philosophy
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. (1981) (arguing that Article
2 is a group of statutes, not a true code).
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displaces all other laws in its subject area, save only that
which the code itself excepts. It is systematic in that all of its
parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a
consistent terminology, form an interlocking, integrated body,
revealing its own plan and containing its own methodology. It
is comprehensive in that it is sufficiently inclusive and
independent to enable it to be administered in accordance
with its own basic policies.... A mere statute, on the other
hand, is neither preemptive, systematic nor comprehensive so
that its methodology is different from that of a code.25
For purposes of this article let us accept the proposition that the
UCC is a "true code."
The UCC is a commercial code, not a regulatory one. Its goal is
to be accurate, not original; to attempt to state as a matter of law
the conclusions that commercial practice apart from the statute
gives to transactions as a matter of fact.26 It is not intended to
regulate commerce or enable litigation, matters which are better
left to consumer protection, antitrust, competition and related laws
tailored to the needs a specialized class of species of transaction.27
Instead, the UCC is an enabling statute, one which seeks to
facilitate customary commercial practice. It does this by setting up
what are variously called "gap-fillers" or "default rules" that supply
necessary contract terms where parties have not done so
adequately. 28 Use of the UCC defaults is not required. Except in
certain limited cases, such as bedrock obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care, the parties may vary UCC rules
by agreement. 29 In other words, the general principal of the UCC is
25. HAWRLAND, supra note 24, at § 1-102:2.
26. See Gilmore, supra note 2, at 1354.
27. See Nimmer, supra note 8, at 220.
28. See, e.g. Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction: The Commercial Irrelevancy of the
"Battle of the Forms", 49 Bus. LAw. 1019, 1022 (1994) (noting that "gap fillers are statutory
provisions that apply in the absence of contract disclaimers or provisions covering a
particular subject"); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) (discussing evolution of concept from "gap-fillers" to
"default rules" and noting technical distinctions); Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn &
Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure
Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARv. J.L & PuB. PoL'y 639 (1989) (using cooperative game theory
as a basis for analyzing default rules); Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filing Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE U. 87 (1989)
(discussing difference between "default" and "immutable" rules); THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN's
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND DIGEST 1-205[AI[2] (2d ed. 1991) (discussing the
"gap filling" role of the UCC).
29. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1999); QUINN, supra note 28, at 1-102[A].
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freedom of contract.30 Another way to think of the UCC is as a
statutory form contract that parties get by default unless they
change it.
The UCC must be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies.3 1  These include simplifying,
clarifying, and modernizing the law governing commercial
transactions.32 Unless specifically displaced by the UCC, general
principles of law and equity supplement the UCC.3 Supplement
here is the operative word. The UCC rejects the old prejudice that
"statute[s] in derogation of the common law - and what statute is
not? - must be strictly construed."34 As a comprehensive enactment,
individual sections should be interpreted together as part of an
entire statutory scheme, not as isolated statutes each standing on
its own.3
5
Article 2 of the UCC applies to "transactions" in "goods."36
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale other than money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities, and things in action.3 7  While the definition is
intentionally broad, in application Article 2 deals with, and the
definition of goods is cast in terms of, a contract of sale. 8 A "sale"
means "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price."39 Article 2 does not apply to services.40
30. HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 1-102:12.
31. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1999).
32. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1999).
33. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1999).
34. See Gilmore, supra note 24, at 1045.
35. See In re Lou Levy & Sons Fashions, Inc., 988 F.2d 311, 314-315 (2d Cir. 1993);
Hunick v. Orona, 657 P.2d. 633, 634 (N.M. 1983). As the Official Comments to Article 1-102
provide:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and policies.
The text of each section should be read in light of the purpose and policy of the rule
or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the
language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case my be, in accordance
with the purposes involved.
U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. (1999).
36. UCC § 2-102. It begins: "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies
to transactions in goods." There are other exceptions not relevant here. See HAWKLAND, supra
note 24, at § 2-102 (transactional exceptions), § 2-105:2 (exclusions from definition of
"goods").
37. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1999).
38. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Computer Servicecenters, Inc.
v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
39. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1999); see generaly HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-106:2.
40. HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-102:4 (and cases cited); QUINN, supra note 28, at
2000
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The hard questions come in deciding whether Article 2 applies to
"mixed" or "hybrid" transactions involving both goods and services.
The usual approach applies a "predominant purpose" test.41 If the
predominant purpose of the transaction involves a sale of'goods,
the entire transaction is in;42 if service aspects are predominant, it
is entirely out.4 For example, a contract with an artist to paint a
portrait, while it could be called a specially manufactured picture,
is not within Article 2 because the service aspect predominates
over the goods aspect.4 Similarly, a contract to sell a business
2-102[A][2].
41. This test was articulated in the seminal case of Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F2d 951 (8th
Cir. 1974):
[Tihe cases presenting mixed [goods and services] contracts of this type are legion.
The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether they are mixed, but, granting that
they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose,
reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g.,
contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally
involved (e.g, installation of a water heater in a bathroom).
Bonebrake, 499 F.2d at 960. See generally HA.wmkND, supra note 24, at § 2-105:1; ALCES & SEE,
supra note 14, at § 8.3.
42. See, e.g., DeFilippo v. Ford Motor Company, 516 F2d 1313 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding
that an agreement to sell an automobile distributorship was within Article 2 because assets
consisted of inventory, not real estate or goodwill); Knoxville Rod & Bearing v. Bettis Corp.
672 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. App. 1983) (holding that the sale of inventory, equipment, franchise
rights, and accounts receivable were within Article 2 under the DeFilippo test); Yorke v. B.F
Goodrich Co., 474 N.E.2d 20 (IM. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that an agreement to provide
technical assistance in connection with the sale of vinyl pellets was within Article 2);
Maryville S & L Corp. v. McDonald, 760 F.2d. 119 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a contract for
the sale of promissory notes secured by deeds of trust on realty were within Article 2); Fink
v. DeClassis, 745 F Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. m. 1990) (holding that the sale of a business,
including inventory and trademarks, was not within Article 2 because the value of the
non-goods was substantially greater than the value of the goods); see generally HAWKLAND,
supra note 24, at § 2-102:4.
43. See Dravo Corp. v. White Consolidated Industries, 602 F. Supp. 1136, 1140 (W.D. Pa.
1985) (holding that the sale of "drawings and tracings" of engineering firm was not a sale of
"goods" within Article 2 because the significance of the items was not their physical
properties but the ideas they contained); Care Display, Inc. v. Didde-Glaser, Inc. 589 P.2d 599
(Kan. 1979) (holding that a contract for trade show exhibits was not within Article 2 because
the predominant purpose involved artistic and design concepts for a booth, and the physical
construction was incidental); Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 305 A.2d. 689 (Pa-
1973) (holding that a contract for the sale of radio stations was not within Article 2 because
the physical assets represented less than 5% of the total purchase price); Computer
Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), affd, 443 E2d 906 (4th
Cir. 1971) (holding that a contract "for performance of data processing services" was not a
"sale of goods" within Article 2); see generally. HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-102:4 (and
cases cited).
44. See National Historic Shrines Foundation, Inc. v. Dali, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 71 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1967); cited with approval by Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974).
The Dali case is discussed extensively in ALCES & SEE, supra note 14, at § 8.3, and in
IAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-105:1.
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whose assets include physical equipment and inventory, which are
certainly goods, along with trademarks, trade names, advertising,
artwork, customer lists, sales records, unfulfilled sales orders,
goodwill and licensing agreements, which just as certainly are not,
is not within Article 2 where the value of the non-goods exceeds
the value of the goods.45 On the other hand, the sale of computer
hardware along with the software to run it has been held to be a
sale of goods where the software is included as an incidental
service without charge.46 Another variant uses a "gravamen test" to
ask whether under the totality of the circumstances is it reasonable
to characterize the transaction as a whole as a contract of sale
within the ambit of Article 2,47 a test which may be more
appropriate in hard cases.48 One court, in an extreme case, even
decided that mere use of a good was sufficient to bring the matter
within Article 2.
49
Whatever test applies, the end result is, in practice, "all or
nothing." If a contract is within Article 2, then the entire contract is
subject to the UCC.5° The contract is not split into separate goods
and services components. 51 By the same token, it follows that all of
45. See Fink v. DeClassis, 745 F Supp. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (value of non-goods
accounted for $1,000,000 of the sales price, while the goods accounted for only $200,000).
46. See Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F2d. 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
Thangle Underwriters is discussed infra notes 418-21 and accompanying text. See generally
ANDERSON § 2:105:143 (collecting cases).
47. See DeFilippo, 516 E2d at 1313; Care Display, Inc., 589 P.2d at 599; System Design
& Management Info., Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990); see generally RAYMOND T. NImmER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY §
6.01 (Rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the differences between the tests).
48. See HAwKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-102:4.
49. See Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So.2d 818 (Ala. 1984). In this case, a
hospital patient was injured during a surgical procedure when part of suturing needle used
by the surgeon broke off and remained in the patient's body. The court held that the
agreement to undergo and pay for the surgery was within Article 2, despite the
overwhelming service component, for the transparent purpose of accessing the implied
warranty of merchantability found in Article 2. See Skelton, 459 So.2d at 821-22. Under this
reasoning, a lawyer who prepares a written contract for a client is also engaged in a sale of
goods.
50. See Fink, 745 F. Supp. at 515, stating: "A contract which predominantly involves the
sale of goods is subject to the UCC in its entirety." Does this mean the contract "in its
entirety" or the UCC "in its entirety" or both? In any case, the Fink court held that for the
particular transaction in question, Article 2 was inapplicable. Id. at 516. The cases discussed
in Part I of this article employ this all or nothing approach in applying Article 2 to software
transactions.
51. But see Robert A. Holmes, Application of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code to Computer Systems Acquisitions, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEcH. LJ. 1 (1982) (arguing
that severing the contract into goods and services components would be the better approach
for software transactions).
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Article 2 applies, not just parts of it. The case law is not always
explicit on this point. Courts that find a transaction within Article 2
usually move immediately to the particular section of the UCC they
want to apply and leave it at that. Because Article 2 is a true code,
a preemptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of an
entire field of law, whose individual sections must be interpreted
together as part of an entire statutory scheme, it follows that once
within Article 2, all of its provisions apply. That has been the
functional approach in the case law: in for an inch, in for a mile.
52
On the other hand, if a contract is outside the scope of Article 2,
then none of its provisions apply directly. However, courts are
encouraged to apply Article 2 rules by analogy, primarily to
personal property leases.5 That Article 2 is a true code is critical
for its efficient application. As a true code, a decision that a
particular transaction is within its scope brings the entire Article 2
panoply into action.
2. The Copyright Act - A Federal Scheme
Computer programs are entitled to protection under the federal
Copyright Act.M Computer programs may also contains elements
protectable under patent, trademark or trade secret laws, but this
article will restrict itself to copyright. 55
Before the current Copyright Act became effective in 1976, there
was a dual system of state common law and federal statutory
copyright.56 The current Act replaced that dual system with a single
comprehensive federal scheme.57 Section 301 preempts any state
law that creates legal or equitable rights equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights under copyright in protectable works of
52. But see the curious statement in Monetti v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 E2d 1178,
1184 (7th Cir. 1991): "We may assume that the UCC applies to this contract; but must aS of
the UCC apply? We have difficulty seeing why." Id. at 1184. Monetti involved an exclusive
distribution agreement for plastic products, and the issue was whether the court could apply
the gap-fillers in Article 2, but use the longer common law statute of frauds. Despite raising
the question, the court concluded that the action was not barred under the Article 2 statute
of frauds in any case. Id. at 1193.
53. See HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-102:4.
54. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-175 (1994). Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "computer
program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." Id. at § 101.
55. For further discussion see NIMMER, supra note 47.
56. See 1 MELVILLE B. NEMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NMMER & NMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02
(1999).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976) (describing the
former dual system as "anachronistic, uncertain, impractical and highly complicated").
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authorship. There is also subject matter preemption under the
Supremacy Clause58 to the extent that the Copyright Act occupies
the field for copyrightable works.5 9 The full range of copyright
preemption is beyond the scope of this Article. 0 For our purposes,
it is sufficient to note that state contract laws affecting
copyrightable works must by tested against the Copyright Act for
compatibility.
Section 201 affirms that copyright interests may be transferred
under state contract law.61 It is through licensing - contracts - that
copyrighted works are exploited. What the Copyright Act does as
far as contracts are concerned is two things.
First, it prevents state law from providing property rights
comparable to those in the Copyright Act under the guise of a
breach of contract action. Preemption only applies, however, when
the state right in question is "'infringed by the mere act of
reproduction, performance, distribution or display.'" 62 If an extra
58. This clause states as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, tinder the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
59. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 1.01.
60. For further discussion regarding copyright preemption generally, see Orson v.
Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the difference between
express preemption, implied or field preemption, and conflict preemption under Copyright
Act); PAuL GoLDsTEN, COPYIGHT ch. 15 (2d ed. 1998) (engaging in a detailed analysis of state
law claims that involve copyright issues to determine whether state law is preempted); 1
NIMMER & NMIMER, supra note 56, at § 1.01 (discussing federalism in the law of copyright); 2
WIILIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1093-1135 (1994) (including an account of the
legislative history of 17 U.S.C. § 301).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1994) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance . .. ."); 1HR. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976)
("Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of the parties to contract with each other and
to sue for breaches of contract."); Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999) ("In
general, state contract laws pertain to the transfer of interests under the Copyright Act.");
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 E2d 150, 153 (2nd Cir. 1968) (state law governs
interpretation of license under 1909 Act); In re CFLC, Inc. (Everex v Co. v. Cadtrak Corp.),
89 F3d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 1996) (assignment of a patent license); see generally GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 60, at § 4.4 (discussing transfers of copyright interests).
62. National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. 991 E2d 426, 431 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("Section 301 preempts only those state law rights that 'may be abridged by an act
which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights provided by federal
copyright law,'") (quoting Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F2d 693, 716 (2d Cir.
1992)). For a discussion of preemption regarding state contract rights, see I NRIIER &
NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 1.01[B][1][a] (explaining preemption as applied to breach of
contract actions).
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element is required, instead of or in addition to these acts,
preemption does not apply.6 For example, a license that authorizes
use of database software only to process internal data is not
preempted because such use does not involve any of the exclusive
rights under copyright.64 However, a state statute permitting a
software producer to enforce contract terms prohibiting the
adaptation of its software by decompilation or disassembly is
preempted by federal copyright law.
65
Second, federal law also places certain restrictions on specific
contract terms, such as a writing requirement for exclusive
licenses.66 The bulk of this article will be concerned with these
additional restrictions.
A fundamental provision of the Copyright Act, which effects both
the nature of a copyright itself and transfers of copyright interests,
is Section 202, which provides as follows:
Ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under
a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object
in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any
material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which
the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in
the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the
absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a
copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey
property rights in any material object.67
Copyright has sometimes been described as the metaphysics of the
law, and if that is true then this is its basic tenet: a copy is not a
copyright. A book is a physical copy of a separate, intangible,
copyrightable literary work; a videocassette is physical copy of a
separate, intangible, copyrightable motion picture; a compact disc
is a copy of a separate, intangible, copyrightable computer
63. National Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 431 (quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56,
at § 1.01[B][1][a]). But see Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F2d 926, 931 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("The question of whether the breach of a contract licensing or assigning a
copyright gives rise to a federal cause of action under the Copyright Act is a complex issue
in a 'murky' area."). See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between
Copyright and Contract, 45 DuKE L.J. 479 (1995).
64. National Car Rental, 991 F2d at 434 (noting also that courts have consistently held
that "copyright protection in computer software does not extend to the software's function").
65. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F2d. 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994). For further discussion of the writing requirement under
the copyright act for exclusive licenses, see infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
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program. It is almost Platonic. A physical copy is but a single
instance of an abstract, intangible idea called a copyrightable work.
The instance is not the essence. The object is not the idea. The
copy is not the copyright. The House Report puts it succinctly:
"The principle restated in section 202 is a fundamental and
important one: that copyright ownership and ownership of a
material object in which the copyrighted work is embodied are
entirely separate things."68
This is the essence of copyright. If you never get this, you never
get it right.
Section 202 also has something important to say about copyright
transfers. Under prior common law copyright, transfer of a physical
object was often presumed to transfer the common law copyright
absent a specific reservation. 9 Section 202, coupled with the
preemptive provisions of Section 301, eliminates this presumption.
The House Report says this is exactly what Congress intended to
do:
[Tihe bill would change a common law doctrine . that
authors or artists are generally presumed to transfer common
law literary property rights when they sell their manuscript or
work of art, unless those rights are specifically reserved. This
presumption would be reversed under the bill .... 0
Under Section 202, therefore, as a matter of preemptive federal
law, there can be no presumption that the sale of a material object
in itself transfers any right to use the copyrighted work." This
applies regardless of whether the transfer is an exclusive license72
or a non-exclusive license. 73
68. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
69. A chief exponent of this view was Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, Inc., 39
N.E.2d 249 (N.Y 1942), which held that an artist who sold a print master was presumed to
convey the common law copyright as well. For further discussion, see 3 NMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 56, at § 10.09[B].
70. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124. (1976).
71. E.g. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984) (purchase of
master tapes from bankruptcy trustee did not transfer non-exclusive license to manufacture
and distributor recordings); In re CFLC, Inc. (Everex v Co. v. Cadtrak Corp.), 89 F3d 673,
678 (9th Cir. 1996) (patent license).
72. See Saxon v. Blann, 968 F2d. 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[u]nder Section
202... the conveyance of 'ownership rights' to a book will not convey the copyright of the
book").
73. See Applied Information Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F Supp. 149, 153 (E.D.N.Y
1977) (noting that "[als a result of Section 202, a court interpreting a [nonexciusive software]
licensing agreement must determine ownership of the copy separately from ownership of the
copyright"); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D.
2000
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There is a qualification. Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a
copy has certain limited privileges to use the copy without
infringing the copyright, such as the "first sale" doctrine. Section
202 does not effect these privileges. What Section 202 says is that
buying a copy of a computer program gives no right to use 4 the
embodied computer program beyond the limited privileges under
the Copyright Act that go with ownership of a copy.
7 5
Compare the underlying metaphysic in the Copyright Act to that
in Article 2. In Article 2 the physical object - the goods - is
paramount. 76 The seller's essential obligation is to transfer and
deliver the goods; the buyer's, to accept and pay for them.77 The
intangible component, the abstract legal title to the goods, is an
incidental.78 Transfer and delivery of the goods alone is sufficient
to create a contract.79 Far from Platonic essences, Article 2 opts for
a distinct materialism.
3. What Happens When They Meet?
Given this difference, what exactly does it mean to say that
Article 2 applies to software transactions? Consider the customer
who enters a store to acquire a copy of LINux. What happens at the
m. 1997) (holding that the purchase of a diskette containing copyrighted clip art did not
allow downloading of the clip art onto a Web page); see generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 60,
at § 4.5.1(c).
74. This article often employs the term "use" for the more technically correct
"exercises any of the exclusive rights in Section 106 of the Copyright Act." This does not
mean any "use," such as in the patent sense. For example, using old CDs for high-tech drink
coasters, as my brother does, does not impact the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Kennedy v.
National Juvenile Detention Association, 187 F3d. 690, 695 (7th Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc
denied, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23736 (7th Cir., Sept. 24, 1999), petition for cert. filed (Dec. 20,
1999) (reading of "use" to mean all rights under copyright).
75. For example, many computer books include a CD with sample code and programs.
Copyright law would prohibit copying the code to create new programs. That is why the
books include a shrink-wrap license to enable such use, along with, of course, warranty
disclaimers. For discussion of a sample license in the popular text by Bruce J. Eckels,
Thinking in Java, and how it authorizes uses beyond those that come from purchase of a
copy, see Lorin Brennan, The Public Policy of Information Licensing, 36 Hous. L REv. 61,
124-127 (Table 13) (1999).
76. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1999), which states: "In this Article unless the context
otherwise requires 'contract' and 'agreement' are limited to those relating to the present or
future sale of goods."
77. See U.C.C. § 2-301 (1999); for further discussion, see infra notes 178-84 and
accompanying text.
78. See U.C.C. § 2-401 (1999); for further discussion, see infra notes 246-48 and
accompanying text.
79. See U.C.C. H8 2-203, 2-206 (1999); for further discussion, see infra notes 277-85 and
accompanying text.
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cash register? There are three possibilities.
The first possibility is that there are two separate contracts: one
for the sale of a copy, and another for the grant of a license. This
hardly seems appropriate. Although Section 202 requires different
obligations for the copy and the copyright, it does not require
different contracts. It would be curious if it did. The customer does
pay a single price. In the goods world, a buyer does not pay one
price for a toaster and another for the box. In a software
transaction, the CD is the container for the embodied computer
program. Indeed, the cost of a blank CD is insignificant compared
to the value of the computer program. Allocating the price between
the copyright interest in the computer program and the pennies it
cost for a CD would be silly.
The second possibility is that only one contract exists, and it is
governed by Article 2. That is, the transaction is predominately a
sale of goods. But that means that the copyright aspects of the
transaction are completely suppressed so that only what happens
to the copies counts. This is precisely what Section 202 tells us we
cannot do. In the case of LINUX, it would mean ignoring the GNU
Public License; but without the license, any sale of the copy is
unauthorized and users of LINUX would become infringers. The
other response is to acknowledge that the sale and the license are
separate, but to assume that Article 2 applies to the license as well.
In other words, the default rules in Article 2 are also appropriate
for a license of intangibles. Many courts and commentators have in
effect opted for this approach, saying that the license is really a
sale of goods and then trying to shoehorn software transactions
into the Article 2 model. The bulk of this Article will show why this
subterfuge is inappropriate.
The third possibility, the only one left, is that there is only one
contract and it is governed by the common law of contracts,
unless, of course, a state adopts UCITA. Common law has more
formalities and far fewer gap fillers than Article 2, so it is less
tolerant of mistakes. On the other hand, the common law's
comparative brevity also allows a wider range of dealings, and
easily accommodates contracts with severable obligations. We. will
return to the question of the proper law to apply to software
transactions after dispensing with Article 2.
B. Article 2 vs. the Copyright Act
This Article now examines, section by section, the default rules
in Article 2 to see if they are compatible with the Copyright Act.
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We begin with the substantive provisions, and then return to the
definitions of "good" and "contract of sale." In so doing, however, it
is important to understand exactly what this exercise is attempting
to show, and what it is not.
I am not arguing that the Copyright Act preempts all contracting
with regard to computer programs. Nor am I arguing, as some do,
that the Copyright Act prevents software vendors from licensing
computers programs in the mass market and restricts them solely
to selling copies. And I am definitely not arguing that the Copyright
Act creates a mandatory collage of "user's rights" that cannot be
varied by agreement. What I am addressing is whether the default
rules in Article 2 are compatible with the requirements of the
Copyright Act in the absence of party agreement. In a few cases,
the Copyright Act imposes mandatory rules that cannot be varied
by agreement, such as a writing requirement for exclusive licenses.
In most cases, however, the Copyright Act contains what are in
effect default rules that parties can vary in appropriate
circumstances, such as the right of a software vendor to control
the rental of copies80 The issue is whether the gap-fillers imposed
by Article 2 in the absence of agreement fit within the requirements
of the Copyright Act.
Article 2 is considered a true code: a preemptive, systematic and
comprehensive enactment of an entire field of law. It is a complex,
interwoven structure that must be interpreted as a whole. The
point of this Article is to show that key default rules creating this
structure are not compatible with the Copyright Act when applied
to software transactions. These include such major conceptual
underpinnings as creating a contract by shipping the goods,
mandatory passage of title, implied security interests, and
inspection rights. This does not say that all defaults in Article 2 are
inapplicable to software transactions. Gap-fillers for payment by
cash or check, risk of loss to copies, and damages for breach of
contract are appropriate. However, without the key foundational
props, the structure no longer stands as an integrated whole. Like a
bridge with the struts kicked out, it no longer stands up but
80. For proponents of this view, see, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract
Law - What Law Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 Hous. L REv. 1 (1999); Maureen
A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market Based Approach, 12
BERKELEY TECH. W. 53, 80 (1997). But see, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Legal-ware: Contract and
Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L REV. 1025 (1999); Note, Intellectual Property,
Contracts and Reverse Engineering After ProCD: A Proposed Compromise For Computer
Software, 67 FORDHAM L REV. 3297 (1999) (discussing different approaches).
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collapses into a jumble of disconnected statutes that undercuts the
entire purpose of Article 2 as a true code.
1. Statute of Frauds
a. Article 2
Article 2-201 contains the UCC's statute of frauds.8' It provides
that a contract for the sale of goods for $500 or more is not
enforceable without a writing that indicates a contract has been
made, signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.
Article 2-201(3) contains three traditional exceptions to the writing
requirement: specially manufactured goods,82 admissions in legal
proceedings,83 and part performance by payment or delivery.84
b. Copyright Act
Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act contains its own writing
requirement where copyright transfers are concerned:
A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of
law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note
or memorandum of such transfer, is in writing and signed by
the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly
authorized agentm
Under the Copyright Act, a "transfer of copyright ownership"
includes an assignment, an exclusive license or a mortgage, but not
a non-exclusive license.8 These must be examined separately.
For exclusive licenses, the writing requirement in Section 204(a)
preempts state law. 7 Section 204(a) differs materially from state
statutes of fraud in that it makes unwritten copyright ownership
transfers "not valid" rather than merely "unenforceable."88
Moreover, the three traditional exceptions to the writing
requirement in Article 2 are not available where transfers of
copyright ownership are concerned. Specially manufactured goods
81. See generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-201.
82. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(a) (1999).
83. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b) (1999).
84. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (1999).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
87. See Konigsberg International v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994); 1 NMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 1.01[B][3][a].
88. Koningsberg, 16 F3d at 357.
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are akin to specially commissioned works-made-for-hire, which
require a writing for the copyright to vest in the commissioning
party.89 Admissions in the course of litigation are not sufficient if
the writing was not executed "substantially contemporaneous" with
the agreement of transfer.90 Finally, part performance, even full
payment by the licensee, is not sufficient to satisfy Section 204(a);
a written instrument of transfer is still required.91 However, a later
executed writing may validate a prior oral exclusive license,
92
especially if there is no dispute a transfer occurred and the writing
is necessary to confer standing on a licensee to pursue an
infringer.
93
Regarding non-exclusive licenses, there is some question as to
whether Section 204(a) permits states to impose a writing
requirement. One view is that, because non-exclusive licenses are
not mentioned in Section 204(a), Congress left the matter open for
the states to decide. The Second and Third Circuits have taken this
approach, holding that a state statute of frauds applies to
non-exclusive licenses. 94 The other view is that Congress, by saying
89. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work-made-for-hire"); see Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); Library Publications, Inc. v. Medical Economics,
Co., 548 E Supp 1231 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 714 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1983). Section 101
recognizes two types of works for hire: those made by an employee in the course of
employment; and for certain types of works, specially commissioned works. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994). Computer programs are not among the enumerated works for which specially
commissioned work-for-hire status is available. Id.
90. Koningsberg, 16 F.3d at 357. Konigsberg held that a letter sent by an author during
litigation claiming full performance of an unsigned exclusive license was insufficient because
it was not executed "substantially contemporaneous" with the transfer. What the Ninth
Circuit undoubtedly meant was that an alternative defense made in the context of litigation
by arguing that even if a license was validly granted, the licensee is in material breach, is not
a "note or memorandum of ... transfer" for purposes of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §
204(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
91. Konigsberg, 16 E3d at 357.
92. See Imperial Residential Design, Inc. v. Palms Dev. Group, 70 F3d. 96, 99 (11th
Cir.1995) (holding that a later writing validated an oral transfer ad initio); Arthur Rutenberg
Homes v. Drew Homes, Inc., 29 F.3d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1994); Valente-Kritzer Video v.
Pinckney, 881 F.2d. 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1989); see generally NEIL BooRsTYN, BooRsTY ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.14 (1999).
93. See Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1429 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing Konigsberg on this point); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697
F2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982); see generally BOonsTYN, supra note 92, at § 8.14.
94. See Grappo v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, 56 F3d 427 (2d Cir. 1995); Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 E2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys
Corp., 925 F2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991). See also Systems Design & Management Info., Inc. v.
Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (applying
the Article 2 statute of frauds to a non-exclusive license under Kansas law); Myers v. Waverly
Fabrics, 475 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1st Dept. 1984), modified, 479 N.E.2d 236 (N.Y. 1985) (same under
New York law).
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nothing, intended that there be no writing requirement for
non-exclusive licenses. There has been some argument for this
view,95 and several cases in other circuits have enforced oral,
non-exclusive licenses without reference to statute statutes of
fraud. 96 The issue is not academic. The Second and Third Circuits
have held the applicable state statute of frauds to be the one in
Article 2-201. Indeed, one of the reasons the Third Circuit justified
applying Article 2 to a non-exclusive software license was precisely
because it thought a single statute of the frauds should apply to the
entire transaction, a point we will return to below.
97
I suggest the correct result is that a state statute of frauds can
apply to a non-exclusive copyright license, just not the statute of
frauds found in Article 2-201.
98
Although several cases have held that a non-exclusive license can
be oral under federal law, none have held that a state statute of
frauds cannot apply to a non-exclusive license. A trenchant
example is Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen.99 When Larry Cohen, a
movie producer, declined to pay the full freight for special effects
of an alien ooze disguised as frozen yogurt, the effects house
sought to enjoin distribution of the movie for copyright
infringement. 100 Not wishing to deprive an eager public of The Stuff,
the court decided that, although there was no exclusive license
because no writing was signed, this was really a dispute about
95. E.g., 3 NIMMER & NINMER, supra note 56, at § 10.03[A][7] (arguing by "negative
implication" that a non-exclusive license does not require a writing), and at § 10.03[A][8]
(cautioning that state law cannot disrupt the federal scheme). See also Lulirama, Ltd. v.
Axcess Broadcast Services, 128 E3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing NiMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 56, at § 10.03[A]). Whether Section 204(a) preempts a state writing requirement as a
matter of federal policy is one thing. But claiming that this must follow by "negative
implication" is a logical fallacy, as Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert explains in his classic work,
Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking. "The proposition that 'A implies B' is
not the equivalent of 'non-A implies non-B,' and neither proposition follows logically from
the other. The process of inferring one from the other is known as 'the fallacy of denying the
antecedent.'" RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LoGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 158
(3d ed. 1997) (citing J. COOLEY, A PRIMER OF FORMAL Logic 7 (1942)).
From the requirement that an exclusive copyright license must be in writing, it does not
logically follow that a non-exclusive license may not be in writing in any circumstance.
96. See Lulirama, 128 F.3d at 879; I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir.
1996); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veek, 110 F.3d 749, 752 (11th Cir. 1997); Effects Associates, Inc.
v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
97. See infra notes 437-60 and accompanying text.
98. But see AucEs & SEE, supra note 14, at § 11.2.1 (arguing that a state statute of
frauds can apply to a nonexclusive copyright license, and claiming it should be the statute of
frauds found in Article 2-201).
99. 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).
100. Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 561.
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payment, and thus found a non-exclusive license to avoid the
infringement claim.10 1 The coirt, which was only thinking copyright,
called it a day by noting that under Section 204(a) there is no
writing requirement for non-exclusive licenses.102 Had it gone the
next step, it would undoubtedly have concluded that although there
might be a writing requirement under state law, part performance
satisfied the usual exception. 1°3
Indeed, Holtzbrinck Publishing Holdings v. Vyne
Communications, Inc.,104 reached just this result when considering
a nonexclusive license to develop a web page.10 5 It held that the
New York general law statute of frauds applied, not the one in
Article 2, but found that the traditional part performance exception
to the statute of frauds was satisfied.
10 6
2. Contract by Shipment of Goods
a. Article 2
Under Article 2, a contract can be formed by conduct. 07 In
particular, under Article 2-206(1)(b), a shipment of conforming
goods, or promise to ship them, in response to a "rush order" is a
valid acceptance. 08 This rule eliminates an old problem with the
so-called "unilateral contract." Assume a buyer makes an order for
immediate delivery. What response is appropriate, shipment (a
performance) or a confirmation of shipment (a promise)? At
common law, if a contract called for a performance (a "unilateral
101. Id.
102. Id. at 563.
103. I suggest that what these decisions really meant to say was something like this:
"Well, Mr. Defendant, you tried to make an exclusive license but failed. Too bad. On the
other hand, Mr. Plaintiff, you have not been a paragon of virtue. We must of course deny the
defendant an exclusive license, but if we leave it there the defendant becomes a copyright
infringer. That is too much in this case. To prevent that, we are going to hold that the
defendant has a non-exclusive license. The Copyright Act does not require a writing for a
non-exclusive license, so we can always say this is what Yiou 'really' meant to do, if you
pardon our wink. What? You say state law requires a writing for a non-exclusive license too?
Perhaps you misunderstood. A non-exclusive license is really no more than a waiver of a
right to sue. This is not the type of 'contract' usually covered by a state statute of frauds,
and even if it is, the statute of frauds can be waived, and your conduct has indeed waived it.
Next case."
104. 2000 WL 502860 (S.D.N.Y)
105. Holtzbrinck Publ'g, 2000WL at *1
106. Id. at 11.
107. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1999).
108. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1999).
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contract"), only a performance would do. This could lead to
obvious injustice if the offer was withdrawn after performance
started but before it was complete. 1°9 When faced with this issue,
Article 2-206(1)(a) now answers "either one." Promise or perform,
either one will do, unless, of course, "otherwise indicated . . . by
language or circumstances."'10
b. Copyright Act
That shipment can create a contract of sale works fine in Article
2. Not so for copyrights. The idea that mere delivery of a copy
makes a contract to transfer a copyright interest was a
presumption for common law copyrights. Section 202 of the
Copyright Act obliterates the common law presumption: "[t]ransfer
of ownership of any material object . . . does not of itself convey
any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object.""' Thus,
the conveyance of ownership rights to a book along with delivery
of the original manuscript does not transfer the copyright of the
book."2 The purchase of a master recording does not allow use of
the master to make copies for further sale.1 3 Buying a copy of a
CD containing clip art gives no license to download the clip art
onto the buyer's Web page. 411  Buying sweaters does not grant any
right to reproduce their copyrighted designs.15 Paying to have a
videotap6 made of a concert grants no copyright in the resulting
videotape." 6  Shipment of copies - goods - conforming or
non-conforming, for immediate delivery or not, does not of itself
transfer any interest, exclusive or non-exclusive, in a copyright." 7
109. See generally QuiNN,.supra note 28, at 2-206[A][3]. One way around this problem
was to presume the contract was bilateral in case of doubt. E.g., Davis v. Jacoby, 34 P.2d
1026, 1030 (Cal. 1934) (noting thato'the cases clearly indicate a tendency to treat offers as
offers of bilateral rather than unilateral cohtracts"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 32
(1981) (stating that in case of doubt, an offer should be interpreted as inviting either a
performance or a promise as the offeree chooses).
110. U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1999).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
112. See Saxon v. Blann, 968 F2d. 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1992).
113. See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984).
114. See Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire -Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1168
(N.D. I11. 1997).
115. See Design Options, Inc. v. Bellepointe, Inc. 940 F. Supp. 86, 91 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
116. See Quintanila v. Texas Television, Inc., 139 F3d 494 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
Forward v. Thorogood, 758 F Supp. 782, 784 n.3 (D. Mass. 1991), affd, 985 F2d 604 (1st Cir.
1993) (authorizing a fan to make a copy of a musical performance did not transfer copyright
in the tapes under the 1909 Copyright Act); but see Lulirama, 128 E3d at 883 (allowing a
nonexclusive license to use radio jingles created under an oral contract).
117. Of course, as mentioned above, the owner of a copy may have certain privileges
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At this point, we need to discuss the curious doctrine of the
"implied license." In some cases, the defendant's conduct, while
perhaps over the line, does not warrant bringing down the full
wrath of the Copyright Act. So courts use the implied license
rubric to excuse or mitigate the effects of the defendant's conduct.
Fair enough. That is what courts do. The issue is whether state
statutory law can mandate an implied license in all cases of
shipment of a copy. I suggest that the answer is "no" for reasons
both legal and practical.
First, there is the not insignificant problem of legal authority. An
implied license is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement,
and federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such actions."8
It is doubtful whether state law can mandate a federal court to
recognize an implied license defense whenever there is delivery of
a copy, come what may. An implied license is fact-specific. Transfer
of a material object may be some evidence that the parties
intended one," 9 but due to Section 202, it is not dispositive. Indeed,
the cases have denied an implied license as often as they have
found one, even with delivery of a copy. 20
The second problem is practical: often the provider of the copy
is not the owner of the copyright. A record store may sell records,
to use the copy in a manner that does not infringe the copyright, such as the "first sale"
doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1999), and there may be certain privileges to use the work,
such as "fair use," see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1999). The point is that the mere acquisition of the
copy does not in itself grant any interest in the copyright beyond the designated privileges in
the Copyright Act.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994); see 3 NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 12.01[A][1].
119. See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 555. But see ALCES & SEE, supra note 14, at §
11.2.2 (arguing that Effects Associates duly applied industry custom and practice to find a
license). The issue, however, is not whether a court may find an implied license from
conduct in some cases, but whether state law can mand'ate one in all cases.
120. Cases finding an implied license include: Luirama, 128 F3d at 882-83 (radio
jingles); I.A.E., 74 F.3d at 775-77 (architectural plans); Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 559
(special effects); Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1984) (magazine articles); Keane
Dealer Serv., Inc. v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (software); Ladas v. Potpourri
Press, Inc., 846 F Supp. 221, 225-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (artwork); Pamfiloff v. Giant Records,
Inc., 794 F. Supp 933, 938-39 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (music); Silva v. MacLaine, 697 F Supp. 1423,
1430 (E.D. Mich. 1988), affd, 888 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1989) (book).
Cases denying an implied license include: Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 E3d 1107, 1113
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a license authorizing the creation and distribution "for free" of
new game levels did not give an implied license to distribute them for a fee); Johnson v.
Jones, 149 F3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998) (architectural plans); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the
Month Club, 13 F Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Il 1998) (holding that placing shareware on the Internet
did not give an implied license to redistribute for a fee); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M.
Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 779 (3d Cir. 1991) (software); Design Options,
Inc. v. Bellepointe, Inc., 940 F Supp. 86, 92-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (fabric designs); Allen-Myland,
Inc. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 549-50 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (software).
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but that does not mean it owns the copyright in the embodied
music or sound recordings. Walnut Creek may sell copies of LINUX,
but it does not own the LINuX copyright. The fact that the copyright
owner has consented to so some mass distribution of copies under
some circumstances does not imply that the copyright owner has
consented to every distribution. State law cannot imply that
delivery of a copy occurs with the consent of the copyright owner,
as this could abrogate the copyright owner's exclusive distribution
right in Section 106(3).
Article 2 may imply that the shipment of goods creates a
contract of sale. The Copyright Act does not prevent that. It merely
prevents state law from automatically presuming such an
agreement from the mere delivery of a copy.
121
3. Contract Where Writings Conflict
a. Article 2
In the best of all possible legal worlds, contracting parties sit
down around the proverbial bargaining table, their lawyers
fluttering about, and painstakingly reduce their agreement to a fully
integrated - and duly executed -. written contract. In the real
world it does not always happen that way. The press of business
intervenes. Standard forms pass in the night, and busy people get
on with making shipments and cutting checks. When a problem
erupts, they suddenly discover that those pretty standard forms
that they paid so much for were not enough to satisfy the legal
niceties for making a "contract" after all. But everyone sure acted
like they did.
To this not uncommon situation, the UCC proposes a solution.
Article 2-207(3) provides that where the conduct of both parties
recognizes a contract even if the writings do not, then a contract
does in fact exist. But what are its terms? Article 2-207(3)
determines them using what is often called a "knock-out" nile.122
The terms of the contract are those where the writings agree;
conflicting provisions are ignored and the remaining terms are
121. Compare UC1TA § 203(2) providing that an offer to acquire a copy invites
acceptance of that order by prompt shipment, but not forming a license by so doing. UCITA
applies to contracts where a software publisher elects to sell a copy and rely solely on
copyright privileges, e.g. sale of a videogame cartridge. UGITA § 103(b)(1)(B). This inclusion
of this provision, duly limited to this later case, is appropriate.
122. See HAWKLAID, supra note 24, at § 2-207:4.
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supplied by the UCC gap-fillers. As Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc.
v. Krack Corp.'23 explained:
At common law, the offeree/counterofferor gets all of its terms
simply because it fired the last shot in the exchange of forms.
Section 207(3) does away with this result by giving neither
party the terms it attempted to impose unilaterally on the
other.... Instead, all the terms on which the parties' forms do
not agree drop out, and the U.C.C. supplied the missing
terms. 124
b. Copyright Act
The Copyright Act rejects a "knock-out" rule where assignments
and exclusive licenses are concerned. Even if the parties have
fulfilled all of the prerequisites for a valid oral agreement, with full
or partial performance, there can be no valid transfer of copyright
ownership unless the writings indicate a proper transfer.125 If the
parties intend to make an exclusive license and the writings are
insufficient, the usual result is simply no contract at all, regardless
of conduct. For example, in Konigsberg International v. Rice,'26 a
movie producer negotiated for an exclusive license to produce a
motion picture based on Ann Rice's best selling book, The Mummy.
Ms. Rice negotiated over the terms of the license and even cashed
the check, but without her signature there was no valid contract.'27
This result follows directly from Section 204(a). Its writing
requirement ensures that "the creator of a work will not give away
123. 794 F2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. Diamond Fruit Growers, 794 F2d at 1444 (citation omitted).
125. See Konigsberg, 16 F.3d at 355; see also Quintanilla v. Texas Television, Inc., 139
F3d 494 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a purported oral transfer of copyright ownership in a
videotape was invalid); Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d. 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that despite performance, oral agreement for an exclusive license was invalid where
writings did not establish license terms); Tine, Inc. v. Kastner, 972 F. Supp. 236, 239 (S.D.
N.Y 1997) (holding that an oral agreement to transfer "motion picture and allied rights" in a
magazine article was invalid despite the payment of $5,000); Mellencamp v. Riva Music, Ltd.
698 F. Supp. 1154, 1167 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (holding that an oral agreement to transfer
copyrights in songs was invalid where writings did not indicate agreement).
126. 16 E3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994).
127. Konigsberg, 16 F.3d at 358-60. Similarly, in Pickney, a video producer negotiated
with an author for an exclusive license to create and distribute videos based on her best
selling book. Pickney, 881 F2d. at 775. Despite an exchange of contract drafts, and part
performance by the producer, the correspondence and accompanying draft agreements were
held to fail to memorialize the oral agreement. Id. An exchange of draft agreements and part
performance also failed to make an exclusive license in MeUencamp, 698 F Supp. at 1167.
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his copyright inadvertently and forces a party who wants to use the
copyrighted work to negotiate with the creator to determine
precisely what rights are being transferred at what price" which
"enhances predictability and certainty of copyright ownership -
'Congress' paramount goal.'" 12 The result is the same for specially
commissioned works made for hire.
129
Of course, where parties try to make an exclusive license and
fail, a federal court may imply a non-exclusive license to exploit
the work. 30 However, the terms of such an implied license are
emphatically not those that would arise from a "knock-out" rule.
Consider Oddo v. Ries,131 which involved an agreement between a
writer and marketer to write a how-to manual incorporating
magazine articles previously published by the writer. When the
marketer decided to hire another writer, there was an implied
license to use the magazine articles, because the original author
had certainly intended them to be used, but not to revise the
original writer's work. 32 Similarly, in MacLean Associates, Inc. v.
Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., ', a programmer's delivery
of a copy of software to a former employer without restriction
evidenced an implied license to use the software for internal use,
but not to license it to third parties.'-" None of these cases created
a contract on the terms where the writings agreed and elsewhere
on the terms of the Article 2 default rules.135 Parties may expressly
agree or demonstrate by conduct that they have agreed to a license
on some terms. State law, however, cannot use a knock-out rule to
dictate the default terms in all cases of botched writings.136
128. Effects Assocs., 908 F2d at 557.
129. See Committee for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 730.
130. See supra notes 85-106 and accompanying text; see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 56, at § 10.03[AI[7].
131. 743 E2d 630 (9th Cir. 1984).
132. Oddo, 743 F.2d at 634.
133. 952 F2d 769 (3d Cir. 1991).
134. MacLean Assocs., 952 F.2d at 779.
135. See McCoy'v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("An
implied [patent] license, however, must not exceed the limits necessary to make the contract
effective.").
136. Compare U.C.IT.A § 210 (1999) (rejecting a "knock-out" rule for contracts formed





The UCC rejects the conveyancer's obsession with punctilious
parsing of the written word as the sole source of contractual
obligations. Instead Article 2-208 provides that contracts are to be
interpreted by merchant standards reflected by what the parties
said as well as what they did.13 7 The agreement of the parties
means more than just the written words. It means their bargain in
fact, as found in their language, or by implication from other
circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing,
and usage of trade.138 The contract is then the total legal obligation
that results from the agreement.
1 39
b. Copyright Act
State rules of construction apply only to the extent that they are
consistent with Copyright Act policies.14 If federal policies would
lead to a different interpretation of a license, then the state rules
must give way. The federal policy of protecting authors means that
a copyright license prohibits any uses not authorized, preempting
contrary state law rules of interpretation against the drafter.
14'
One area where federal copyright law takes precedence is
determining the "scope" of a license, as opposed to a "contractual
use restriction."142 Exceeding the scope of a license is a copyright
infringement, whereas violating a use restriction is breach of
contract. 143 Scope deals with the specific boundaries of the rights
granted in the protected work as "limited in time, place or
effect,"' 44 while a use restriction deals with the exercise of the
137. See QUiNN, supra note 28, at 2-208.
138. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1999).
139. See U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1999).
140. See Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988); Fantastic
Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick International, Inc., 661 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1981).
141. See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) ("We can rely on
state law to provide the canons of contractual construction, but only to the extent such rules
do not interfere with federal copyright law or policy.").
142. See S.O.S., 886 F2d at 1089.
143. See Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp, 188 F3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). If the
licensor cancels the license for material breach, further use becomes an infringement.
Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F2d 926, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1992).
144. This comes from the definition of "transfer of copyright ownership" in Section 101
of the Copyright Act, which provides that such a transfer may be "limited in time, place or
effect." See, e.g. U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Communications, 936 E2d 692 (2d Cir. 1991)
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rights within these boundaries.
Several cases illustrate the difference. For example, Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.145 involved a license of the
Java programming language that contained a broad grant of rights
to create adaptations, and a separate provision requiring the
adaptations to be compatible with Sun's Java standards. The right
to create adaptations (derivative works) is one of the rights
reserved to the copyright owner,146 so the first step was met. The
remaining question was whether the compatibility requirement
limited the scope of the adaptation right granted, which would have
justified a preliminary injunction to prevent infringement, or was
merely contractual use restriction, which would not. The case was
remanded to evaluate the contractual intent.
147
Similarly, in S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.,1u a licensee who
created and marketed a modified version of a software accounting
system exceeded the scope of the license where the license did not
authorize such conduct. 49 Other the other hand, in National Car
Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International, Inc.,' °
the software provider only licensed use of its database program for
processing the licensee's own internal data. Processing the data of
other companies violated the use restriction but was not an
infringement because it did not involve one of the exclusive rights
under Section 106.151 In any case, the scope of a copyright license
is a question of federal law, not state law. 52
(addressing the time when exclusive license began); Video Views Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925
F2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1990) (addressing place as defined in the phrase "adult motion picture
arcade facilities"); Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 809 F2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that a broadcast station's acquisition of syndicated exclusivity rights in
local ielevision markets was a transfer of ownership); Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner
Entertainment Co., 926 F Supp. 40, 42 n.6 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (providing the plaintiff with an
exclusive license that "though limited in time and place of effect, constitutes a transfer of
copyright [to plaintiff] as defined in the Copyright Act").
145. 188 F3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
147. Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1123.
148. 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
149. S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1089.
150. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
151. Nat'l Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 427-32. See also U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter
Communications, Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 695-96 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the early release of a
book violated a contractual restriction but was not an infringement where the license term
started on the agreement's execution date).
152. See S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1088. Compare U.C.I.T.A § 105(a) (1999) (express deferral
to preemptive federal law) and U.C.I.TA. § 307 (1999) (generally adopting federal nlles for
interpretation of grants).
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5. Assignment of Rights and Obligations
a. Article 2
Article 2-210(2) contains the default rule that "all rights of either
seller or buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would
materially change the duty of the other party, or increase materially
the burden or risk imposed on him by the contract, or impair
materially his chance of obtaining a return performance."' Of
course, the parties can change this rule by agreement. But this
provision recognizes that, in general, the assignability of rights is a
"normal and permissible incident" of the sale of goods.1 4
b. Copyright Act
It is otherwise for copyrights. Copyright law places specific limits
on the transferability of a license, and provides certain rules for
transfer of a copy. To understand these rules, we again follow the
admonition in Section 202 to distinguish the copy from the
copyright; transfer of the copyright interest must be examined
separately from transfer ,of a copy.
Regarding transfer of copyright interest, an exclusive license is a
"transfer of ownership" and as such is assignable absent
contractual restrictions. 15 5 A non-exclusive license, however, being
personal to the licensee, is not assignable without consent of the
licensor.156 This rule is a matter of federal intellectual property law,
which preempts state law transferability rules.15 7 It has been the
rule for close to a century under both the current and the prior
copyright acts. ia A licensor may of course agree that a
153. U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (1999).
154. U.C.C. § 2-210 cmt. 1 (1999). See also Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. O.R. Concepts,
Inc., 869 F Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (assignment of distributorship to sell health care
products); HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-210:1.
155. See In re Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1997) (citing
I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 E3d 768, 774-75 (7th Cir. 1996)); see generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 56, at § 10.02[B][4].
156. See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
a non-exclusive master use license was not assignable in bankruptcy); In re Patient Educ.
Media, 210 B.R. at 242-43 (holding that a non-exclusive license for a patent was not
transferable in bankruptcy); In re CFLC, Inc. (Everex v. Cadrak) 89 F3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a nonexclusive patent license was not transferable in bankruptcy); see
generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at §§ 10.01[C][4], 10.02[B][4].
157. See Harris, 734 F2d at 1334.
158. See Neva, Inc. v. Christian Duplications Int'l, Inc.,743 F Supp. 1533,. 1546 (M.D.
Fla. 1990) (holding that a nonexclusive license to use recordings was not assignable under
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non-exclusive license is transferable. State law, however, cannot
imply such agreement as a "gap-filler" merely from the licensor's
silence.
Regarding transfer of a copy, Section 106(3) gives the copyright
owner the exclusive right to authorize the public distribution of
copies of a copyrighted work by sale, lease rental or other
disposition. However, there are three noteworthy exceptions to this
exclusive right: the "first sale" doctrine in Section 109; the
computer use privilege in Section 117; and the nonprofit library
privilege in Section 108.
The first sale doctrine in Section 109 provides that a lawful sale
of a copy "exhausts" the exclusive distribution right for that copy,
so its further sale or transfer is not a copyright infringement.159 But
there are limits on the doctrine. First, the original sale must be
authorized by the copyright owner.160 Second, it only extends to the
owner of the copy, not to someone who merely acquires possession
of it. 161 Third, it only effects the distribution right, not the other
exclusive rights. 162 Thus, a lawful owner of a DVD may resell the
DVD (distribution right) without infringement, but may not allow
broadcast of the motion picture embodied on the DVD (public
performance right). In the case of LINUX, the license authorizes the
recipient of a copy to make further copies (reproduction right) to
prepare enhancements to the program (adaptation rights) and to
distribute those new copies (distribution right). The first sale
doctrine does not authorize this additional conduct merely from
acquiring ownership of the first copy. Doing so without an
enforceable license would be an infringement.
There is an exception to the first sale doctrine where computer
programs are concerned: the software rental right. In 1990,
Congress amended Section 109 to allow the owner of a computer
program to restrict rental of a copy even after a first sale.'6 This
the 1909 Copyright Act); see generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 10.01[CI[4].
159. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). See generally 2 NnMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at §
8.12; BooRsTYN, supra note 92, at § 6.03.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994) ("a copy lawfully made").
161. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) & (d) (1994).
162. See Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F Supp. 86, 91 (S.D. N.Y 1996)
(first sale doctrine does not authorize reproduction); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741, 744 (N.D. IlM. 1983) (or adaptation); Red-Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp.,
883 F.2d 59, 64 (or public performance); see generally 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at
§ 8.12[D].
163. Computer Software Rental Amendment of 1990, Pub. Law No. 101-650, Sec. 801,
104 Stat. 5089 codified 17 U.S.C. § 109(b).
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was enacted because of fear that the ease of copying of computer
programs would lead to wide scale piracy without restrictions on
rental. This rental right has been held to preempt state law
contracting rules to the contrary.'1
The second exception is the computer use privilege accorded in
Section 117. Under this section, the owner of a copy of the
computer program may make a new copy or adaptation of a
computer program "as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program in conjunction with a machine."' 65 Exact copies
made under this section may be leased, sold or otherwise
transferred but only with the original copy and as part of the
transfer of all of the original owner's rights in the computer
program.1' Note that this in effect operates as a limitation on -the
"first sale" privilege that would otherwise exist for the owner of an
authorized copy, since an "exact copy" made in conformity with
Section 117 may only be transferred under these conditions.
1 7
A third exception exists for nonprofit libraries. They are
exempted from the computer software rental rightM because a
separate provision, Section 108, allows nonprofit libraries to make
and distribute copies of copyrighted works under certain conditions
without infringing a copyright, including digital copies of computer
programs. 169
164. See Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Brenengen, 928 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. N.C. 1996)
(post-1990 rental of software prohibited); Central Point Software v. Global Software &
Access, 880 F. Supp. 957, 965 (E.D. N.Y 1995). A like restriction applies to the rental of
phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994); A&M Records v. A.LW., Ltd., 855 F2d.
368 (7th Cir. 1988) (record rentals disguised as buy-back plan prohibited); see generally
BooRryN, supra note 92, at § 6.21. The rental right does not abrogate applicable antitrust
laws. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(4) (1994).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (1994); see DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse
Communications, 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999), (holding
that section 117 applies only to the owner of a copy of a computer program, not to one with
mere possession); Allen-Myland v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 536-37 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (holding that section 117 did not authorize the use of microcode where the copy was
not lawfully acquired); but see Syngeristic Technologies v. IDB Mobil Communications, 871 F.
Supp. 24, 29 (D. D.C. 1994) (adaptation allowed because party was owner of a copy of the
program). See generally 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 8.08; BOORSTYN, supra note
92, at § 6.11. Section 117(a)(2) also authorizes making copies for archival purposes. Title IIl
of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28., 1998) added
new subsections (c) and (d), allowing the making of a copy for maintenance and repair. The
purpose was to reverse the effect of the decision in Mal Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
991 F2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 117(b) (1994); see generally BooRswTN, supra note 92, at § 6.1113].
167. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 8.08[B][3] so arguing.
168. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(a) (1994).
169. As originally enacted, Section 108 allowed nonprofit libraries to make
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These exceptions can be modified by contract in appropriate
cases. For example, the first sale doctrine and the computer use
privilege only run in favor of the lawful owner of a copy. Nothing
in the Copyright Act mandates that a software licensor must sell
copies, even in the mass market. By the same token, nothing in
state law mandates sale-only either; indeed Article 2A of the UCC
deals with leases of personal property where no sale occurs. As the
Federal Circuit observed in DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse
Communications,70 contractual restrictions on the ownership and
use of a copy which vitiate the Section 117 privilege are
enforceable.171 The same applies to the nonprofit library privilege.
In Section 108(f)(4), Congress explicitly said so: "Nothing in this
section . . . in any way affects . . . any contractual obligation
assumed at any time by the library or archives when it obtained a
copy of a work . . . in its permanent collections."172 Nonprofit
libraries often acquire manuscripts and other works under
conditions that restrict their access and use, such as private papers
made available for limited research only. Congress provided that
contractual undertakings of libraries are not effected by Section
108 to prevent the drying up of this valuable resource. 173
reproductions in "facsimile" (not digital) format solely for purposes of preservation, security
or research. In Section 404 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998), Congress amended 17 U.S.C. § 108 to allow reproductions in
digital format. For further discussion see 2 N4MnER & NMmER, supra note 56, at § 8.03;
BooeRY=, supra not 92, at § 6.06. Section 108 does not affect any fair use privilege a
nonprofit library may have under Section 107. 17 U.S.C § 108(f)(4) (1994); see generalty
WILLAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVMEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW ch. 13 (2d ed. 1995).
170. 170 F3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
171. DSC Communications Corp, 170 E3d at 1360.
172. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (1994).
173. See HR. REP. No. 94-1476, at 77 (1976), stating as follows:
Clause (4) [of Section 108(0] provides that the right of reproduction granted by this
section does not override any contractual arrangements assumed by a library or
archives when it obtained a work for its collections. For example, if there is an
express contractual prohibition against reproduction for any purpose, this legislation
shall not be construed as justifying a violation of the contract. This clause is intended
to encompass the situation where an individual makes papers, manuscripts or other
works available to a library with the understanding that they will not be reproduced.
Id. Courts have been quite willing to enforce library access agreements according to their
terms. See, e.g., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 E2d 731, 741 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
an agreement restricting library access and uses was valid but was not breached by
paraphrasing limited excerpts); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37 F.3d. 881, 899
(2d Cir. 1994) (stating that "the very fact that Congress restricted the rights of libraries to
make copies implicitly suggests that Congress views journal publishers as possessing the
right to restrict photocopying, or at least the right to demand a licensing royalty from
nonpublic institutions that engage in photocopying"). The amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 108 in
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act did not affect § 108(0(4). The extent to which a
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How do these rules apply to software transactions? Assume a
licensee acquires a copy of a copyrighted database program under
a non-exclusive license. As a matter of federal law, the license to
use the computer program is not transferable absent agreement by
the licensor.174 As to the copy, whether that is transferable depends
on the terms of the contract. If the contract provided there was no
sale of a copy, or otherwise restricted transfer, under state contract
law those terms would be enforceable. '75 If the contract is silent,
and the copy is acquired under lease or other use restriction so
that there was no transfer of ownership, then the transferee would
not have a first sale or computer use privilege and use of the copy
could be an infringement. If there is a sale of a copy, then the
usual state law rule would allow transfer of a copy. The first sale
doctrine would then provide that transfer of the copy was not an
infringement, and the computer use privilege would allow the
transferee to make a copy of the program onto its computer if its
conditions were satisfied. Neither of these privileges, however,
would allow any additional uses enabled in the license. Some
commentators confuse this point. They assume that a software
transaction, especially in the mass market, is no more than a sale
of goods, and then complain that provisions restricting assignment
of the copyright license also restrict resale of the copy.176 This
comes from the wrong image of the transaction.
17 7
6. Basic Obligations of Parties
a. Article 2
Article 2-301 sets forth the basic obligations of buyer and seller
in a contract of sale: "The obligation of the seller is to transfer and
nonprofit library's "fair use" privilege under Section 107 may be reordered by contract is of
course a separate issue.
174. Compare this with the attached GNU Public License, which does authorize
transfer of the license, but only under specific conditions.
175. As this paper argues, the applicable contract rule should be determined by state
common law. However, for a useful comparison, note that both Article 2-403 and Article
2A-303 provide that express contractual restrictions on transfer of rights or delegation of
duties are enforceable. Of course, this is the contract rule. Whether and in what
circumstances other rules of positive law, such as anti-trust law, may require another result,
is a different question.
176. See, e.g. David A. Rice, Digital Information As Property And Product: U.CC.
Article 2B, 22 U. DAYTON L REV. 621 (1977).
177. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 503(1)(A) (1999) (deferring to applicable rules of federal
law) and § 503(1)(B) (1999) (otherwise adopting the current rule from Article 2).
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deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance
with the contract."178
How does this work in practice? In particular, if the agreement is
silent, who goes first? Article 2 provides two default rules regarding
the timing, or dependency, of these obligations. Article 2-507(1)
states: "Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty to
accept the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay
for them."179 Good enough. The default rule is seller goes first. Or is
it? Section 2-511(1) says: "Unless otherwise agreed, tender of
payment is a condition to the seller's duty to tender and complete
any delivery."80 This looks like a buyer first rule. The Official
Comments resolve the apparent dilemma by stating that "[ulnless
there is agreement otherwise, the concurrence of the conditions as
to the tender of payment and the tender of delivery requires their
performance at a single place or time." i'8 In other words, absent
agreement, the seller's obligation to deliver and the buyer's
obligation to pay are dependent and concurrent. This means that
each party must tender performance when due in order to put the
other in breach. 82 The default rule is that all goods must be
tendered in a single delivery,' 3 and full payment is due on their.
receipt.'14
Thus, in the Article 2 conceptual model, the parties' basic
obligations are unitary, dependent, and concurrent. They are
unitary in the sense that the seller has one main obligation -
transfer/deliver - and the buyer has another - accept/pay. They
are dependent in that the obligation to perform one is conditioned
on performance of the other. They are concurrent in that they
happen at the same time. All, of course, are subject to change by
agreement of the parties.
178. U.C.C. § 2-301 (1999).
179. U.C.C. § 2-507(1) (1999).
180. U.C.C. § 2-51191) (1999).
181. U.C.C. § 2-511(2) cmt. 2 (1999); see generally HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at §§
2-507:1, 2-511:1; QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-705[A][1].
182. See Oakland Gin Co., Inc. v. Marlow (In re The Julien Co.), 44 F.3d 426, 430 (6th
Cir. 1995) (holding that, because delivery and payment did not occur concurrently, sections
2-507 and 2-522 of the Tennessee Commercial Code were inapplicable); see generally
HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2:511:1.
183. See U.C.C. § 2-307 (1999); Martel Constr., Inc. v. Gleason Equip., Inc., 534 P.2d 883
(Sup. Ct. Mon. 1975) (all goods must be delivered in single lot unless agreed otherwise); see
generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-307[A].
184. See U.C.C. § 2 -310(a) (1999); Lewis v. Hughes, 346 A2d 231 (Ct. App. Md. 1975)





A software transaction could not differ more. There, the basic
obligations of licensor and licensee, absent agreement, are
compound, independent and asynchronous.
Regarding the compound nature of a software transaction, the
licensor often has two "transfer and deliver" obligations: to transfer
the copyright and to deliver a copy. Under Section 202 of the
Copyright Act, these must be treated as independent obligations.'8
One does not affect the other. In Applied Information
Management, Inc. v. Icart,'8 6 a perceptive district court, called on
to interpret a non-exclusive software license, got it exactly right:
Resolution of the issue is complicated by the fact that an
agreement of this nature may convey rights and interests in
two, rather than only one form of property; the developer may
.transfer copyright rights in the software program (intellectual
property rights) and at the same time transfer rights in the
copy of the program through the material object that
embodies the copyrighted work (personal property rights).
Because technological developments that are the subject of
such licensing agreements are relatively recent, the absence of
clear legislative direction further complicates resolution of the
issue. Furthermore, courts that have considered the question
have not directly addressed the distinction between the two
different forms of property rights involved.1 87
Under Section 202, a licensor's delivery of a copy - the goods -
does not in itself fulfill any obligation to transfer the copyright.
Indeed, as with LINUX, the party delivering the copy may not even
be the one granting the license.1 8 Conversely, as Section 202
185. Applied Info. Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 (E.D. N.Y. 1997) ("As
a result of Section 202, a court interpreting a licensing agreement must determine ownership
of the copy separately from ownership of the copyright."); see infra notes 188-201 and
accompanying text.
186. 976 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. N.Y 1997).
187. Applied Info. Management, Inc., 976 F Supp. at 150-51.
188. In other cases, the licensor may not need to deliver any copies at all. For
example, if a new license merely extends the term of an existing one, the licensee may
already have all required copies. And if the information is made available over the Internet,
then there may be no delivery of a copy at all as a matter of federal law. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994) (defining "perform"); see generally 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 8.24[A]
(discussing vanishing distinctions among copyright categories). Whether transmission over
the Internet does constitute a "delivery of a copy," a "public performance," or the more
generic right of "making available," is a complex question beyond the scope of this article.
For details see Lorin Brennan, The Copyright Wars: The WIPO Treaties and The New
Vol. 38:459
Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software
explicitly provides, a transfer of rights does not in itself constitute
a sale of a copy.8 9
What about the licensee? When granting a generic information
license, it cannot be assumed that the licensee is obligated to pay
everything or anything on receipt of a copy. First, there may be
separate payments for the copy and for the rights. This is the usual
case, for example, in the motion picture industry, where prints and
other exploitation copies are expensive to make. Typical license
agreements in that industry provide one payment for the rights,
usually due on execution, and a separate payment for materials
when they are later delivered. Second, payments can be, and often
are, spread over time in the form of royalties that arise from
exploitation of the work. 90 Finally, a licensee may not be obligated
to pay anything at all. A licensor may provide the information free
of charge in the hope that the licensee will watch embedded
advertising. This has been the case for free television broadcasts
for decades; more recently, some companies give away free
Internet access in exchange for the right to show advertising on the
user's Web page.19' Shareware is provided free of charge with the
hope, but not the requirement, of payment. 192 Indeed, since under
federal law copyright ownership can pass "by any means of
conveyance or operation of law," there is no requirement for any
consideration at all.193 It also follows that a licensee's payment for a
copy does not necessarily fulfill an obligation to pay for the license
Information Economy, in 2 PU FOURTH ANNUAL INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 623
(1998) (available at <http://www.2Bguide.com>).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994); see Chamberlain v. Cocola Assoc., 985 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.
1992). Chamberlain involved the interpretation of California Civil Code § 988 (1982), which
requires a writing to transfer title to a work of art where there is also an exclusive or
nonexclusive transfer of any of the copyright rights in the work. The question was whether
delivery of sculpture for display in a restaurant transferred title to the sculpture absent a
writing. Noting that Section 202 of the Copyright Act differentiates between copyrights and
their material embodiments, Chamberlain held that California Civil Code § 988 mimics
federal law by only requiring a written agreement for a transfer of property rights that
accompany a transfer of copyright rights. Chamberlain, 985 F2d at 293. The Chamberlain
court failed to appreciate that under federal law, a "transfer of copyright" means an
exclusive license, whereas California Civil Code § 988 requires a writing where there is
either an exclusive or nonexclusive license, which was certainly the case.
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (stating that the validity of a later transfer prevails if it was
taken "for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding obligation to pay royalties").
191. See <http://www.netzero.com>.
192. See Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
193. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1994). For example, copyright ownership could pass by gift.
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 10.03[B].
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to use the copyright. 194
Finally, in some information transactions it could be the
licensee's job to deliver the copies and the licensor's job to pay.
Because the transfer and copy delivery obligations are independent,
there is no reason why they cannot be performed by different
parties. A licensor may authorize a licensee to use information to
manufacture copies for the licensor, in which case the licensee
delivers the goods and the licensor pays the price. 195 There is
simply no reason to assume in a software transaction that a
licensor always transfers copies to the licensee for a price.
Regarding the independent nature of a software transaction, in
the generic information license, a party's performance does not
necessarily require an immediate counter-performance. That is, the
obligations of licensor and licensee are independent. This is
consistent with the common law rule that contractual obligations
are presumed independent absent a contrary intent.196 In particular,
because the obligations are independent, breach of a covenant will
not disturb the licensee's rights under the license unless the breach
allows termination of the license. 197 Thus, a breach will not excuse
compliance with the license so long as the license remains in
effect. For example, assume the licensor is in material breach. The
licensee has two options: cease use and sue for breach, in which
case it may no longer use the rights; or affirm the contract and sue
for partial breach, in which case it must abide by the use
restrictions. 198 Alternatively, assume the licensee is in material
194. See Chamberlain, 985 F.2d at 282; Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1167.
195. See, e.g., Platt & Munk Co., Inc. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir.
1963) (copyright licensee manufactured toys using copyrighted characters of buyer/licensor;
1909 Act); also McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F3d 917 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (patent
licensee manufactured knives for patent owner); Monte Carlo Shirt Co. v. Daewoo
International (America) Corp., 707 F2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983) (trademark licensee
manufactured shirts for resale by licensor).
196. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 617 (1964). The Restatement states the rule as
follows:
[W]hether performance by one party is a condition to his recovery from the other
involves the consideration, in the main, as to whether the promise of the one who
seeks recover is dependent or independent. . . . [T]he performance of a dependent
promise or covenant is a condition to the recovery of the counter-promise or
counter-covenant, whereas the performance of an independent promise or covenant is
not a condition of recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 277(1) (1981).
197. See Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 661 F2d 479, 483-84 (5th Cir.
1981); see generally 3 NIMMER & NiMmER, supra note 56, § 10.12.
198. See ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 952 E2d 643, 649 (2d Cir.
1991) ("On the heel's of [the licensor's] repudiation, [the licensee] had two options: (i) it
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breach. Then licensor has two options: if breach is material and
allows cancellation, licensor may do so and reclaim the rights;199
however, if the licensor does not cancel but sues on the contract, it
may not use the rights inconsistent with the license or it can
become an infringer.
2°°
Regarding the asynchronous nature of a software transaction, in
the generic information transaction one cannot assume that both
parties must perform concurrently. To the contrary, the usual
assumption is that performances are asynchronous. The licensor
may grants rights today, while the licensee undertakes to make
royalty payments tomorrow as the work is exploited. Or the
licensee may make payments today while the licensor undertakes
to create the work for delivery tomorrow. Rights and copies can be
delivered at different times and in different segments, and paid for
in different ways at separate time.
Contrary to the rigid default roles assigned to buyer and seller in
the Article 2 world, in the information universe the default roles of
licensor and licensee are versatile and diverse. Both parties can be
licensors and licensees in the same copyrighted work at the same
time; indeed, if the license is non-exclusive, both parties can
exercise the same rights in the same copyright at the same time.
The obligations to transfer a license and deliver a copy are distinct.
Unlike Article 2, these obligations can be allocated all to one party
or separated between them. The licensor does not necessarily have
any obligation to deliver a copy; and the licensee does not
necessarily have an obligation to pay for it if the licensor does.
Performance by one party is independent of performance by the
other, and there is no obligation that performances occur
concurrently. It would be hard to find more disparate contract
models.
201
could have stopped performance and sued for total breach; (ii) it could have affirmed the
contract by continuing performance while suing for partial breach."); see also 17 Am. Jun. 2D
Contracts § 729 (1964).
199. See Nolan v. Sam Fox Publ'g Co., Inc., 499 F.2d 1394, 1397 (2d Cir. 1974).
200. See Charter Communications, 936 F2d at 692 (exclusive license); Dodd, Mead &
Co., Inc. v. Lilienthal, 514 F Supp 105 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) (exclusive license).




7. Duration of a Contract
a. Article 2
If contract of sale is silent about the duration, what default rule
applies? Under Article 2-309(2), a contract for successive
performances of indefinite duration is valid for a reasonable time
but may be terminated at will at any time by either party. A party
must give reasonable notice of termination unless it happens
automatically on an agreed event.2 2 Contracts calling for successive
performances, such as distribution agreements, can sometimes fail
to specify a fixed end date, and these default rules allow them to
avoid nullification on the grounds of indefiniteness. 2°3
b. Copyright Act
Characteristically, the Copyright Act takes a different approach,
with separate rules depending on whether the license is exclusive
or non-exclusive. In Manners v. Morosco,2°4 the Supreme Court held
that an exclusive copyright license of unspecified duration is
presumed perpetual.20 5 "Perpetual" in this context is a term of art
meaning "for the full duration allowed by law," not "forever."20 6
Thus, for exclusive licenses, the copyright rule rejects any
presumption in Article 2-309(2) that the license is terminable at will
after a reasonable time.
As to non-exclusive licenses, the Circuits are split. Rano v. Sipa
202. See U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (1999).
203. See generally HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-309:1, 3.
204. 252 U.S. 317 (1919).
205. Manners, 252 U.S. at 325. Manners involved an exclusive license of unspecified
duration to perform the play Peg 0' My Heart. Id. at 317-18, 232. The Supreme Court
affirmed the following holding of the Second Circuit:
Since the contract is not revocable by will by either party or otherwise limited as to
its duration by its express terms or the inherent nature of the contract itself with
reference to its subject matter, it is presumably intended to be permanent or
perpetual in the obligation it imposes.
Manners v. Morosco, 258 F 557, 559 (2d Cir. 1919). See also Viacom International, Inc. v.
Tandem Productions, Inc., 368 F Supp 1264, 1275 (S.D. N.Y 1974), affd. on appeal, 526 F2d
593 (2d Cir. 1975) (following Manners).
206. See Shoptalk, Ltd. v. Concorde-New Horizons Corp., 168 E3d 586 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that an agreement to pay royalties for the play Little Shop of Horrors, as adapted
from the movie, expired when the copyright in the movie and screenplay expired); April
Productions, Inc. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., 126 N.E.2d 283, 289 (N.Y 1955) (holding that a
contract of unstated duration to pay royalties from the sale of musical compositions could
not be interpreted, in the absence of express language, as requiring the payment of royalties
after the expiration of underlying copyrights).
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Press, Inc.20 7 held that Section 203 of the Copyright Act, which
allows a licensor to terminate a license after 30 years, evidences a
federal presumption that non-exclusive licenses must endure for at
least 30 years absent a contrary specification. 208 Rano has been
widely criticized, and Walthal v. Rusk2°9 declined to follow it,
holding that Section 203 creates a statutory maximum, not a
minimum, so that a non-exclusive license is terminable at will
under applicable state law.210 The Eleventh Circuit, in Korman v.
HBC Ftorida, Inc.,211 came to the same conclusion as Wathal.
8. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
a. Article 2
Article 2-314 implies a warranty of merchantability in every
contract of sale unless it is effectively excluded or modified.212 The
implied warranty of merchantability requires, among other things,
that goods "pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description" and that they are "fit for the ordinary purpose for
which such goods are used."213 As discussed in the next Part,
numerous decisions have held that software licenses are subject to
this implied warranty. Indeed, one suspects that the primary
purpose for treating computer programs as "goods" under Article 2
is precisely to subject them to a warranty when the program does
not perform as someone hoped or expected.
b. Copyright Act / Federal Law
There is no section in the Copyright Act that prevents or requires
application of an implied warranty of merchantability to a
computer program. There is, however, a First Amendment problem.
A computer program is a literary work, for copyright purposes the
same as a novel. Applying an implied warranty of merchantability
on computer programs raises serious questions about imposing
207. 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993).
208. Rano, 987 F.2d at 585; see also Lulirma, 128 F2d at 882 (holding that a
non-exclusive license supported by consideration was not terminable at will).
209. 172 F3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
210. WalthaL, 172 F3d at 485. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 308 (1999) (after deferring to other
law, establishing specific default rules for duration of types of software licenses).
211. 182 F3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).
212. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1999).
213. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), (c) (1999).
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liability on content, implicating the First Amendment.2 14 The usual
response is that a computer program performs a useful function,
unlike a novel, and so liability is appropriate.215 However, the cases
have rejected this simplistic approach.21 6 The issues in this area are
complex and I will not repeat them here, as they are thoroughly
discussed in the law reviews cited in the notes. I am interested in a
different approach, one that takes us to the heart of warranties for
computer programs. I am talking about the Halting Problem.
A full examination of all the legal issues raised by the Halting
Problem is beyond the scope of this article. I hope to deal with
them in detail in a later piece. For now, allow me to give a brief
overview of the issue, omitting details in the interest of brevity.
217
What is a computer program? Legal definitions are really more
suggestive than descriptive. In fact, a computer program is a
214. For a perceptive and thorough discussion of the issues involved, see Joel Wolfson,
Express Warranties and Published Information Content Under Article 2B: Does The Shoe
Fit?, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 337 (1997); Joel Wolfson, Electronic Mass
Information Providers and Section 552 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: The First
Amendment Casts A Long Shadow, 29 RUTGERS L REV. 67 (1997).
215. See, e.g. Jean Braucher, Why UCITA, Like Article 2B, Is Premature and Unsound,
available online at Carol Kunze's Web Site, A Guide to the Proposed Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.2bguide.com/>.
Curiously, Professor Braucher criticizes UCITA for allegedly short changing the First
Amendment rights of licensees, yet dismisses any First Amendment rights of licensors as
trivial. For other inconsistencies in Professor Braucher's position, see Jeff C. Dodd, Time and
Assent In the Formation of Contracts: The Mischief of Applying Article 2 to Information
Contracts, 36 Hous. L REV. 195 (1999).
216. See, e.g., Wimter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no
liability for incorrectly identifying a poisonous mushroom as edible in a cookbook); Cardzo
v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (finding no liability for failing to warn about
ingredients in cookbook); Roman v. City of New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1981) (finding no
liability for an inaccuracy in a Planned Parenthood brochure); Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.YS.2d
821 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding no liability for an injury arising from performing an
experiment in a science book).
217. The Halting Problem is about the limits of program functionality, a subject with an
extensive literature. Popular texts include DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GoDEi, ESCHER, BACH: AN
ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1998), a Pulitzer Prize winner. A highly readable text is JOHN CASTI,
COMPLEXIFICATION (1994), especially Chapter Four The Lawless. An historical perspective is
MORRIS KLINE, MATHEMATICS - THE Loss OF CERTAINTY (1980). For a more mathematical
presentation, see RICHARD JOHNSONBAUGH, DISCRETE MATHEMATICS (1997), especially Chapter 10:
Automata, Grammars, and Languages, and RAYMOND GREENLAW & H. JAMES HOOVER,
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE THEORY OF COMPUTING (1998). Those undaunted by a technical approach
are invited to explore ANIL NERODE & RICHARD A. SHORE, LoGIC FOR APPLICATIONS (1993),
especially Chapter I, Section 8: Computability and Undecidability. This text discusses the
Church-Turning Thesis that a Universal Turning Machine computes every effective function,
i.e., a UTM is a universal model of computation. They also give a proof of the Halting
Problem. The discussion in this article is drawn from these sources, although any errors are
my own.
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precise mathematical object first formulated by Alan Turing in the
1930s. In essence, we can think of a computer program as a "logic
processor." Given a set of statements (input) it uses an algorithm
(logic processor) to produce a result (output). By analogy, think of
plane geometry as described in Euclid's Elements. Euclid begins
with a series of postulates (inputs) and using deduction (logic
processor) derives theorems (output). Theorems once derived can
be fed back into the system as new input to deduce newer
theorems. Turing developed a mathematical model of this
procedure called a Universal Turing Machine (UTM). In so doing,
he also discovered the amazing result that some things are
impossible for computer programs to do. Impossible in this context
does not have the legal gloss of "commercially impracticable." It
means literally impossible; a computer the size of the known
universe, running from the beginning until the end of time, could
never do it.
The Halting Problem is the classic example. For any computer
program, we would like to know whether it will halt on a given
input or get stuck in an infinite loop and run forever. Turning
proved that no algorithm (computer program) existed that could
answer this question for every program. Let us take a practical
example. Assume we are told about Bug Finder, an all purpose
software utility that can take any computer program, process it
overnight, and the next morning print out a list of all "bugs." Does
Bug Finder work? Turning's proof tells us this is impossible. The
next morning, Big Finder could still be churning away, and we
would have no way of knowing whether it was still at work finding
bugs, or was caught in an infinite loop. 218 This does not mean that
218. There are many proofs of The Halting Problem. This one is drawn from GREENLAW
& HOOVER, supra, at 10-13. Bug Finder is represented as being able to take any program and
to print out a/ bugs, i.e., to halt. What we need to do is construct a valid program for which
Bug Finder will not halt, thus disproving that it works in all cases. To do this we will run
Bug Finder on itself. This is certainly legitimate, since we want to make sure that Bug Finder
itself is bug free. So let us construct a new program, Bug Finder Pro, that works like this (in
simplistic pseudo code):
Sub BugFinderPro
Input (Bug Finder) 'Read the program code for Bug Finder
Run Bug Finder (Bug Finder) 'Run Bug Finder on the code for Bug
Finder
If Result (Run Bug Finder(Bug Finder)) = 'If Bug Finder finds all bugs and halts
Print Out, Then Repeat Then repeat forever in an infinite loop
Elself Result (Run Bug Finder(Bug Finder)) = 'Otherwise, if Bug Finder does not halt




we cannot find some bugs in some programs. What it means is that
there is no mechanical procedure - no algorithm - that is
guaranteed to find all bugs in all programs. We need to search for
them "by hand" on a case by case basis.
This brings us to the study of computational complexity. Some
problems are known to be so complex that they simply overwhelm
the ability of computational resources to solve them in any
reasonable time. Take an oversimplified example. In the late 1990s,
a popular operating system for personal computers reportedly
contained over ten million code interactions; it also reportedly had
over 14,000 possible "bugs" when it was released, although these
were not considered serious impediments to user satisfaction. In a
worst case scenario, testing all 14,000 "bugs" against all ten million
interactions at the rate of one per second would take 14 x 103 x 108
seconds, or more than 400 years; this assumes correcting one "bug"
does not require re-testing all combinations. Obviously, this is a
worst case scenario. A great deal of theoretical and practical
research focuses on techniques to reduce the resources needed to
determine program correctness. But there are limits. Some
problems are known to be computationally feasible, meaning that
techniques exist to solve them in a "reasonable" time. Many others,
like the Halting Problem, are known to be impossible; no solutions
exist. A large number of problems are intractable; computationally
feasible solutions are unknown and may never exist. Of course, for
some programs with discrete functionality, it is possible to test for
all "bugs." Printer drivers are an example. As programs increase in
size, complexity, and functionality, however, the possibility of
thorough testing in a reasonable time declines.219
Bug Finder Pro may look strange, but it is a valid program. So now run Bug Finder on
Bug Finder Pro to see if it finds all bugs, i.e. halts. If Bug Finder is indeed bug free, then
Bug Finder Pro will enter an infinite loop and never halt - but that means that Bug Finder is
unable to print out all bugs in all programs, a contradiction. On the other hand, if Bug
Finder is not bug free, then it will not halt when running Bug Finder Pro either, another
contradiction. We must therefore conclude that Bug Finder does not exit - at least not in any
computable language. For a more whimsical discussion, see HOFSrADTR, supra, at 75-83, in
which his characters Achilles and the Tortoise try to construct a "perfect" record player
(complete formal system) that can play any record (statement in system) to disastrous
results.
219. Here is an example of a feasible problem: given three binary numbers x, y, and i,
determine if the ith bit (beginning from the least significant bit) of x %ey is a 1. GREENLAW &
HOOVER, supra, at 263. This problem can be solved in polynomial time and is of complexity
class P. On the other hand, the Traveling Salesperson Problem'is considered intractable. A
salesperson needs to make a sales trip to several cities. What is the shortest possible route
for so doing that only visits each city once? Finding such a route for an arbitrary number of
cities is classified as NP-Complete. GREENLAW & HOOVER, supra, at 300. It is a hard problem.
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Now let us apply this to the question of computer program
warranties. In discussing computer programs, one often hears the
assertion that if the program does not perform as expected, it is
necessarily defective. 220 These claims are often based on an
anthropromorphic image of computer programs as little genies that
can do anything a living being can do at the push of a button. For
example, in the discussions about UCITA, the Society For
Information Managers argued that under Article 2, a software
publisher has a legal obligation to deliver a perfect program.221 But
the Halting Problem tells us that some program behavior is
impossible to expect. As the saying goes, the law does not demand
impossibilities. A car is not defective because it does not run
forever; a perpetual motion machine would violate the Second Law
of Thermodynamics. Yet some would have us believe that this is
what Article 2 requires of computer programs. This does not mean
that programmers should not test software. It does mean that there
are reasonable limits to testing. A product is not unfit where
detection and correction of the defect is not reasonably possible.222
I am not arguing that there should be no warranties for computer
programs. What I am arguing is that the problem is far more
complex than current discussions credit. Even in the commercial
Throwing more machines at it (parallel computing) does not help, since problems that are
NP-Complete in polynomial time are also NP-Complete under logarithmic space reducibility.
GREENLAW & HOOVER, supra note 226, at 292. An open question in computer science is
whether the complexity class NP reduces to Partnership; do algorithms exist to solve NP
class problems in a "reasonable" time, or are these problems inherently intractable? Although
there is no proof yet, it is considered highly unlikely that such algorithms exist (i.e., P g NP).
The Traveling Salesperson Problem, one of the most studied in computer science, is not just
an issue for business junkets. Building integrated circuits often involves the same issues.
220. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Why UCITA, Like Article 2B, Is Premature and
Unsound, available online at Carol Kunze's Web Site, A Guide to the Proposed Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.2bguide.con>.
221. This is another example of politics in the discussions about UCITA. SIM is
primarily composed of traditional manufacturing companies who are software licensees, and
this position had the transparent goal of creating an impossible standard as a mandatory
legal risk shifting device. When the Drafting Committee declined this invitation, SIM
complained that UCITA was "unbalanced." Curiously, when the SIM companies were asked
whether they would accept a requirement in Article 2 that their manufacturing arms be
required to deliver "perfect" products, they declined for themselves what they would have
imposed on others. See generally, Holly K Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 Hous. L
REv. 121, 145 (1999).
222. See, e.g., McMichael v. American Red Cross, 527 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1975). This opens
the door to a discussion of the idea of the "unavoidably unsafe product," an issue beyond
the scope of this article. See generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-314[A][12][c]. My point is
not that all computer programs should be classified "unavoidably buggy" in all cases. My
point is that the issue deserves far greater study that it has received so far.
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speech area, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
limits restrictions to verifiable advertising that can be proven true
or false. 223 The Halting Problem tells us that there are some
computer program functions that can never be proven "true or
false."224 There are other problems for which we may not know the
answer in any computationally tractable time. To argue that any
computer program that is not "perfect" is per se defective is to
indulge in little more than junk science. To argue that a software
publisher is obligated to disclose all "defects" in a program begs
the enormously difficult issue of defining just what a software
"defect" is, let alone the computational difficulties of determining
what every defect might be. The legal profession owes more than
that to the software industry and to society. A more sophisticated
and honest analysis of warranty liability for computer programs is
called for. We cannot undertake such analysis unless and until we
abandon old habits of mind that cloud our thinking and confound
our reason. Rote application of warranty principles in Article 2 that
were fashioned for fundamentally different objects is exactly the
type of muddled thinking that we need to abandon if we are to
make any progress. To me, this is the most pressing reason why
Article 2 cannot apply to software transactions.
2 5
9. Sales on Approval
a. Article 2
In some cases, a seller may deliver goods to a buyer "on
approval." Take it home. Try it out. If it does not work, bring it
back for a refund. These types of deals need guidance on such
matters as risk of loss and the rights of intervening creditors. For
these purposes, the UCC supplies Article 2-326. It singles out three
situations for special treatment: (1) a "sale on approval;" (2) a "sale
223. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (noting that "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity"); see
also Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F Supp. 141, 150 (D. D.C. 1995) (noting that there is
no First Amendment liability for "rhetorical hyperbole that cannot be proven true or false").
224. Technically, the Halting Problem addresses the question of decidability. But to see
that this is accurate, convert Bug Finder to a program than answers the question: "You found
all bugs in Program X, True or False."
225. Compare U.C.I.T.A., Part IV (establishing a more appropriate set of software
warranties, in particular U.C.I.T.A § 403(c) (1999)), which contains no implied warranty for
informational content).
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or return;" and (3) a "consignment" and arrangements akin to an
assignment.226 A "sale on approval" occurs when the buyer has the
right to return goods delivered primarily for use.227 In a sale on
approval, returnable goods in the hands of a buyer are not subject
to claims of the buyer's creditors until they are accepted. 228 A "sale
on return" arises when returnable goods are delivered primarily for
resale, and includes a "consignment."
229
b. Copyright Act
Central Point Software v. Global Software & Access 230 considered
the relationship between Article 2-326 and the Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1990.-1 The "first sale" doctrine in
Section 109 allows the owner of a lawfully made copy to sell or
otherwise dispose of that copy without permission of the copyright
owner.232 However, concerned about the possibility of piracy due to
the rental of copies of computer programs, Congress added an
exception to the first sale doctrine, which allows computer
program copyright owners to control the rental of copies. In
Central Point Software, a computer store provided copies of
software to its patrons on a deferred billing plan that allowed
return of the software within five days for small return fee. Despite
the characterization of the transaction as a "sale on approval"
under Article 2-326, it was a rental for federal proposes and is thus
a copyright infringement absent consent of the software copyright
owner.m The consignment rules in Article 2-326 thus cannot create
a disguised "rental" under federal copyright law.23
226. U.C.C. § 2-326 (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-326[A].
227. U.C.C. § 2-326(1)(a) (1999).
228. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1999).
229. U.C.C. § 2-326(1)(b) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-326[A][5].
230. 880 F. Supp. 957, 965 (E.D. N.Y 1995).
231. Central Point Software, 880 F. Supp. at 965; see Pub. Law 101-650; 104 St. 5089
(Dec. 1, 1990).
232. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) 91994).
233. Central Point Software, 880 E Supp. at 963, 965. See Adobe Systems, Inc. v.
Brenengen, 928 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. N.C. 1996) (post-1990 rental of software prohibited). A like
restriction applies to the rental of records. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994); A&M Records v.
A.LW., Ltd., 855 F2d. 368 (7th Cir. 1988) (record rentals disguised as buy-back plan
prohibited); see generally 2 NLMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 8.12; BOORSTYN, supra note
92, at § 6.21.
234. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(40) (1999) (stating that the term "license" includes a
consignment of a copy and containing no provision comparable to UCC Section 2-326).
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10. Sales or Return (Consignments)
a. Article 2
In a sale or return, goods are subject to claims of the buyer's
creditors while in the buyer's possession unless the seller takes
specific steps to notify third parties of the true nature of the
transaction.235 Those steps, per Article 2-326(2), are either: (1)
posting an appropriate sign indicating the goods are on
consignment; (2) establishing that the business is generally known
to be selling goods of others; or (3) complying with the financing
provisions of Article 9.236 Even if the parties use terms like "on
consignment," the transaction is still deemed a "sale or return"
unless the seller takes these steps. 2
7
b. Copyright Act
For copyrighted software, the rules are different. With regard to
the rights, a copyright license may be limited in time, so that the
rights are "returnable" when the license period ends. 23 However,
this fact alone does not make them subject to licensee's creditors.
If the license is exclusive, then the licensee is an owner of the
rights licensed within the scope of the license,239 and a lien on the
licensee's interest would be another transfer of ownership requiring
a writing signed by the licensee.240 If the license is non-exclusive,
then it is not assignable to the licensee's creditors in any case
without the consent of the licensor.
241
What about copies? Little Brown & Co. v. American Paper
Recycling Corp.242 addressed that problem. Used books were
consigned to a recycler for destruction. When the recycler sold the
books, the publisher sued for copyright infringement, and the
recycler asserted a "first sale" defense. However, since the
consignment of the books was only a bailment, no title passed to
235. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-326[3][4].
236. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-326[5].
237. U.C.C. § 2-326(3) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-326[5].
238. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (a transfer of ownership may be limited in "time, place or
effect"); see Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 926 F Supp. 40 (S.D. N.Y
1996) (when license ends, rights revert to licensor).
239. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (defining "owner" and "transfer of ownership") and 204(d) (1994).
240. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994).
241. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984).
242. 824 F Supp. 11 (D. Mass. 1993).
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the recycler, and the first sale defense did not apply.2"
11. Importance of Title
a. Article 2
Before Article 2, the question of "title," who held it when and
where, was the critical determinant of rights and obligations in a
sales contract both at common law and under the Uniform Sales
Act.2" Professor Llewellyn was not enamored with this approach.
He preferred to discard this "lump concept" in favor of "narrow
issue" solutions.245 In a major departure from pre-UCC law, Article
2-401 does just that. It dispenses with questions of title as the
determinant for critical issues in a sale of goods:
Each provision of thi§ Article with regard to the rights,
obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers
or other third parties applies irrespective of title to goods
except where the provision refers to such title.
2 46
This was a major innovation in Article 2. Instead of looking to
the status of title as the problem-solving device, Article 2 instead
addresses specific issues with solutions tailored for that problem.
247
Title is dethroned. We must remember that contracts for the sale of
goods raise primarily state law matters. Article 2, a state statute,
can therefore freely dispense with questions of title to property
interests in goods as necessary to meet is state law objectives.
b. Copyright Act
Copyrighted computer programs, however, are property interests
created by federal law. Under the Copyright Act, title to a copy is
often critical for determining rights, obligations, and remedies. For
example, Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides a fair use
defense to an infringement claim.248 However, knowingly using a
243. Little Brown & Co., 824 F. Supp. at 13-15. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 103(c) (1999)
(stating that UCITA defers to Article 9, which itself defers to federal law for licenses, see
U.C.C. § 9-103); and U.C.I.T.A. § 503(a)(3) (1999) (stating that the licensor's reservation of
title reserves title to all copies made under the license).
244. See HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-401.
245. Id.
246. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1999).
247. Id.; see also QUiN, supra note 28, at 2-401[A].
248. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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copy obtained by wrongful means can vitiate a fair use defense.249
This would include, for example, knowing use of a purloined
manuscript, 25° obtaining a copy of a computer program from the
Copyright Office by false representations, 251 or acquiring ownership
of a film print by misrepresenting its intended use.2 52 Section 109 of
the Copyright Act contains a "first sale" doctrine restricting the
copyright owner's ability to control subsequent disposition of
certain copies. However, the first sale doctrine only applies to "the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title."25 "Mere authorized possession of a copy, if title in the
tangible copy does not pass to the possessor, will not trigger the
[first sale] limitation of Section 109(a), and hence, will not affect
the copyright owner's rights under Section 106(3)."154 Section 117
allows a copy of a computer program to be loaded into RAM
without triggering an infringement, but, again, the exemption only
applies to "the owner of a copy of the computer program."255 Title
to copies remains an important concept for copyright law.256
12. Mandatory Transfer of Title
a. Article 2
Article 2-401(1) provides flatly that "[a]ny retention or reservation
of by the seller of title (property) in the goods shipped or delivered
to the buyer is limited in effect to reservation of a security
249. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 13.05[A][l][d].
250. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1985).
251. See Atari Games v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
252. See Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.
N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982).
253. 17 U.S.C. § 309(a) and (d) (1994). "The privileges prescribed by subsection (a) and
(c) do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who has
acquired possession of the copy of phonorecord from the copyright owner by rental, lease,
loan or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it." Id.
254. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 8.12[BJ[1]. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v.
Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 213 (E.D. N.Y 1994) (holding that
the first sale defense was inapplicable because "Microsoft only licenses and does not sell its
Products"); Little Brown & Co., 824 F Supp. at 11 (holding that a consignment of books to a
bailee for destruction did not constitute a first sale).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994); see Allen-Myland, 746 F Supp. at 536-37 (holding that
section 117 did not authorize the use of microcode where the copy was not lawfully
acquired).
256. Compare U.C.IT.A. § 501(b) (1999) (adopting the rule that transfer of a copy does
not transfer informational rights); U.C.I.T.A. § 502 (1999) (adopting specific default rules for
transfer of title to copies); and U.C.I.T.A. Part 6 (1999) (adopting rules that distinguish
performance of license from delivery of a copy).
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interest."2 7 This is one of the few sections of the UCC that cannot
be changed by agreement.25 It has two effects. First, even if the
parties intend to reserve title in the seller, and the agreement so
provides, the seller cannot prevent the passage of title to the buyer
upon delivery of the goods.259 Second, any title interest retained by
the seller is converted, at best, to a security interest. 26° A "sale"
consists of the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price. 261 Although title does not determine crucial issues of rights
and obligations, passage title still remains a major concept in
determining the scope of Article 2.262 Thus, the requirement that in
a sale there is a mandatory passage of title is a critical structural
support for all of Article 2.
b. Copyright Act
This result is repudiated preemptively for copyrights. First let us
consider mass market transactions in software, such as our old
friend LINux. Copies of mass marker software are made available
through non-exclusive licenses, and as a matter of preemptive
federal law, there is no transfer of ownership ("title") at all to the
embodied computer program.26 Acquiring a retail copy of LINUX
may pass title to the copy, but does not and cannot pass "title" to
or ownership in the embodied computer program regardless of
what Article 2-401 says.
Now let us look at assignments and exclusive licenses, which are
transfers of copyright ownership. The prior Copyright Act of 1909
included a judicial gloss called the "indivisibility doctrine."264 It
essentially meant that only the totality of rights under the copyright
could be "assigned;" anything less was a "license." The current
257. U.C.C. § 2401(1) (1999).
258. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. American Employers Ins. Co., 622 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. App.
1993) (reservation of title until final payment ineffective); Meinhard-Commercial Corp. v.
Hargo Woolen Mills, 300 A.2d 321 (N.H. 1972) (parties' intent does not govern question of
passage of title under 2401).
259. See O'Donnell, 622 N.E.2d at 575 ("[Article] 2-401(1) . . . restricts the parties'
contractual freedom to delay passage of title by agreement [and] negates any attempt... to
forestall passage of title beyond the moment of final delivery"); see generally HAWKLAND,
supra note 24, at § 2401:3; ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 2-401:182.
260. See O'Donnell, 622 N.E.2d at 575; see generally HAWILAND, supra note 24, at §
2-401:3; ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 2401:182.
261. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
262. See QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-106[A][2].
263. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "transfer of copyright ownership").
264.. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 47, at § 10.01[A].
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Copyright Act has eliminated the "indivisibility doctrine."265 Section
201(d)(2) now provides that "[a]ny of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of the rights
specified in section 106, may be transferred . . . and owned
separately."266 This means that when a licensor transfers a divisible
copyright interest, the licensor retains the following ownership
interests: a beneficial ownership interest in the rights transferred,
i.e., a right to sue for infringement as this may effect royalties
due;2 67 a residual divisible interest in all rights not granted;268 a
statutory termination right under certain conditions;269 and a
reversionary interest allowing the transferor to reclaim the rights
and sue for copyright infringement if the license is cancelled for
breach.270 Put another way, an exclusive license does not pass
ownership of the entire copyright, but only the exclusive rights
designated within the scope of the license.
A licensor's retained interest is a true ownership interest and not
a mere security interest. This means that the licensor can exercise
all of its rights directly upon the happening of the triggering event
without the necessity of first conducting a foreclosure sale under
Article 9. A beneficial owner who has transferred a copyright
ownership interest in exchange for royalties has immediate
standing to sue for infringement if the assignee does not act.271 A
licensor may sue for any use by a licensee outside the scope of the
license, i.e., for infringement of its divisible reserved interest.2 7 2 A
licensor's termination rights, unlike a mere security interest that
would be lost to a foreclosing senior creditor, cannot be contracted
away prior to its vesting.27 3 If a license is cancelled for material
breach, a licensor may immediately pursue all available remedies,
265. See 3 NumAER & NIMMER, supra note 47, at § 10.02[A].
266. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1994).
267. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994); see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 47, at § 12.02[C].
268. 17 U.S.C. 201(d)(2).
269. 17 U.S.C. § 203; see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, § supra note 47, at § 11.02. Note that this
is an interest that may not be contracted away.
270. See Schoenberg v. Shapolosky Publishers, Inc., 971 E2d. 926, 932 (2d Cir. 1992);
see 3 NrkmER & NmnmR, supra note 47, at § 10.15[A].
271. H1R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976); see Wildlife International, Inc. v. Clements,
591 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984); 3 NIMMER & NMMER, supra note 47, at § 12.02[C].
272. See Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1115; Schoenberg, 971 F2d at 926; S.O.S., 886
E2d at 1081.
273. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(5) (1994) ("Termination of the grant may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will to
make any future grant."). This limitation reflects a Congressional intent to protect authors
against unremunerative transfers. See Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 173 (1985); see
generally 3 NDMER & NMMER, supra note 47, at § 11.01[B].
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including seizing any infringing copies.274 In none of these cases
must the licensor first conduct a foreclosure sale or accord the
licensee a right of redemption under Article 9.275
In sum, a non-exclusive license of a computer program, as a
matter of federal law, cannot be a sale - a transfer of title for a
price - in the embodied computer program. An exclusive license,
while a transfer of ownership, lacks the incidents of a "sale" under
Article 2. Thus, this central conceptual support for Article 2, one
that determines its entire scope of application, is incompatible with
basic requirements of copyright law. The Copyright Act explodes
yet another critical structural support in Article 2 where software is
concerned.276
13. When Title Passes
a. Article 2
Although title has diminished importance in Article 2, it is still
necessary to have a default rule for when title passes to serve
needs outside Article 2. Tax law is an example.27 7 Article 2-401 does
the job, providing default rules that set a precondition to the
passage of title and providing four variations for different
situations. The precondition is that the goods must be "identified to
the contract."278 Identification does not shift title to the buyer, but
rather marks the point at which the buyer can first acquire an
insurable "special property interest" in the goods. 279
Once the identification hurdle is surmounted, Article 2-401
provides four working rules for transferring title in different
situations. The first and overarching rule is that title passes in
274. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1994); see Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broadcasting,
106 F3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997).
275. See In re SSE International Corp., 198 B.R. 667, 670 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Pa 1996)
(arguing that finding a security in intellectual property from mere delivery of a copy would
be "nonsensical").
276. Compare U.C.IT.A. § 307(a), (b) (1999) (transfer of rights limited to those
specified and necessarily implied) and U.C.I.T.A. § 307(f)(2) (meaning of exclusive license).
277. See, e.g., New England Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Service, 504
A.2d 506, (Conn. 1986); see generally HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2:401:3; QUINN, supra
note 28, at 2-401[A][4].
278. U.C.C. § 2-401(1) (1999).
279. U.C.C. § 2-501(2) (1999) (special property interest in buyer even though seller
retains title); see Hughes v. Al Green, Inc., 418 N.E. 2d 1355 (Ohio 1981); see generally
HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2:501 QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-501[A].
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accordance with the explicit agreement of the parties.280
Absent agreement, the usual rule is that title passes to the buyer
"at the time and place at which the seller completes his
performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods."281 This is in keeping with the Article 2 model that delivery
and payment are concurrent obligations.282  There are two
exceptions. If the seller must ship the goods, title passes when the
goods are shipped, unless there is a specified destination, in which
case title passes when the goods arrive.2s If the contract requires
delivery without moving the goods, then title passes on delivery of
documents of title; if no documents are required, at the time of
contracting. 281 The default rules for determining when title to goods
passes under Article 2 in the absence of express agreement are, not
to put too fine a point on it, complex. 285 They are not the rules
under the Copyright Act.
b. Copyright Act
The Copyright Act speaks in terms of "ownership" rather than
"title." A "copyright owner" is the owner of any of the exclusive
rights under a copyright, 28 and a "transfer of ownership" is
essentially an assignment, exclusive license or mortgage of some
discrete bundle of these rights. When does this ownership interest
pass ("vest") under a license? The Copyright Act does not give an
explicit answer. Section 205, however, establishes a system for
recording transfers in the Copyright Office and provides rules for
determining priority among competing transfers. 287 The federal
scheme preempts state law.288 It leaves us two cases to consider:
exclusive license vs. exclusive license, and exclusive license vs.
nonexclusive license.289 .
280. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1999) ("Unless otherwise explicitly agreed ... .
281. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1999).
282. See infra notes 344-50 and accompanying text.
283. U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a) and (b) (1999).
284. U.C.C. § 2-401(3) (a) and (b) (1999).
285. See Applied Information Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F Supp. 149, 153 n.2 (E.D.
N.Y. 1977) ("However, no section of the UCC assists in determining whether a transaction
involves a transfer of ownership [in a copy]. [Although UCC 2-401 contains several default
rules] it provides no guidance as to whether title ever passes under a given agreement.
[Piroposed section 2B-501 . . .would resolve this question ....").
286. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "copyright owner").
287. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994).
288. See National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loan of Denver, 116 B.R.
194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
289. Compare U.C.I.T.A § 501(a) (1999) (establishes that rights pass as provided in
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When determining the priority of one exclusive license over
another exclusive license, Section 205(a) provides that, as between
the two exclusive licenses, the "one executed first prevails" if it is
recorded in the time and manner required under Section 205 before
the later transfer. Otherwise, the later transfer if first recorded
prevails.
Although there is sparse case law on the subject, this would
seem to establish the rule that, absent contrary agreement, a
copyright ownership interest "vests" on execution of an exclusive
license. Of course, if either exclusive license is recorded, the
priority rules in Section 205 roll into play, and the one first
recorded as required by that section prevails.290 The Copyright Act
therefore indicates a default notion that a copyright ownership
interest passes on execution of license, not performance. It
certainly does not pass on delivery of a copy. 291 U.S. Naval
Institute v. Charter Communications,292 illustrates the difference.
Tom Clancy granted exclusive U.S. publication rights in The Hunt
For Red October with the proviso that the book not be released
until October to coordinate with the U.K. publication date. The U.S.
publisher jumped the gun and released the book in September, and
Clancy sued. He claimed that the transfer of rights did not become
effective until October, the performance date, making the early
release an infringement. Not so. Under the contract, the transfer of
ownership became effective on execution, not the release date, so
there was a breach of contract, but no infringement. 293
contract, and default rule that they pass when the information exists and is identified in
contract, which, for existing works, would occur on execution); U.C.I.T.A. § 109(a) (express
deferral to preemptive federal law).
290. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994). For a recorded license to prevail, it must be recorded
"in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c)." Id. Section 205(c)
in turn requires that, in order for a recorded document to give constructive notice, the
document must specifically identify the work to which it pertains so that it can be located
by a search of the records, and that the work be registered. Id. at § 205(c). What if the work
is registered after the license is recorded? In re AEG Acquisitions Corp., 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr.
C.D. Ca 1991), acknowledged that a recorded copyright mortgage in an unregistered film
became perfected when the work was subsequently registered, i.e., the registration "related
back" to validate the prior recording.
291. Contrary statements in In re Amica, 135 B.R. 534 (Bkrptcy. N.D. 11l. 1992) are
discussed infra at notes 467-82 and accompanying text.
292. 936 F2d 692 (2d Cir. 1991).
293. Charter Communications, 936 F.2d at 695, 696. See also Applied Information
Management, Inc. v. Icart, 976 F. Supp. 149, 153 n.2 (E.D. N.Y 1977) ("However, no section of
the UCC assists in determining whether a transaction involves a transfer of ownership [in a
copy]. [Although UCC 2-401 contains several default rules] it provides no guidance as to
whether title ever passes under a given agreement. [P]roposed section 2B-501 ...would
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As for determining the priority of an exclusive license and a
nonexclusive license, Section 205(d) deals with conflicting
"transfers," not just "transfers of copyright ownership." Thus, it
applies equally to exclusive and non-exclusive licenses, with one
exception. Under Section 205(e), a written non-exclusive license,
whether or not recorded, trumps an exclusive license if either: (1)
it was executed first; or (2) it was taken in good faith and without
notice before the exclusive license is recorded. 94 Again, the
Copyright Act prefers measuring rights from execution, not
performance or delivery.
Finally, regarding copies, the Copyright Act does not contain a
rule for when title to a copy passes, leaving that to state law.
2 95
However, as mentioned above, it does provide that unauthorized
use of a copy before title passes is an infringement. Contractual
restrictions may indicate that an ownership interest has not passed
even though the license is perpetual and a single fee is paid.
296
14. Revesting of Title Upon Rejection
a. Article 2
What happens when the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept the
goods, or fails to make a payment when due, or repudiates its
obligations under a contract of sale? Under Article 2-401(4), upon a
rejection or refusal to accept the goods, whether or not justified,
title to the goods reverts to the seller. Similarly, on a justified
revocation of acceptance, title also revests in the seller. Revesting
occurs automatically by operation of law.297
b. Copyright Act
Not so for copyrights. The gap-filler rule is that upon a licensee's
default, the copyright interest only revests in the licensor if the
resolve this question .... ").
294. 17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1994).
295. But see ALCES & SEE, supra note 14, at § 15.1 (arguing, based on case law, that
title to copies of sheet music passed on delivery of copies, and that the same rule should
apply to copyright interest, but acknowledging that the agreement of the parties controls).
296. DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, 170 E3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
297. U.C.C. § 2-401(4) (1999); see National Fleet Supply, Inc. v. Fairchild, 450 N.E.2d
1015 (Ind. App. 1983); Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc. v. Commodity Engineering Co., 689
F.2d 478 (4th Cir. 1982); see generally HAwKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-401:5; QUINN, supra
note 28, at 2-401[A][3].
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default allows cancellation of the license and the licensor elects to
do so. 298 Elaborating this point requires a quick glance at how civil
actions for infringement of copyright are heard.
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action
"arising under" the Copyright Act.299 A federal question arises if the
complaint seeks a remedy expressly allowed in the Copyright Act
or requires an interpretation of the Act; otherwise, the case belongs
in state court." In contract actions, the litmus test is whether the
complaint alleges breach of a condition to, or a covenant of, the
license. If a failure of a condition, then the license is ineffective,
making unauthorized use an infringement.3°1 If a breach of a
covenant, then the question is whether the breach is so material as
to justify cancellation.m If not, then the claim is for breach of
contract, not infringement, and belongs in state court.30t If so, then
the plaintiff has an election of remedies: affirm the license and sue
for damages, or cancel and sue for infringement.3°4 Suing only for
damages can be regarded as affirming the contract, leaving the
license in place305 Indeed, if the license is exclusive and the
licensor does not elect to cancel, then the licensor's attempted
exercise of the licensed rights make the licensor an infringer."
What this means is that there is no automatic revesting of "title"
298. Compare U.C.I.T.A § 502(c) (1999) (rejection of copy revests title to copy) and §
706(2) (rejection of copy does not cause automatic cancellation and revesting unless a
material breach of whole contract).
299. 17 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
300. See generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 12.01 (discussing application
of rules).
301. See Costello Publishing Co. v. Rostelle, 670 F.2d. 1035, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
302. See Schoenberg, 971 E2d. at 932. Although the Schoenberg court uses the word
"rescission," it uses that word to mean "cancellation." Id. See U.C.C. § 2-106 (1999).
303. See Charter Communications, 936 E2d at 692; Fantastic Fakes, 661 F2d at 483-84
("A mere breach of covenant may support a claim of damages for breach of contract but will
not disturb the remaining rights and obligations under the license including authority to use
the copyrighted material."); see generally 3 NInMER & NMnMER, supra note 56, at § 10.12[A].
304. See Fosson v. Palace (Waterland) Ltd., 78 F3d 1448, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1996);
Costello Publ'g Co., 670 F.2d. at 1045; Nolan v. Sam Fox Publ'g Co., Inc., 499 F2d 1394, 1400
(2d Cir. 1974) (deciding under the 1909 Copyright Act); see generally 3 NIMMER & NImMER,
supra note 56, at § 10.15[A].
305. See Charter Communications, 936 F.2d at 692; Dodd, Mead v. Lilienthal, Inc., 514
F.Supp 105 (S.D.N.Y 1981); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER § 10.15[A].
306. See US. Naval Institute v. Charter Communications, 936 E2d 692, 965 (2" Cir.
1991) ("Indeed, the licnesor may be liable to the exclusive licensee for copyright
infringement if the licensor exercises rights which have theretofore been exclusively
licnesed."); Dodd, Mead & Co., 514 F. Supp at 105 (writer who sued publisher for unpaid
royalties and also attempted to distribute book infringed exclusive publication rights of
publisher); see generally 3 NUIMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 10.15[A].
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in the licensor by operation of law upon a licensee's breach or
repudiation. Revesting only happens if the licensor makes an
affirmative election to cancel the license, or if the license by its
own terms causes an automatic reversion on default.30 7 By the same
token, a license that waives the licensor's right to cancel, even for
material breach, precludes revesting and a consequent infringement
suit.30 Unfortunately, one case, In re Amica, Inc.,an got this
pathetically wrong. It held that upon a licensee's rejection of a
copy, the copyright interest automatically revested in the licensor
by operation of law due to Article 2-401(4). This spurious result is
dissected below.
3 10
15. Rights of Seller's Creditors Against Goods Sold
a. Article 2
Article 2-402 deals with the problem of delayed deliveries, that is,
where the buyer pays for the goods, but delays taking delivery.
What happens to a third party creditor who loans money to the
seller on the strength of what looks to be unsold inventory? To
deal with this situation, Article 2402(1) provides as a general rule
that the rights of the seller's unsecured creditors are subject to the
buyer's right to recover identified goods.31' However, this priority
does not apply if the identification of the goods was fraudulent
under the law of any state where the goods are situated, excluding
good faith retention by a merchant-seller for a commercially
reasonable time.312 Article 2 does not determine what that state law
might be, but simply leaves it undisturbed. 313
b. Copyright Act
What are the rights of an unsecured creditor in a copyrighted
work as against a subsequent licensee? As discussed elsewhere,
those priorities will be allocated under the priority scheme in
307. See Frankel v. Stein and Day, Inc., 470 E Supp. 209 (S.D. N.Y 1979) (provision that
rights "shall automatically" revert on publisher's failure to perform enforced); Kama Krippa
Music, Inc. v. Schekeryk, 510 F.2d. 837, 844 (2d Cir. 1975) (provision for automatic revesting
for failure to pay songwriter's royalties under 1909 Act).
308. See Fosson, 78 F3d at 1448.
309. See In re Amica, 135 B.R. at 534.
310. See infra notes 473-82 and accompanying text.
311. U.C.C. § 2-402(1) (1999).
312. U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1999).
313. U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-402[A][1].
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Section 205 of the Copyright Act.314 Generally, priority will be
determined by who records first in good faith in the Copyright
Office. The exception will be if the subsequent licensee takes under
a written non-exclusive license in good faith and without notice of
the creditor's rights. In any case, federal law, not Article 2, sets
priorities.
315
16. Good Faith Purchaser For Value
a. Article 2
It may happen that a seller owns less than full legal title to the
goods offered for sale. At the extreme end, the seller may be a
thief and the goods stolen. Or the seller may be a bailee to whom
the goods were entrusted who nonetheless purports to sell them as
the seller's own. These situations require some accommodation
between the rights of the lawful owner of the goods and the
innocent buyer who purchases in reliance on the seller's apparent
authority. Article 2-403 provides a series of rules to deal with these
situations.
The basic or "shelter" rule is that a buyer only gets what the
seller had to give.316 As Article 2-403(1) puts it, "a purchaser of
goods acquires all the title which his transferor had or had power
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased." Thus, a buyer
of stolen goods acquires nothing and the seller may still recover
them. The situation becomes more complicated when the seller has
something more. In that case, Article 2-403 provides two
exceptions: the voidable title rule and the entrustment rule.
Under Article 2-403(1), a seller with voidable title can transfer
good title to a good faith purchaser for value. The UCC does not
define voidable title in a comprehensive fashion, leaving that to
state law development. It does, however, provide that the doctrine
applies in at least four special cases enumerated in Article 2403.317
Article 2403(2) also allows a buyer in the ordinary course to
acquire title that can even be superior to that of the seller in the
"entrusting" situation. "Entrusting" is broadly defined to include any
314. See supra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
315. Compare U.C.I.T.A § 109(a) (1999) (deferring to federal priority scheme); see also
ALcEs & SEE, supra note 14, at § 15.2 (agreeing with this result).
316. See generally Qum, supra note 28, at 2-403[A][2].
317. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-403[A][4].
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delivery and acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of
any condition by the entrusting party.318 However, the entrusting
rule only applies where the entrusted party is a "merchant who
deals in goods of that kind." 19 And the purchaser must be a "buyer
in the ordinary course," which the UCC defines as:
a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the
sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods buys in the ordinary
course from a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind but does not include a pawnbroker.
320
Assuming that these hurdles are surmounted, then such a buyer
takes good title to the goods, which may even be superior to those
of the transferor.
b. Copyright Act
Copyright law takes a different approach. It adopts the basic
"shelter" rule that a transferor may not convey any greater interest
than the transferor owned.321 However, it rejects the "voidable title"
and "entrustment" exceptions in the UCC.322 The innocent intent of
a transferee will not prevent a finding of infringement liability,
although it may reduce the available remedies.323 Where a
transferee utilizes a work supplied by another, the transferee's
ignorance that the supplier wrongfully copied or appropriated the
work will not immunize the transferee from liability to the
legitimate copyright owner.324 Apparent authority is not a defense to
a claim of copyright infringement. 325  Similar rules apply to
318. U.C.C. § 2-403(3) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-403[A][9].
319. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-403[AI[9][b].
320. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-403[AI[9][c].
321. For further discussion of the scope of a license, see cases discussed supra at note
94; see generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 10.10[B].
322. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 506 (1999) (transferee takes subject to terms of license - no
voidable title or entrustment rules).
323. See ARP Films, Inc. v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 952 F2d 643 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that a licensee who uses the licensor's information in an unauthorized manner, even
if acting in good faith, may nonetheless be liable for an infringement); see generally 4
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 13.08.
324. See Buck v. Jewell La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1930) (deciding under
the 1909 Copyright Act); Costello Publishing, 670 F2d. at 1035; see generally 4 NiMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 13.08.
325. See Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 1992); MacLean
Associates Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F2d 769, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1991)
(actual authority required for work-made-for-hire).
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disposition of copies. Thus, a sale of copies by a bailee without
authorization is an infringement, even though the bailee may have
ostensible title.
3 26
Stenograph v. Simms327 reached exactly this result. Stenograph
licensed software to Varlack, which Simms claimed Varlack gave
her as a gift. Stenograph sued for copyright infringement and
conversion of the copies of the software.3 28 Simms' claim that the
copy had been sold to Varlack was found to be incorrect, because
the license agreement specifically prohibited transfer, making the
"first sale" doctrine inapplicable.
329
17. Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency
a. Article 2
Article 2-501 gives a buyer a "special property interest" in goods
that are identified to the contract330 This interest gives a buyer an
insurable interest in the goods.3' It also allows a buyer to recover
the goods upon the seller's breach or repudiation, and gives a
allows a right of replevin.3 2 A particularly important remedy comes
in Article 2-502. This section allows a buyer who has paid all or
part of the purchase price for goods in which there is a special
property interest to recover the goods if the seller becomes
insolvent within ten days of the first payment.2 There is some
argument that a buyer's right to reclaim under Article 2-502 is
326. See little Brown & Co. v. American Paper Recycling Corp., 824 F Supp. 11 (D.
Mass. 1993) (despite UCC 2-403, books consigned to bailee for destruction could not be
resold as this would infringe copyright holder's exclusive distribution right); The Walt Disney
Co. v. Video 47, Inc., 972 F Supp. 595 (S.D. Fla 1996) (rental of counterfeit videocassettes an
infringement despite purchase of copies); see generally 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56,
at § 8.12[B][2].)
327. 2000 WL 964748 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
328. A claim for conversion of a copy is not preempted. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 56, at § 1.01[B][1][i].
329. Stenograph, 2000 WL 964748.
330. U.C.C. § 2-501 (1999); see generally ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 2:501:3 (what
constitutes identification); HAWKLAND, supra note 17, at § 2-501:1 (importance of determining
"identification").
331. U.C.C. § 2-501(1), (3) (1999); see generally ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 2:501:30;
HAWKLAND, supra note 17, at 2-501:3.
332. U.C.C. §§ 2-711(2)(a) (remedies for breach) and 2-716(3) (replevin) (1999); First
Tennessee Bank v. Graphic Arts Centre, 859 S.W.2d 858, 865 (Mo. App. 1993) (citing
ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 2-501:16).
333. U.C.C. § 2-502(1) (1999); see generally ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 2:502:3;
HAWKLAND, supra note 17, at § 2-502:1.
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superior to the rights of lien creditors, including the trustee in
bankruptcy.' 4
b. Copyright Act
Now, what about copyrights? Let us assume that a licensee has
paid all or a portion of the license fee under a copyright license for
an identified work, but that the copies have not yet been delivered.
Does the licensee then have a "special property interest" in the
rights or the copies allowing reclamation in the case of the
licensor's insolvency?3 5
Answering this question requires looking at the Bankruptcy
Code.336 In re Select-A-Seat Corp.,37 a case decided under the old
Bankruptcy Act, held than an executory exclusive software license
could be terminated by the trustee for a bankrupt licensor, thus
denying the licensee its exclusive rights despite payment of a
$140,000 license fee. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc., 3 applying the new Bankruptcy Code, reached the
same conclusion and allowed a bankrupt licensor to terminate an
executory non-exclusive technology license despite partial payment
of royalties. These cases thus held that a licensee, whether
exclusive or non-exclusive, has no "special property interest" in
intellectual property rights allowing it to recover them in case of a
licensor's insolvency. As Lubizol put it: "[the licensee] would be
entitled to treat rejection as a breach and seek a monetary
damages remedy; however, it could not seek to retain its contract
rights in the technology by specific performance even if that
remedy would ordinarily be available in this type of contract."3 9 In
response, Congress added Section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code,
allowing a licensee under certain conditions to retain its rights in
intellectual property, including their embodiments.' 4° Thus, the
right, if any, of a licensee to recover either rights or copies in case
of a licensor's insolvency is determined by federal bankruptcy law,
334. See generally HAWKLAND, supra note 17, at § 2-502:6; QUINN, supra note 28, at 1
2-502[A][3].
335. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 811 (1999) (no concept of special property interest but
specific performance available as a remedy); § 813 (licensee may elect to continue use after
licensor's breach).
336. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-500 (1994).
337. 625 F2d. 290 (9th Cir. 1980).
338. 756 F.2d. 1043 (4th Cir. 1984).
339. Lubrizol Enterprises, 765 F2d at 1048.
340. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n); see generally 3 COLLIER ON BANfuprcY 1 365.14 (15th ed. rev.
1999).
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not Article 2-502.
This is consistent with the Copyright Act. A lien or hypothecation
of a copyright interest is a transfer of copyright ownership, which
requires a writing.34 Because the buyer's special property interest is
conceptualized as a type of security interest,3 2 it would also need a
writing signed by the licensor to be effective. Such a lien cannot be
implied by state law. Moreover, a special property interest under
Article 2-501 does not effectuate a transfer of title to the copies.
Thus, if the ownership of the copies resides with the bankrupt
licensor, a licensee has no first sale privilege to dispose of them.3
18. Buyer's Right to Inspect
a. Article 2
Venerable tradition has it that a buyer can inspect the
merchandise3 44 The question is not whether but when. Where the
contract is silent, Article 2-512 provides two rules on the timing of
inspection: the normal rule, and the variant rule.345 The normal rule
is that a buyer has a right to inspect identified goods before
payment or acceptance. 46 Inspection can occur "at any reasonable
time and place and in any reasonable manner." The variant rule347
says that a buyer is not entitled to inspect before payment in three
cases: (i) where the parties so agree; 48 (ii) where the contract is
C.O.D.;349 or (iii) where the contract provides for "payment against
documents of title, except where such payment is due only after
the goods become available for inspection. "35  These rules apply
341. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (defining "transfer of copyright ownership"); 204(a) (1994).
342. See generally HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-502:6.
343. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117 (1994); see CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F
Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that when a copy of software was transferred to
creditors, the privilege to continue using the copy under Section 117 ceased).
344. See, e.g., Turlock Merchants & Growers, Inc. v. Smith, 251 P. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d
Dist. 1926) (discussing the buyer's right to inspect under pre-UCC law); M.A. Newark & Co.
v. Smith, 146 P. 1064 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1915).
345. U.C.C. §§ 2-512, 513 (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-513[A].
346. U.C.C. § 2-513(1) (1999); see generally QUINN,'supra note 28, at 2-513[A][2].
347. U.C.C. § 2-513(3) (1999); see generally QUmIN, supra note 28, at 2-513[A][3].
348. U.C.C. § 2-513(1) (1999).
349. U.C.C. § 2-513(3)(a) (1999).
350. U.C.C. § 2-513(3)(b) (1999). The third situation bears closer study.
Where the contract calls for "payment against documents," e.g., order bill against sight
draft, it is the documents that control payment and since they will normally arrive
before the goods themselves, inspection is not only legally deferred but deferred as a
practical matter as well. Since the use of documentary payment terms is common, this
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irrespective of title to the goods.35'
b. Copyright Act
Copyrights are not the same. Certainly, a licensee can inspect a
copy. Examine the book to make sure the ink doesn't run. Check a
software package to verify it includes a CD instead of 3.5" floppies.
Look in the videocassette box to check that the movie on the
cassette label is the same as the one on the box. All perfectly
acceptable. But if inspection goes beyond checking the
characteristics of the copy and requires examining the embodied
copyrighted work, then the Copyright Act has something to say
about when - and if - inspection is allowed without consent of the
copyright owner.
352
If inspection of a computer program requires loading the
program onto the user's computer to examine how it works, then,
unlike under Article 2, the status of title to the copy is of critical
importance. Loading a program means making a copy, one of the
exclusive rights reserved to the copyright owneratu Doing so
without authorized is an infringement. 35M Section 117 does allow
type of situation is perhaps the principal illustration of the rule requiring payment
before inspection.
QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-513[A][3]. Think about this rule for copyright licenses. In a sale
of goods, the goods are primary and the documents of title secondary. In information
licensing, however, what counts is the legal permission to use the information - the license
- because it distinguishes the infringer from the authorized user. Is not the license akin to a
"document of title"? If so, one could argue that, for information licenses, the variant
"document" rule in Article 2-513(3)(b) is the correct default rule; a licensee has no right to
inspect before payment unless the license says otherwise.
351. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1999).
352. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 603 (1999) (no inspection right for submission to satisfaction
of a party); § 604 (no inspection right where inspection would provide substantially all the
value of information that cannot be returned); § 608(b) (no inspection before payment if
inconsistent with contract).
353. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994); see Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc., 25 F.
Supp.2d 1218, 1229 (D. Utah 1997); Sega Enterprises, Inc. v Accolade, Inc., 977 F2d 1510 (9th
Cir. 1992) (intermediate copying of computer object code constituted copying but allowed as
fair use); Atari Games v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (single
unauthorized copy of computer program supports claim of infringement); see generally 2
NMMER & NIMMER, supra note 28, at § 8.08 ("[It is] clear that the input of a work into a
computer results in the making of a copy, an hence, that such unauthorized input infringes
the copyright owner's reproduction rights.") The NoveU case, while doubtless correct on this
point, is mistaken on its application of Article 2, as discussed infra at notes 536-37 and
accompanying text.
354. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994); see Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Associates, Inc., 144 F.3d
96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (loading software from a floppy disc into RAM causes a copy to be
made); Fonar Corp. v. Domenick, 105 F3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997); MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc,. 79 F.3d 1532
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loading a copy of a program onto a hard disk, but only by the
owner of a copy.35 If the licensee does not own the copy, then this
privilege does not exist, and loading the program for inspection is
an infringement. 35 If title to the copy revests in the licensor,
because of, say, rejection of the copy, then the Section 117
privilege ends.357 Some types of inspection, even without copying,
can also be an infringement. For example, a video store may not
allow patrons to watch ("inspect") videos in a private room prior to
purchase because this infringes the copyright owner's public
performance right.35 A computer store may not allow customers to
take home programs for "home inspection" under a deferred billing
plan since this would violate the program owner's exclusive rental
right.35 In sum, where copyrighted works are concerned, any
"gap-filler" inspection rights implied by state law must yield to
limitations under federal law unless the copyright owner agrees
otherwise.360
(lth Cir. 1996) (issue whether literal copying of source code for purposes of determining
interoperability an infringement).
355. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
356. See MAI Systems, 991 F2d at 518-519. Note that Congress amended Section 117 in
the Digital Millenium Copyright Act to allow limited copying for servicing, thus abrogating
the specific holding in MA! Systems. See Syngeristic Technologies v. IDB Mobil
Communications, 871 F. Supp. 24, 29 9 (D. D.C. 1994) (holding that the right to inspect
software under Section 117 existed only because title to the copy had passed under UCC
2-401).
357. See CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F Supp. 337, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1992.) (on
transfer of copy of software to creditors privilege to continue using copy under Section 117
ceases).
358. See Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1991); Columbia
Pictures Industries v. Aveco, Inc., 612 F. Supp 315 (M.D. Pa 1985), aff'd, 800 F2d 59 (3d Cir.
1986); Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd Home, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Penn. 1983),
qffd, 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984); Columbia Pictures Industries v. Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989) (rental of videocassettes for use in hotel rooms
equipped with cassette players not a public performance).
359. See Central Point Software v. Global Software & Access, 880 F Supp. 957, 965
(E.D. N.Y. 1995).
360. Another emerging issue involves computer programs provided over the Internet
via cable modems. Cable services, including video-on-demand, are the subject of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. (Pub.L No. 102-385, 106 Stat.
1460 codified variously in 47 U.S.C. §§ 521- 595.) The Act provides a comprehensive scheme
for the Federal Communications Commission to set cable service rates. See Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FC.C., 56 F3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It preempts all state regulations of
cable service rates inconsistent with the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(1). Can state law allow a
cable subscriber to view ("inspect") a program provided by the cable service before
payment, or would such a rule be a regulation of "rates" preempted by the Act? Storer Cable
Communications v. City of Montgomery, 806 F Supp. 1518, 1544 (M.D. Ala 1992) held that a
city ordinance which prohibited price discrimination based on geographic location, although




The "perfect tender" rule in Article 2-601 allows the buyer to
reject the whole "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract."361 Under Article 2-711(1), the
buyer may then cancel the entire contract. Thus, for a
non-conformity in the physical items alone, a buyer may cancel the
entire contract. In Article 2's perfect tender model, acceptance of a
performance marks a sharp boundary between two very different
worlds. Before acceptance, the buyer can reject "if the goods or the
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract."36 2
If the buyer does reject, the buyer must seasonably notify the seller
and specify the defects or risk being barred from any remedy for
the nonconformity.36 After acceptance, the landscape changes. A
buyer's revocation requires that "the nonconformity substantially
impairs the value to him," a far more difficult measure than the
perfect tender one.3 6
b. Copyright Act
Section 202 of the Copyright Act provides that in a copyright
license the terms transferring rights are independent of those
transferring copies. Although no court has yet been faced with the
issue, its is fair to ask whether the perfect tender rule is consistent
with Section 202.365 Consider a custom software license where the
licensee agrees to pay one million dollars for a copyrighted
database program to be delivered on a CD. The licensor delivers
the program on a DVD. If the perfect tender rule were strictly
applied, then the licensee would be entitled to cancel the entire
license for a nonconformity merely in the copy. But Section 202
says that terms relating to transfer of the copy do not effect the
conveyance of the copyright interest, so that delivery - or
non-delivery - of the physical object does not effect the copyright
New York v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1992) (local regulation of "downgrade" charges for
changing from premium to basic cable service not preempted).
361. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1999).
362. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-601[A][4].
363. U.C.C. §§ 2-605, 2-607(3) (1999).
364. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at 2-608[A][1].
365. Compare U.C.I.T.A. § 704(a) and (b) (1999) (no "perfect tender" rules except in
mass market contract only calling for a single delivery of a copy).
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transfer. The licensee should remain liable for as least that portion
of the one million dollars attributable to the copyright interest.
Presuming otherwise, as the perfect tender rule does, would mean
that terms effecting the transfer of the material object also effected
the transfer of the copyright interest, contrary to Section 202.366
20. Buyer's Obligations for Rejected Goods
a. Article 2
When the buyer rightfully rejects the goods, three interrelated
sections of Article 2 determine the buyer's further rights and
obligations. Article 2-602 sets the context. Basically, the buyer may
not exercise any ownership interest in the goods, and must hold
unpaid goods in the buyer's possession with reasonable care until
the seller can reclaim them.367 Under Article 2-603(1), if the seller is
not present in the marketplace, a merchant buyer has a duty,
absent contrary instructions from the to seller, to make reasonable
efforts to resell the goods for the seller's account if they are
perishable or threaten to decline in value speedily. If the goods are
not perishable, then the buyer nonetheless has the option of
reselling them for the seller's account under Article 2-604. In so
doing, the buyer is held only to the obligations of good faith
conduct, and such conduct does not amount to an acceptance of
the goods or a conversion.
36
b. Copyright Act
Again, copyright licenses raise a different calculus. For these
purposes, we can assume that "rejection" means that the licensee
has declared the licensor in default for a material breach.
First let us start with the copyright interest. As discussed above,
there is no automatic revesting of "title" (copyright interest) in the
licensor unless the licensee makes an affirmative election to cancel
the license or the license causes an automatic reversion on
default.369 If cancellation ("rejection") does occur, then the licensee
366. See Oddo v. Ries, 743 F2d 630 (91h Cir. 1984) (rejection of manuscript did not
terminate copyright interest). Regarding the Perfect Tender rule for software, see D.P
Technologies, 751 F Supp. at 1038; but see In re Amica, Inc., 135 B.R. at 534, which is
further discussed infra at notes 467-82 and accompanying text.
367. U.C.C. § 2-602(2) (1999); QUINN 20602[A].
368. U.C.C. §§ 2-603(3) and 2-604 (1999).
369. See Fantastic Fakes, 661 F2d at 483-84 ("A mere breach of covenant may support
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has no right or duty to relicense the copyright interest. To the
contrary, if the licensee tries to do so after cancellation, the
licensee becomes an infringer.
370
As to copies, as discussed above, a rejection of a copy does not,
under Section 202, affect the copyright interest unless the license
so provides. Assume that the license does provide that failure to
deliver a particular copy is material breach and for this reason the
licensee elects to cancel. In that case, if rejection means that title
to the copy has not passed, then the licensee has neither the right
nor the duty to resell the rejected copy, as this would infringe the
licensor's exclusive distribution rights.3 1'
21. Seller's Right to Resell
a. Article 2
What happens when the buyer wrongfully refuses to accept the
goods, or fails to make a payment when due, or repudiates its
obligations under a contract of sale? The first thing that happens is
that "title" to goods revests in the seller by operation of law.
37 2
Then the UCC remedy provisions roll into play.37 3 One particular
option an aggrieved seller may want is the right to resell the goods
to mitigate damages. The UCC has several specific provisions that
allow the seller to do so.374 The procedures for reselling the goods
are set forth in Article 2-706.
b. Copyright Act
As discussed above, for the copyright interest there is no
automatic revesting of "title" in the licensor by operation of law
a claim of damages for breach of contract but will not disturb the remaining rights and
obligations under the license including authority to use the copyrighted material."); see
generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 10.12[A]. See supra notes 61-79 and
accompanying text.
370. See ARP Films, 952 F2d at 649 (where licensor repudiated license, licensee's
continued exploitation indicated election to affirm contract making failure to pay royalties a
material breach); see generally 3 NIAMER & NmriEr, supra note 56, at § 10.15[A].
371. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994); Dodd, Mead & Co., 514 F Supp at 105 (exclusive
license).
372. U.C.C. § 2-401(4) (1999); see supra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
373. U.C.C. § 2-703 (1999) (cataloging seller's remedies); see generally QUINN, Supra
note 56, at 2-703[A].
374. See generally QUINN, supra note 56, at 2-703[A][4] (cataloging seller's remedies
that looks to the goods).
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upon a licensee's breach or repudiation. 3 5 If the breach is not
material, then the licensor may have claim damages, but may not
disturb the licensee's rights.376 Even if the breach is material,
revesting only happens if the licensor makes an affirmative election
to cancel the license or the license causes an automatic reversion
on default.37 7 If the license is exclusive and the licensor does not
elect to cancel, then the licensor's attempted exercise of the
licensed rights makes the licensor an infringer.
378
As for copies, the Copyright Act may impose limits on the right
to resell, depending on whether the party providing the copies is
the licensor or the licensee. Assume the licensor delivers copies to
a licensee for exclusive distribution, and the licensee breaches. (In
Article 2 terms, the "buyer-licensee" is in breach.) The licensor
nonetheless has no right to take and sell unsold copies absent a
cancellation as this would infringe the licensee's exclusive
distribution rights.3 79 Assume it is the licensee who manufactures
copies for delivery to the licensor. (In Article 2 terms, the
"buyer-licensor" is in breach.). Then on material breach by the
licensor, there is authority that the licensee may resell the copies
to mitigate damages.3
375. See supra notes 369-75 and accompanying text.
376. See Fantastic Fakes, 661 F.2d at 483-84; see generally NuMMER & NwMER, supra
note 56, at § 10.12[A.
377. See supra notes 369-75 and accompanying text.
378. See Charter Communications, 936 F2d at 965; Dodd, Mead & Co., 514 F Supp. at
105; see generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 10.15[A].
379. See Dodd, Mead & Co., 514 F Supp. at 105.
380. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F3d 621 (2d Cir. 1995). In Platt & Munk Co.,
Inc. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963), a case decided under the 1909
Act, a manufacturer licensed to produce educational toys tied to sell them in mitigation
when the copyright owner refused to pay. As Justice Friendly put it:
The question is whether an unpaid manufacturer of copyrighted goods, which are
alleged to be defective by the copyright proprietor who has ordered them, may sell
them in satisfaction of his claim for the contract price without infringing the
"exclusive right".of the proprietor to "publish... and vend the copyrighted work."...
It seems exceedingly strange that [this] question should arise for the first time... one
hundred and seventy-three years after the initial grant of copyright protection by
Congress ....
Platt & Munk Co., 315 F2d at 849. The Court allowed the sale. But see 2 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 56, at § 8.12[B][3][b] (arguing that the reasoning in Platt was rendered




22. Buyer's Security Interest
a. Article 2
Under Article 2-711(3), upon rightful rejection or revocation, a
buyer has a security interest in any goods in the buyer's possession
for any payments made. The buyer may hold and resell such goods
in like manner as any aggrieved seller.
b. Copyright Act
Under the Copyright Act, an aggrieved licensee who rejects the
license or the copies has no security interest at all in the copyright,
and a limited one at best in the copies. With regard to the
copyright, a security interest constitutes a "transfer of copyright
ownership."38l As such, it must be signed by the copyright owner to
be effective s82 Even if the licensee pays for the software and the
vendor cashes the check, there is no effective security interest in
the copyright without a signed writing so providing.2 In other
words, upon rightful or wrongful rejection or revocation by a
licensee, the licensee has no security interest in the copyright for
the amounts paid unless the licensor so agrees in writing. As to
copies, the licensee may have a security interest in them, but on
foreclosure could only sell the copies subject to the limited use
privileges in the Copyright Act. Any licensed use, such as a right to
copy code into a new program, would not be granted.
23. Chart of Statutory Differences
The following chart summarizes the previous discussion, showing
the irreconcilable differences between Article 2 and the Copyright
Act.
381. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "transfer of copyright ownership").
382. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a); see In re Avalon Software, 209 B.R. at 520-521 (no security
interest in copyrighted software absent compliance with signature requirements of federal
law).
383. See Konigsberg Int'l, 16 F3d at 357 (no exclusive license absent signature even
with payment).
384. See LeFlore v. Grass Harp Productions, Inc., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340, 342 n.1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1997) (holding that a foreclosure by a lien creditor on a film negative granted
no rights in the embodied motion picture).
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CAcR OF STATUTORY DIFFERENCES
ARTIcLE 2 COPYRIGHT ACT
2-105: "Goods" are tangible, movable, and in § 202: Copyrightable works are intangible,
single location at time of identification immovable and simultaneously everywhere
2-106: "Sale" means passing of title in goods § 101: No transfer of copyright ownership
in non-exclusive licenses
§ 203(d): Only transfer divisible copyright
ownership in exclusive license within scope
of license
2-201: Statute of frauds with traditional § 204(a): Writing requirement for exclusive
exceptions licenses; traditional exceptions inipplicable
2-206(1)(b): Contract formed by shipment of § 202: No copyright license from transfer of
goods copies
2-207(3) In contract by conduct, terms § 204(a): No exclusive license by conduct;
determined by "knock-out" rule and Code if implied non-exclusive license, no
defaults knock-out rule for terms
2-208: Terms interpreted by commercial § 301: Where applicable, interpretations
practice based on federal policies preempt state
rules
2-210(2): Rights and obligations assignable § 101: Exclusive licenses presumed
absent material impairment assignable
Non-exclusive licenses not assignable;
copies transferable under specific
conditions for first sale, computer use
privilege, and nonprofit libraries
2-301: Basic obligations of buyer and seller. § 202: Basic obligations of licensor and
unitary, dependent, concurrent licensee: compound, independent,
asynchronous
2-309(2): Contract for successive § 203; Exclusive licenses of indefinite
performances of indefinite duration duration perpetual; non-exclusive licenses
terminable at will may be terminable at will (split in
authority)
2-314: Implied warranty of merchantability First Amendment: Limits on implied
warranties for some program functionality?
2-326(1): Sale on Approval § 109(a): Preempts U.C.C. for software
rentals
2-326(2): Sale or return (consignments): § 202(d); 204(a): :Licensor's retained
Buyer's creditors superior unless seller interestsuperior to licensee's creditors
takes specific steps unless creditors take certain steps;
§ 109(a): First sale doctrine inapplicable to
consignee
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2-401: Title to goods not determinative of §§ 109; 117: Title to copies determines
rights and remedies existence of fair use, first sale and
computer program privileges
2-401(2): General rule, title to goods passes § 205(d): General rule, rights vests on first
on delivery execution or first recording
2401(2): By operation of law, title to goods § 101: No title passes at all in non-exclusive
passes to buyer and any reservation of title license
by seller is a mere security interest
§§ 201, 203 & 501: Licensor retains divisible
legal and equitable ownership interests in
unlicensed rights that are not security
interests
2-401(3): Mandatory revesting of title to 17 USCA § 1338(a): No automatic revesting
goods in seller upon rejection or on licensee default unless licensor elects to
repudiation, whether or not correct cancel license
2-402(1): Buyer's right to recover goods in § 205: Priority of interests under license
seller's possession superior to seller's determined by federal law, not state law
creditors in some cases
2-403: Person with voidable title can still § 109: Bailee cannot pass ownership
pass good title to buyer in ordinary course interest sufficient to trigger first sale
defense.
2-502: Buyer has special property interest in 11 USCA § 365(n): Licensee's right to retain
identified goods superior to seller's lien rights or copies determined under
creditors in case of seller's bankruptcy Bankruptcy Code, not state law
2-512: Generally, buyer has a right to § 106: Licensee has no right to inspect
inspect goods before payment before payment if inspection impacts
exclusive rights
2-601: "Perfect tender" rule says any § 202: May disallow "perfect tender"
non-conformity in goods a material breach assumption that defect in copies is material
of whole contract breach of whole license
2-602 & 2-603: On rightful rejection, buyer § 106: On licensee's cancellation, no right or
has right and in some case obligation to duty to relicense copyright interest or
resell goods for seller. dispose of copies
2-703, 2-706: Seller may take and resell § 106: On licensee's breach, licensor may
goods to cover if buyer defaults not relicense exclusive copyright interest
without cancellation; licensee-seller may
dispose of goods in mitigation
2-711: Buyer has security interest in § 2-204(a): Licensee has no security interest
rejected goods to extent of price paid in license absent licensor consent; security
interest in copies depends on who supplied
them
C. Article 2 on Its Own Terms
We have worked through the mechanics of Article 2 and the
Copyright Act, looking at where the underlying models are
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incompatible. Now it is time to come back to basics. On its own
terms, does Article 2 apply to software transactions? Article 2-102
sets forth the scope of the sales article thus: "Unless the context
otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods...
" So, "goods" and "transactions" are the key words. Let us examine
whether a software license falls within these parameters.
1. A Computer Program is Not a "Good"
What is a "good" under the UCC? Article 2-105(1) says:
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are moveable at the time of identification to the
contract for sale other than money in which the price is to be
paid, investment securities and things in action.
Thus, under Article 2, there are two tests for "goods:" a substance
test - moveability; and a timing test - identification. Computer
programs do not fit under either one.
a. Moveablility
Is a computer program moveable? Several courts and
commentators have thought so. But remember, we are not talking
about the copy of the computer program; we are talking about the
computer program itself. That is what these authorities say is a
"good." So try this experiment. Log on to the Linux Web site and
download a copy of LIuqx onto your hard disc. If the learned
authorities are right - if a computer program becomes a tangible,
moveable good when it is embodied in a copy - then LiNUX the
computer program has migrated to your hard disc and is no longer
available on the Linux Web site. It should have moved. But wait.
Go back to the Linux Web site and check it out. LiNux is still there,
waiting to be copied. It has not moved. In fact, it is now in two
places at the same time. How can this be? A computer program is
supposed to be moveable. This means travelling from one place to
another. How can a moveable computer program be in two places
at the some time?
Try another test. Run to Anchorage and start distributing copies
of LINuX without complying with the GNU Public License; infringe
the copyright.3 6 Now run to Miami and do the same thing. If LINUX
385. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1999).




the computer program is indeed moveable in the marketplace then
it stands to reason that it cannot be in two different marketplaces
at the same time. You cannot sue for the same injury to the same
car in two different places. Moving from point A to point B
necessarily means leaving point A. If you believe this about LINUX,
be prepared for a rude awakening. Like things in action, which by
definition are not goods, a copyright in a computer program is an
intangible interest, which may be enforced simultaneously
everywhere.
These hypothetical experiments are tongue-in-cheek, but the
point is not. A copy of a computer program may be tangible and
moveable, but not the computer program - the copyrightable work.
The computer program is intangible, immovable, and
simultaneously everywhere. Those that argue otherwise make the
junior's mistake of confusing the copy with the copyright.
b. Identification
Now let's look at the identification test. Is the software identified
to the contract or by the contract? Again, consider LINux. If the
computer program LINUX is a good, then what exactly is it that is
identified to the contract when you acquire a CD at CompUSA?
If LINUx is a good, then under Article 2-401, title to LINUX the
computer program must necessarily pass by operation of law. But
"title" to LINUX would mean the entire, worldwide, perpetual
copyright, while the GNU Public License only grants a limited,
non-exclusive license. LINUX the computer program is not identified
to the contract; rather the object of the contract - the scope of the
grant - is identified by the license. Goods, being tangible, can be
identified by the senses apart from the contract and must be
identified to it. Copyright interests, being intangible, are only
delimited by words in the contract.
"But," you say "I left CompUSA with a CD. This is a tangible
copy. Surely this is the good identified to the contract." Maybe, but
beside the point. The issue is not whether the blank CD is
identified, but whether the computer program embodied on the CD
is also identified .8 7 Article 2-501(1) is explicit that identification
must occur no later than: (i) for existing goods, when the contract
is made; or (ii) for future goods, when they are designated as the
387. See ALCES & SEE, supra note 14, at § 8.15.2 ("[T]he acquisition of intellectual
property itself requires 'identification' by means other then mere transfer of physical
possession of the object in which the intellectual property is embodied.")
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goods to which the contract refers.3 Now, when you took the CD
home, you probably copied the computer program onto your hard
drive. That hard drive copy did not exist when you stood at the
cash register. What existed, what was necessarily the only object
that could be identified to the contract under Article 2-501, was the
copy of the computer program in the CD case. You can argue that
the copy on your hard drive was a future good, but did the store
clerk really designate that payment was not for the CD in your
hand but for the hard disk copy you might make later on? I think
not. That means that under Article 2-501, the copy that was made
on your hard drive could not have possibly been identified to the
contract. So if the copy on your hard drive is the computer
program that does not "work," that means - but you get the point.
And what happens when a copy is downloaded over the Internet?
Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pennsylvania, Inc. held that the
delivery of cable television programming signals was not a
"transaction in goods" under the UCC because programming signals
are not "fairly identifiable as movables before the contract is
performed."39° Digital signals passed by electronic means over the
Internet to download copies of computer programs should also not
qualify as identified goods.
Article 2 is about the sale of wares - tangible, moveable hard
goods identifiable by the senses. Computer programs are intangible
products of the mind that are immovable and simultaneously
everywhere. They are not delimited by the senses but described in
words. They are not identified to a contract but by a contract. Yet
the Article 2 eschatology would have it that these intangibles
nonetheless descend into physical form where they lose forever
their incorporeal essence to become only dense matter. Tales of
angels that take on human form and forfeit their immortality make
engaging movies and wonderful stories. But such imaginings belong
to myth, not law.
2. A Software License is Not a "Sale"
Article 2-105(1) says that Article 2 applies to "transactions" in
goods, not just "sales." Does this mean that Article 2 can apply to
software licenses because they are transactions? An interesting
distinction, but pointless. Article 2 deals with, and the definition of
388. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a) and (b) (1999).
389. 671 A.2d. 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
390. Kaplan, 671 A.2d at 723.
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goods is cast in terms of, a contract of sale.3 91 Article 2-106(1) says:
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires, "contract"
and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or
future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes both a
present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future
time. A "sale" consists of the passing of title from the seller to
the buyer for a price (Section 2401). A "present sale" means a
sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract.
3 92
The inclusion of transactions within Article 2-105(1) is meant to
cover a limited number of familiar situations which are not
technically sales but are nonetheless are covered in the statute,
most particularly consignments.3 93 It does not sweep every
commercial transaction involving goods into Article 2.
Novemedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp.394 made that point.
The case involved a settlement agreement to a patent infringement
suit, which called for the delivery of the allegedly infringing
inventory to the patent owner. When the inventory proved to be
defective as well as infringing, the irate patent owner brought suit
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Article
2. To the patent owner, this was surely a "transaction in goods"
within the scope of Article 2. The Federal Circuit saw it otherwise:
Many commercial transactions are not governed by Article 2
of the UCC: sale of land or securities, assignment of a contract
right, or granting a license under a patent or copyright, to
name just a few. The mere fact that title to Article 2 goods
changes hands during one of these transactions does not by
that fact alone make the transaction a sale of goods ....
Here, the mere fact that the parties' settlement agreement
includes the transfer of personal property in its provisions
does not make it a simple sale of goods (slippers) for a price
(release of a legal claim) .... The settlement agreement is no
more a contract for the sale of slippers than it is a licensing
agreement for NDM's patents. In fact, it is neither exclusively;
it is a mixed contract .... 395
391. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Computer Servicecenters,
Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F Supp. 653 (D. S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443 F2d 906 (4th Cir 1971).
392. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1999).
393. Article 2-326; QUINN 2-102[a][1].
394. See Novemedix, Ltd. v. NDM Acquisition Corp., 166 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
395. Novemedix, 166 F.3d at 1182 (emphasis added).
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Novemedix indicates the real reason for trying to apply Article 2 to
software transactions: to impose an implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness. But these implied warranties only apply
to a "contract" of a sale,396 not any "transaction" in goods.
A sale means "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for
a price." 97 In a non-exclusive software license, there is as a matter
of federal law no transfer of copyright ownership398 to begin with,
hence no sale of the computer program ever occurs. There may be
a sale of the CD embodying the computer program, but not the
licensed computer program. In an exclusive license, there is a
transfer of copyright ownership, but this is not a passing of title in
the Article 2 sense due to the numerous ownership interests
retained by the licensor.
39
Think again of LINUX. This license is non-exclusive. A customer
who acquires a copy of LINux does not acquire any ownership
interest in the computer program, so the legally separate license
from the Linux organization cannot be a sale of goods even under
Article 2's own definitions." It seems so counter-intuitive. The
customer is after all walking off with a physical object - the CD
and the packaging. It also seems counter-intuitive that the Sun does
not orbit the Earth. But looking beyond facade to fact yields the
conclusion that neither intuition is correct.40 1  A software
transaction is a license of a computer program, not a sale of goods.
Some commentators say that software vendors call a software
transaction a license to avoid the first sale doctrine,4 but this is
incorrect. These commentators think that a software transaction
can only be a sale or a license, one or the other, take it or leave it.
They fail to understand that software transactions have two
independent components, one of which might involve the sale of a
copy, but the other part, the real substance, involves a license of
396. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1999) ("a warranty that goods shall be merchantable is implied
in a contract for their sale"); 2-315 (warranty of fitness at time of "contracting").
397. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1999); see generally HAWKIAND, supra note 24, at § 2-106:2.
398. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "transfer of copyright ownership").
399. See infra notes 484-86 and accompanying text.
400. See Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F Supp.2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(end user license agreement a license, not a sale); Berthold Types v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 101 F
Supp.2d 697 (E.D. MIl. 2000) (software license not a sale because no transfer of title).
401. Professor Casti's book, Complexification, discusses the ways that science tries to
explain what is really happening when the world behaves at variance with our common
sense, i.e., "that Grand Canyon-sized chasm between what we think and what is actually the
case." CAsTi, supra note 226, at 2-3.
402. E.g. Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap
Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 572 (1998) (arguing as much).
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computer information. Software vendors call their transactions
licenses to avoid inappropriate application of Article 2 in ways that
ignore the license, or worse, subject the license to the default rules
in Article 2. Many programs, like LIwux, give a licensee greater
rights than are allowed by the first sale doctrine, and the licensee
needs the license to enable that expanded use. Licensors correctly
identify software transactions as licenses because that is exactly
what they are.
3. "Predominant Purpose" is the Wrong Test
Despite these conceptual discontinuities, many authorities still
try to justify applying Article 2 to software transactions under the
predominant purpose test. The argument is that, despite the
licensee's paramount goal of obtaining the legal rights in the
computer program, since somewhere along the way a use-enabler
like a CD floated by, the predominant purpose of the deal is really
a sale of goods. The upshot of this reasoning is that terms in the
license unpalatable at least to the licensee, typically a disclaimer of
warranties, are ignored. As the next section will discuss, this has
led to frantic contortions as courts and commentators engage in a
desperate struggle to fit the facts into this image. One can imagine
Medieval astrologers feeling the same desperation as they tried to
plot their patrons' horoscopes using the imagery from Ptolemic
astronomy.
In fact, however, predominant purpose is simply the wrong test.
It attempts to draw a dividing line along a single conceptual
continuum from services to sales, with services at one end being
out of Article 2 and sales at the end being in. This linear
continuum, however, exists solely along a state law axis. State law
can presume that commercial transactions only fit somewhere
along this line, so the question is either-or, one or the other,
entirely within Article 2 for all purposes, or entirely without.
But interests in copyrightable computer programs are determined
by federal law. This federal interest is orthogonal to the single
extension between services and goods and requires analysis in an
entirely new dimension. Predominant purpose is inadequate for this
multi-dimensional approach. The necessary and proper test is
statutory conformity: do the underlying policies and purposes of
Article 2 when taken as a whole conform to the requirements of
the Copyright Act when applied to software transactions? The
Official Comments to Article 1-102 agree this is the correct
approach:
Vol. 38:459
Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software
[T]he proper construction of the Act requires that its
interpretation and application be limited to its reason ...
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying
purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read
in light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in
question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of
the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the
case my be, in accordance with the purposes involved.
403
This test demands a more rigorous analysis that simply reading the
definition of goods in splendid isolation. It requires reading the
whole of Article 2 section by section to determine whether the way
it implements its transactional model conforms with the policies
and purposes of the Copyright Act. The UCC itself mandates that it
be interpreted as a whole in a manner that promotes its underlying
purposes and policies,4°4 not in piecemeal fashion.
Courts applying the predominant purpose test to software
transactions simply ignore this requirement. Instead, once they
decide to that the transaction is within Article 2, they pick and
choose the specific provision they want, such as the statute of
frauds or an implied warranty. They do not apply Article 2 as a true
code - an integrated, systematic, preemptive whole - but as a grab
bag of disconnected statutes out for the plucking.
In application, the predominant purpose test uses rote
comparison of the cost of the copy to the amount of the license fee
in order to fix the transaction along the services/goods continuum
solely on the basis of price.4 5 But this allows too easy
manipulation to subvert the federal scheme. If a purveyor of copies
of LINUX allocates 1R to the license and $19.99 to the copy, does
this mean one can now ignore Section 202 and treat the sale of the
copy as granting a copyright license? What if the allocation is 49%
to the license and 51% to the copy? Still a sale of goods? What
about 51% license and 49% copy? Since the value of a blank CD is
typically pennies, would it not be appropriate to allocate 1% to the
value of the tangible CD and 99% to the value of the intangible
right to use the computer program in any case? Determining
whether a transaction is inside or outside Article 2 merely by
moving the price toggle along the sales-service slide bar both
abuses copyright law and disgraces the interconnected structure of
403. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) cmt. 1 (1999).
404. U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1999).




D. What Law if Not Article 2?
So what contract law does apply to software transactions?
If some contract law applies to software transactions, and that
law cannot be Article 2, then the only candidate left, absent UCITA,
is the common law of contracts. Common law lacks many benefits
of Article 2. It is not tailored to software transactions specifically;
it does not provide a comprehensive set of gap-filler rules; it is not
uniform among the states; even within a state it is often scattered
among a daunting array of statutes and court decisions; and its
rigid, formal rules are not adaptable to rapid change. Moreover,
both common law and current Article 2 have no provisions to deal
with the explosive growth of e-commerce, including click-on
contracts, digital authentication, Web-based delivery, or bargaining
through electronic agents to name a few. Nonetheless, unless and
until a state adopts UCITA, it is all there is.
406
This analysis has particular importance in mass market software
transactions, especially those involving "shrinkwrap" licenses. Use
of shrink wrap licenses has generated considerable discussion. Two
cases, Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology4 7 and
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,4°m are usually at the heart of the debate.
In Step-Saver, a software vendor supplied prepackaged software
with a shrink-wrap license. The customer ordered the software
over the phone, then sent a followed-up purchase order detailing
the items, price, shipment and payment terms. In response, the
vendor sent a confirming invoice and shipped the software with a
shrink-wrap license disclaiming all warranties. The action was,
surprise, for breach of warranty. The parties agreed to let Article 2
govern the transaction, 4°9 and on this basis the court applied the
"battle of the forms" rule in Article 2-207. Under this rule, held the
court, the contract .arose with the exchange of purchase order and
invoice, so the warranty disclaimer in the shrink-wrap did not
become part of the contract, because the customer did not accept
it.410
406. As of this writing, UCITA has been adopted in Virginia and Maryland.
407. 939 F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1991).
408. 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
409. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 422-24 and accompanying text.
410. Step-Saver, 939 F2d at 92-103. But what about the license to use the computer
program? Step-Saver, upon finding the shrinkwrap license invalid, recognized that further
distribution of the software without a license could be a copyright infringement, but found
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ProCD involved a database of telephone numbers on CD-ROM,
available in both a consumer version and, for a higher price, a
commercial version. A shrink-wrap license limited the consumer
version to non-commercial use only. Zeidenberg purchased a
consumer version and made it available to commercial users over
the Internet. He claimed, in reliance on Step-Saver, that the
shrink-wrap license was unenforceable. The ProCD Court
disagreed. Unlike Step-Saver, there was only one form, not an
exchange of forms, so Article 2-207 did not apply. The court
believed that the operative section was Article 2-204(1): "A contract
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including conduct by both parties which recognizes existence of a
contract." ProCD had structured its offer to be accepted by the
buyer acknowledging the license terms when it loaded the software
and began using it. This created an enforceable contract on the
terms of the license.
Any differences in these decisions involves applying Article 2 to
mass market software transactions. Both decisions, however, agree
on the result under common law: a shrink-wrap license is fully
enforceable under the "last shot" rule. At common law, an
acceptance must be absolute and unqualified; any variation from
the offer is a rejection and new counter-offer.4 ' As Step-Saver
explained:
Under the common law, . . . an acceptance that varied any
term of the offer operated as a rejection of the offer, and
simultaneously made a counter offer. This common law
formality was known as the mirror image rule, because the
terms of the acceptance had to mirror the terms of the offer
to be effective. If the offeror proceeded with the contract
despite the differing terms of the supposed acceptance, he
would, by his performance, constructively accept the terms of
the "counteroffer," and be bound by its terms. As a result of
these rules, the terms of the party who sent the last form...
would become the terms of the parties' contract. This result
was known as the "last shot rule."412
This means that when the copies of the software arrive with the
no infringement in that case because the copyright owner acknowledged an implied license.
Id. at 96 n.7.
411. E.g. CAL ClVIi CODE § 1585 [1872]; Slavin v. Borinstein, 25 Cal.App.4th 720, 30
Cal.Rptr.2d 745 (1994).
412. Step-Saver, 939 F2d at 99.
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shrinkwrap license, at common law the shrink-wrap constitutes a
counter-offer, which the licensee then accepts by using the
software.413 The shrink-wrap license is then enforceable in all of its
terms.
414
The result is critical to protect consumers. In Step Saver, the
court acknowledged that without the shrinkwrap license, the
licensee could face a claim of copyright infringement. It found no
infringement in that case, however, because the copyright owner,
seizing defeat from the jaws of victory, acknowledged an implied
license authorizing the licensee's use.415 But this result does not
apply across the board. Consider LINux. The GNU License
specifically conditions any exploitation of the copyright on
enforceability of. the license and the waiver of warranties., If this
shrinkwrap were invalid, one would never get to the question of
breach of warranty, because the sale of the copy to the licensee in
the first instance was unauthorized, the "first sale" and "computer
use" privileges would be inapplicable, and the licensee's act of
loading the copy onto a hard drive would be an infringement.
Many critics object to UCITA because they maintain it validates
mass market shrink wrap licenses that would otherwise be
unenforceable under Article 2. This reasoning is unsound. The
correct analysis is that shrinkwrap licenses are fully enforceable in
413. Id.; see generally 12 An. Jua 2D Contracts § 92 (1964) (stating that where the
offeror agrees to the new terms, then a contract arises on the terms of the counter-offer);
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(1) (1981) ("The manifestation of assent may be
made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts of by failure to act.")
Even the pro-Article 2 commentators agree that this is the result without Article 2. See, e.g.,
Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply,
35 EMORY UJ. 853, 857-858 (1988) ("[Ihf a computer software buyer [sic] sent a standard
purchase order form to a software producer who responded with a standard purchase order
confirmation promising delivery ... and the confirmation forms contain different terms, the
common law would treat the purchase order as an initial offer and the confirmation as a
counteroffer. Therefore, absent action by the software buyer [sic] that amounted to
acceptance of the counteroffer, no contract was created.") ProCD said this was the result
under Article 2-204(1), which has not pleased some commercial law professors. But this is
certainly the rule at common law, so the end result in ProCD, that the shrinkwrap license is
enforceable, is correct.
414. See Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Electric, Co., 143 F3d 828, 834 (4th Cir.
1998); Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986); see
generally HAWKLAND, supra note 24, at § 2-207:4. The Seventh Circuit has adopted a different
characterization, limiting the "mirror image" and "last shot" rules to executory contracts.
Instead, the better approach is to see the contract as formed by "layering," with use of the
software constituting assent to the terms of the shrinkwrap. See Hills' Pet Nutrition, Inc. v.
Fru-Con Constr. Corp., 101 F3d 63, 64 (7th Cir. 1996). UCITA adopts the Seventh Circuit's
more modem "layering" approach. See U.C.I.T.A. § 207 (1999).
415. Step-Saver, 939 E2d at 93 n.7.
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all particulars under long-standing common law contract rules. Far
from validating otherwise unenforceable shrink-wrap licenses,
UCITA imposes procedural limits on their use to ensure meaningful
disclosure and assent in a ways suited to modem commerce.
Courts have finally begun to face whether Article 2 is compatible
with the Copyright Act when applies to software transactions.
Given the force with which the copyright critics have raised the
preemption issue of late, there is little doubt this rivulet will
become a torrent. When the issue is confronted head-on, it is hard
to imagine a modem court continuing to apply "sales of goods"
imagery to software transactions when the Copyright Act tears the
heart out of so much of Article 2.
III. AUTHORITIES ASTRAY
The mathematician Georg Cantor once described what he called
the law of conservation of ignorance. A false conclusion once
arrived at and widely accepted is not easily dislodged and the less
it is understood the more tenaciously it is held.416 Thus it was a for
a millennium with the belief that the Earth was the fixed center of
the Universe. Thus it is now with the conceit that Article 2 must be
the fixed hub of the commercial universe around which software
transactions must necessarily revolve.
A. The Case Law
The conventional wisdom has it that the question whether Article
2 applies to software transactions is now settled. There is hardly
even any debate over it, most parties being content merely to string
cite a list of cases supposedly so "holding." The cases themselves
tell a different story. To understand what they really say, we need
to understand hov they evolved.
Before the advent of the personal computer, software was
provided with a large computer system, often without additional
charge. A few early cases held that the total transaction was within
Article 2, a result that made little difference because the complaints
were invariably about the hardware, not the software. With the rise
of the PC and separately licensed software, later courts seized on
these early cases as "holding" that Article 2 applied to a separate
software license, when in fact they held no such thing. These
courts analogized a software license to a "sale of goods" without
416. See MoRRis KLNE, MATHEMATICS: THE LOSS OF CERTAINTY 88 (1980).
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ever considering the Copyright Act, leading to embarrassing wrong
results. By the late 1980s, one finds a series of decisions that
merely assume a software license is within Article 2 because either
(1) the parties, not knowing any better, stipulate to apply Article 2,
or (2) the court applies the earlier "holdings" without analysis. As
the 1990s progressed, software vendors began to raise repeatedly
the incompatibilities between Article 2 and the Copyright Act. In
every modem case that considers the Copyright Act, the court
holds that Article 2 is inapplicable to a software license. When one
puts aside the confused reasoning of the earlier cases, the case law
in fact affirms that Article 2 cannot apply to software transactions.
So that there is no doubt about it, this section lays out what the
case law really says. It generally follows the historical development.
With pedantic license, we might divide the cases into four
categories: (1) not applicable; (2) circular reasoning; (3) wrong
reasoning; and (4) right result.
1. Early Inapplicable Cases
Several early cases cited for the proposition that Article 2 applies
to software transactions in fact never addressed the issue at all.
These case typically were decided when software was tightly
bundled in what are called "turnkey" systems: an integrated
hardware and software package that was supposed to work
together as a whole.417 The problems in these early systems were
really with the hardware, not the software.
a. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.418
An early example is the famous Triangle Underwriters. Triangle
bought a Honeywell H-110 computer system consisting of
"'hardware', or the core computer, printer, collator, and related
equipment, and 'software,' the designation for programming created
for use in connection with the hardware." In 1979, when Triangle
Underwriters was decided, the software industry was much
different than it is today. Mainframe computers - "big iron" - were
the industry staples, and most software was propriety code written
solely for each vendor's platform.4 19  Thus, Honeywell's
417. See RAYMoND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 6.01 (Rev. ed. 1999).
418. 604 F.2d. 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
419. The situation was colorfully described by Frederick P. Brooks, Jr. a system
engineer whose experience in developing software for IBM mainframes earned him the
sobriquet "farther of the IBM System/360." In 1975, he wrote a classic text on software
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compensation was limited to the purchase price for the hardware;
it did not even bill for the software, before, during or after
installation.4 0 The contract was really for the sale of "big iron" with
some free software thrown in.
b. Chaltos System v. National Cash Register Corp.
421
Another case to the same effect is Chaltos. It involved a breach
of warranty claim for the sale of "399/656 disc system" which was
identified as "computer hardware." The problems had to do with
the sector seek and storage subsystem of the computer, not the
software.422 In any case, "[b]oth parties . . . concede[d] the
applicability of the U.C.C." 423
c. Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Univac
424
This 1987 case involved the lease of a Sperry 90/25 computer
system to handle graphic typesetting. The issue was whether the
contract included a separate license of an applications program,
engineering, The Mythical Man-Month. In 1995, Professor Brooks, then the Kenan Professor
of Computer Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel, revisited the text. What
was the biggest new surprise in the twenty years since it was written? Shrinkwrapped
software. He wrote:
Every software guru I have talked to with admits to being caught by surprise by the
microcomputer revolution and its outgrowth, the shrinkwrapped software industry.
This is beyond a doubt the crucial change of the two decades since The MM-M.
Schumacher stated the challenge more than 20 years ago:
What is it that we really require from scientists and technologists? We need methods
and equipment which are
" Cheap enough so that they are accessible to virtually everyone;
" Suitable for small scale application; and
" Compatible with man's need for creativity.
These are exactly the wonderful properties that the microcomputer revolution has
brought to the computer industry and its users, now the general public. The average
American can now afford not only a computer of his own, but a suite of software that
twenty years ago would have cost a king's salary. . . . In 1975, operating systems
abounded: each hardware vendor has at least one proprietary operating system per
product line, many had two. How different things are today! Open systems are the
watchword ....
FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHIcAL MAN-MONTH (1995).
420. Triangle Underwriters, 604 F2d. at 743.
421. The full history of this confusing case is: Chaltos Sys. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp.,
479 F. Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 1979) (finding of liability and damages), affd in part and
remanded in part, 635 F2d 1081 (1980), appeal after remand, 670 F.2d. 1304 (1982)
(affirming damages award).
422. Triangle Underwriters, 479 F Supp. at 742; Triangle Underwriters, 635 F.2d at
1084. Note that the contract also warranted the operability of the computer as "goods."
423. Triangle Underwriters, 635 F.2d at 1084.
424. 824 F2d 576 (7th Cir. 1987).
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and the action was one for fraud when the shocked licensee
discovered there was an additional license fee involved. The district
court concluded, and the court of appeals affirmed without
discussion, that Article 2 and common law applied to the lease of
the computer.425 But the software license was a separate issue
entirely. The court found that Sperry did not misrepresent that it
was included in the contract for the sale of the computer.
d. USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Systems
426
This 1989 case involved the sale of a "'turnkey' minicomputer
based material control system."427 The contract was "mixed" in the
sense that it involved the sale of a computer and incidental
services in properly configuring the hardware.428 However, the
problem was caused by a defect in the disk controller system.
29
There is no mention of software.40
e. Xerox Corp. v. Hawkes
431
This 1992 case, decided by the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
involved a breach of warranty claim arising from the lease of a
copy machine. Following the advice of Professor Anderson that
"Article 2 may be extended by analogy to non-sale transactions,
such as equipment leasing,"42 the court applied Article 2's implied
warranties by analogy to the lease of the machine. It said nothing
about software, directly or by analogy.4
f. Camara v. Hill4M
This case involved the sale of a CCDA 640K computer, a
Starwriter printer, a copy of WordPerfect, and a dBaseIII
accounting package to be customized for the recipient's use. The
425. Graphic Sales, 824 F2d at 579.
426. 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
427. USM Corp., 546 N.E.2d at 890.
428. Id. at 894.
429. Id. at 891.
430. As such, the court quite correctly relied on Triangle Underwriters. Id. at 894.
431. 475 A.2d 7 (N.H. 1992).
432. Xerox Corp., 475 A.2d at 9 (citing ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 2-102:4).
433. Completely missing the point that the New Hampshire Supreme Court was
reasoning by analogy to equipment leasing, Colonial Life Ins. cites Hawkes for the
proposition that the use of "transaction" in Article 2-102 means that Article 2 applies to a
sofware license. This reasoning also snookered the Seventh Circuit in Micro Data Base.
434. 596 A.2d 349 (Vermont 1991).
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court found that the contract price was allocated to the equipment,
that the accounting software was not delivered, and that the
recipient had accepted the computer by using it, thus making the
claim for a failure of delivery time barred.
435
2. Interim Wrong Reasoning Cases
When the PC industry began to make software separately
available from the hardware, several cases struggled to find the
proper contract law to describe the transaction. Llyewllyn
described this struggle aptly: "Unless the stock intellectual
equipment is apt, it takes extra art or intuition to get proper results
with it."43 6 The following cases demonstrate all too well what
happens when that extra art or intuition is missing. To be fair,
judges are not appointed to indulge in metaphysical musings, but to
decide cases. Litigants want answers, not theories, and want them
now. To get the job done, busy judges often seize instinctively the
tools they know. If that means a short glance at well-known UCC
that might be twisted to fit, as opposed to an expedition through
scattered case law, which one will a harried judge choose? The
problem with these cases is not so much their result as their
reasoning, and the precedent it sets. Today's emergency may justify
using a hammer to drive in a screw, but that does not make this a
fitting technique tomorrow. To assume it does is gives full reign to
Cantor's law of the conservation of ignorance. These cases, more
than anything else, demonstrate why we need a new uniform law
like UCITA, to provide guidance about how to properly deal with
software transactions.
a. Advent Systems, Ltd. v. Unisys Corp.
43 7
The undisputed winner of the prize for most inapt reasoning
must go to Advent Systems. Sadly, it is one of the few cases that
truly struggled to justify applying Article 2 to software transactions.
But the stock intellectual equipment was inapt, and the results
horrific.
The dispute involved a non-exclusive software distribution
agreement. Advent Systems, a British company, was primarily
engaged in producing document management software. Unisys, a
435. Camara, 596 A.2d at 350.
436. Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L REV. 873, 876
(1939).
437. 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
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computer manufacturer, wanted to become Advent's distributor in
the United States. Advent agreed to modify its software and
hardware interfaces to run on Unisys hardware. Advent was
required to purchase the necessary hardware for this purpose. The
Distribution Agreement provided that "Unisys desires to purchase,
and Advent desires to sell, on a non-exclusive basis, certain of
Advent hardware products and software licenses for resale
worldwide." When a dispute arose, Unisys claimed the contract was
for a sale of goods and barred under the statute of frauds in Article
2-201 because no quantity was stated. The trial court found that
services aspects predominated and so the UCC did not apply. The
appellate court said the case raised one central issue: Does Article
2 apply to 'computer programs? It gave three justifications for
concluding it does: (1) reasoning by analogy; (2) policy motivations;
and (3) avoidance of inconsistent obligations. None of them make
the slightest sense.
Reasoning by analogy: The court began by looking at the
definition of "goods" as "all things (including specially
manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of
identification for sale."4 In deciding that computer programs meet
this requirement, the court reasoned thus:
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process,
but once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to
computer owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc
recording of an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by
the artistry of musicians and in itself is not a "good," but when
transferred to a laser disc becomes a readily merchantable
commodity. Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is
not a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a
good. That a computer program may be copyrightable as
intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the
form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is
tangible, moveable, and available in the marketplace. The fact
that some programs may be tailored for specific purposes
need not alter their status as "goods" because the [Uniform
Commercial] Code definition includes "specially manufactured
goods."439
This remarkable statement has the unique quality of being wrong
438. Advent Systems, 925 F2d at 675.
439. Id. at 675.
Vol. 38:459
Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software
on every point it makes. Let us look at it sentence by sentence.
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process,
but once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to
computer owners.
No. Computer programs do result from an intellectual process,
and once "fixed in a tangible medium of expression" they become
copyrightable works protected under the Copyright Act." 0 This
does not mean that the computer program is then "widely
distributed." Under Section 106, the copyright owner has the
exclusive right to widely distribute copies of the computer
program, but the computer program itself, the copyrightable work,
is often jealously guarded."1 What is widely distributed are the
copies. This sentence makes the amateur's mistake of confusing the
copy with the copyright.
An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of'an
orchestral rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of
musicians and is not itself a "good," but when transferred to
a laser disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity.
Wrong. Without clearing the intellectual property rights in the
music, the laser disc is not merchantable at all. There are four
different sets of rights involved. First, there is the sound recording
copyright in the sequence of sounds created by the musicians and
captured in the laser disc."2 Under Section 202, this copyright is
different from the laser disc in which it happens to be embodied.
Second, there could be an existing copyright in the musical
composition the musicians are playing. This is a separate copyright
from that in the sound recording.43 Third, the Uruguay Rounds
440. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1994) ("literary works").
441. Take a look at the GNU Open Source License. "When we speak of free software,
we are referring to freedom, not price." See also Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month
Club, 13 F Supp.2d 782 (N.D. Ill 1998) (holding that placing shareware on the Internet did
not give implied license to redistribute for a fee).
442. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1994) ("sound recordings"). "Sound recordings" are works
that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other sounds, but not including
the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes or other phonorecords, in which they are
embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "sound recording"); see generally BooRmYN,
supra note 92 § 2.12.
443. See Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 E Supp. 282, 292 (D. N.J. 1993) (copyright in
sound recording does not extent to sound recording, and vice versa); see BOORSTYN, supra
note 92, at § 2.12 ("[W]hen an original song is recorded by any means in any form ... there
are two separate copyrighted works: a musical composition and a sound recording.")
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Agreement Act 444 added Section 1101 to the Copyright Act, giving
performers rights in their live musical performances equivalent to
copyright. Finally, the musicians may have a state law right of
publicity in their performances. 445 A person desiring to make a laser
disc copy must first obtain authorization from all rights holders or
the copy will be pirated.446 Even if making a copy is authorized,
that does not in itself grant any additional authorization to make
further reproductions or to distribute ("merchandize") them."
47
There are also criminal penalties if the unauthorized reproduction
is made willfully for commercial advantage or private financial
gain. 448 Article 2 itself recognizes that to be merchantable, goods
must pass without objection in the trade449 and that the title
conveyed must be good, i.e., there is no infringement of intellectual
property rights.45° Contrary to Advent Systems, a copy of an
orchestral rendition does not become a "merchantable commodity"
merely because it is embodied in a laser disc. It may not be
"merchandized" unless and until the intellectual property rights are
cleared in an enforceable license. Indeed, if an unauthorized copy
444. Pub. Law. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (Dec. 8, 1994); see BooRSmYN, supra note 92,
at § 6.43. Although this statute was enacted after Advent Systems was decided, it is still
relevant because courts continue to cite this quotation in Advent Systems.
445. See e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 E2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (right of
publicity in famous singer's vocal style); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment does not bar right to publicity claims);
see generally HAROLD ORENSMIN & DAVID E. GUINN, ENTERTAINMENT LAw & BUSINESS § 1.2
(1990) (explaining right of publicity). Under 17 U.S.C. § 1101(d) (1994), the rights of
performers in live musical performances do not annul or limit any state law rights.
446. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1994): Anyone who, without consent of the performer or
performers involved . . . fixes the sounds or sounds and images or a live musical
performance in a copy or phonorecord . . . shall be subject to the remedies provided in
Section 502 through 505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright." Id. (emphasis
added).
447. See Quintanilla v. Texas Television, Inc., 139 E3d 494 (5th Cir. 1998) (merely
arranging and paying for videotaping of music concert did not transfer any copyright
ownership in resulting tape); Forward v. Thorogood, 758 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass 1991) (fan
authorized to record musical performance for personal use did not thereby obtain any
common law copyright in recording under Massachusetts law; applying 1909 Act).
448. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994) (copyright); see generally BooRsTYN, supra note 92, at §
14.01. The URAA also added new section 2319A to Title 18 of the United States Code,
making it a criminal offense for anyone, without consent of the performer, to knowingly and
for private financial gain record or tape a live musical performance, or reproduce any copies
from an unauthorized fixation. The No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L 105-47, 111 Stat. 2678
(Dec. 16, 1977), amended the Act to allow victims to submit statement of loss. See BooRSTYN,
supra note 92, at § 14.09[2].
449. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at I 2-314[A].
450. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a) cmt. 3 (1999); see generally QUINN, supra note 28, at I
2-312[A].
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is made willfully and for private financial gain, is not a
merchantable commodity at all; it is a one-way ticket to a federal
penitentiary.
Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a
good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.
Not even close. By definition, when the lecture is transcribed, it
becomes a "literary work" not a "book."451 The book is just a
particular copy in which the literary work happens to be fixed.
This House Report makes this explicit:
The definition of these terms in section 101, together with
their usage in section 102 and throughout the bill, reflect a
fundamental distinction between the "original work" which is
the product of "authorship" and the multitude of material
objects in which it can be embodied. Thus, in the sense of the
bill, a "book" is not a work of authorship, but it is a particular
kind of "copy." Instead, the author may write a "literary work,"
which in turn can be embodied in a wide range of "copies"
and "phonorecords," including books, periodicals, computer
punch cards, microfilm, tape recordings, and so forth. It is
possible to have an "original work of authorship" without
having a "copy" of "phonorecord" embodying it, and it is also
possible to have a "copy" or "phonorecord" embodying
something that does not qualify as an "original work of
authorship." The two essential elements - original work and
tangible object - must merge through fixation in order to
produce subject matter copyrightable under the statute.
452
In other words, the oral lecture may be an original work of
authorship, but until it is fixed (transcribed), it is not copyrightable.
It may, however, be protected by other law; for example, California
protects original works of authorship not fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. 453 Once it is transcribed, then the lecture
becomes a copyrightable literary work, and the book becomes a
copy. But the literary work does not merge into the book and
451. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "literary work"); see generally BOORsTYN, supra note
92, at § 2.04 ("By definition, an author writes a "literary work" (not a book) which is fixed in
a material object (a book). In other words, the book is the copy (material object) in which
the copyrightable literary work is embodied."). The sequence of sounds in the lecture may
also produce a copyrightable sound recording, but let us leave this aside.
452. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976).
453. CAL CVIL CODE § 980 (1972).
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transmogrify into a mere mortal. It retains a distinct, intangible -
copyrightable - essence.45
That a computer program may be copyrightable as
intellectual property does not alter the fact that once in the
form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is
tangible, moveable, and available in the marketplace. The fact
that some programs may be tailored for specific purposes
need not alter their status as "goods" because the [Uniform
Commercial] Code definition includes "specially
manufactured goods."
We have already discussed why this analogy is nonsense. But let
us really put the court to the test and ask: under this reasoning, is
the decision in Advents Systems itself a "good?" No, I do not mean
the copies in the Federal Reporter. I mean the actual decision
itself; a statement of law independent of the particular copies in
which it happens to appear. This is what Advent Systems is
asserting. When intellectual property is incorporated in a physical
medium, it loses its separate existence and becomes a good. So, let
us apply this test to Advent Systems itself and see what happens.
A computer program is a literary work, the product of an
intellectual process. So is the decision in Advent Systems. A
computer program is written is a technical language with specific
requirements for its form and content. So is the decision is Advent
Systems. A computer program often performs a useful function and
is not merely decorative. So, too, the decision in Advent Systems. A
computer program is compiled in a specific form and embodied in
a digital copy such as a floppy disc. The decision in Advent
Systems is edited into a written form and made available in written
books or on-line. Once embodied in an electronic copy, a computer
program, according to Advent Systems, becomes "tangible,
moveable, and available in the marketplace." Once embodied in the
written or electronic form the decision in Advent Systems has also
become "tangible, moveable, and available in the marketplace." Do
you not have a copy of the decision in a handy Federal Reporter?
Although computer programs may be tailored for specific
purposes, they still qualify as specially manufactured goods.
Although the decision in Advent Systems may have been rendered
454. We might ask of Advent Systems a related question: What if the professor
solemnly avers in the lecture that E = mc3 , and, in reliance on this, I try to built a nuclear
power plant with disastrous consequences. Is the dear, befuddled professor liable for "breach
of implied warranty" because the content of his lecture became a "good"?
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for a specific case, that should not alter its status as a specially
manufactured good. By its own reasoning, Advent Systems would
have to conclude that the decision in Advent Systems itself is also
a good. Not the copy of the decision; the decision itself, the
abstract judicial action that altered the legal rights and obligations
of the parties in that case and set a precedent for the legal rights
and obligations of future parties. That intangible legal rule is, if
Advent Systems is to be believed, by the very act of being written
down, now a tangible, moveable good. Does that not then mean
that Advent Systems, the loser in the case, can tear up its copy of
the decision Advent Systems - i.e., reject the "goods" - and
thereby nullify its effect? And would not destroying the copy
extinguish - overrule - it? But if by destroying the copy I destroy
the decision, then there is no longer any mechanism to merge the
decision into the copy, -meaning the decision in Advent Systems
still exists! So if it does exist, then it does not exist; but if it does
not exist, it exists. The conclusion is absurd. What does that say
about the premise froin whence it came?
455
Policy Considerations: After deciding that software is a "good,"
the Advent Systems court then argues that good public policy
requires applying Article 2 to software:
Applying the U.C.C. to computer software transactions offers
substantial benefits to litigants and the courts. The Code offers
a uniform body of law on a wide range of questions likely to
arise in computer software disputes: implied warranties,
consequential damages, disclaimers of liability, the statute of
limitations, to name a few ... The importance of software to
the commercial world and the advantages to be gained by
uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong policy arguments
455. Self-referential paradoxes have been around for a long time. One of the oldest is
that of the Cretan Lar "All Cretans are liars. I am a Cretan." Both of these sentences cannot
simultaneously be true. Supposedly, Aristotle invented logic in an attempt to deal with the
Cretan Liar Paradox. We saw this technique previously in the proof of the Halting Problem -
applying a program to itself. Perceptive readers will note that this is the technique used by
Kurt Godel, to prove the most celebrated result of Twentieth Century logic, the
Incompleteness Theorem. Basically, he proved that any finite axiom system sufficient to "do
math" was "incomplete." That is, the system could produce true statements that could not be
proven true or false using the logical methods of the system. He did this by, in effect,
embedding the paradoxical sentence "This sentence is not provable" within the natural
numbers. For further discussion, see HOFSTADTER supra note 226, and CAsn, supra note 226.
Computer programs "do math," and thus are subject to the Incompleteness Theorem. In fact,
the Halting Problem follows from the Incompleteness Theorem. For a further discussion of
their relationship, see JOHN CASTI, FIVE GOLDEN RULES: GREAT THEORIES OF TWENTIETH CENTURY
MATHEMATICS - AND WHY THEY MATrER, ch. 4 (1996).
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favoring inclusion. The contrary arguments are not persuasive
456
The court is quite right that there are strong policy arguments in
favor of a uniform body of law to deal with computer information
transactions. It is dead wrong that the necessary body of law can
or should be Article 2. Actually looking at how Article 2 deals with
"the wide range of questions likely to arise in computer software
disputes" shows how hopelessly unsuited it is to the task. It was
written for a different time and another problem. In Llewellyn's
day, courts needed a new code to deal with the newly emerging
industrial economy based on mass produced wares. That was then
and this is now. Commercial law in our time needs another
modernization to deal with computer information, and it is not and
can not be Article 2.
Inconsistent obligations: The third reason was the statute of
frauds. The Advent Systems court held that Article 2-201 applied to
the software license because "segregating goods from non-goods
and insisting that 'the Statute of Frauds apply only to a portion of
the contract,' would make the contract divisible and impossible of
performance within the intention of the parties."4 7 This separation
argument ignores that the fact that segregating the goods from the
non-goods is precisely what Section 202 of the Copyright Act
requires. If splitting the goods from non-goods would make the
contract "impossible of performance" then the court should have
treated the non-good copyright aspects as primary and applied the
contract law applicable to non-goods.
Had the court looked at the Copyright Act, it would have realized
that its "single statute of frauds" approach required abandoning
Article 2. The license in question was non-exclusive. Assume for a
moment it was exclusive. Then Section 204(a) of the Copyright Act
would imposed its own preemptive writing requirement. If the
contract was indeed indivisible so that only one writing
requirement could apply to the whole, then due to Section 204(a)
the "one statute of frauds" could not be Article 2-201. But the very
reason the court said Article 2 applied was to use Article 2-201 for
the entire contract. If Article 2-201 could not apply to the
indivisible exclusive software licensee, then there was no reason to
apply Article 2 at all.
Of course, the license in Advent Systems was non-exclusive, and
456. Advent Systems, 925 F2d at 676.
457. Id.
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the court did use Article 2-201. So what does that tell us about
Advent System's rationale for applying Article 2 to a software
transaction? Remember now, we are not talking about just any
statute. We are talking about Article 2 - a true code, one that
preempts an entire field of law and displaces all other laws in its
subject area, one that is systematic with all of its parts forming an
interlocking, integrated body, and one that is so comprehensive and
inclusive it can be administered in accordance with its own basic
policies. Does its application depend on the subject matter of the
transaction? A detailed analysis of contractual terms? Perhaps a
paragraph? A sentence? Even a word? No. According to Advent
Systems, it depends on nothing more than the three letters n-o-n.
Does "ridiculous" say it well enough?
One would think this was enough, but this court was not done.
Having demolished copyright law to get into Article 2, Advent
Systems then proceeded to shred sales law. First it looked at the
statute of frauds in Article 2401, which requires a quantity term;
the contract did not mention a quantity. Of course not. It was a
license. The number of copies depended on how vigorously the
licensee exercised the rights. But since Advent Systems had bought
into the delusional "goods" imagery, it had no choice but to look
for a quantity. After a valiant but ultimately fruitless effort, it gave
up and decided that Section 2401 does not really require a quantity
term after all. Instead, it claimed there was an escape hatch in
Article 2404, which allows exclusive output deals without a
quantity term but with an obligation of best efforts. That was a
problem here, since the licensee did not really give it the old
college try. So Advent Systems says that "best efforts" in Article
2404 does not really mean that at all, only "good faith efforts."
After ignoring so much other law, what was one more statute to
raze? Would it be arch to point out that Article 2404 deals with
exclusive output arrangements, whereas the license at issue was
non-exclusive, so this escape hatch was really not available to
begin with?
Had Advent Systems used the proper imagery, it would have
reached the same result with much greater ease. It would have
simply applied the state common law statute of frauds. No quantity
term to worry about. Then it would have applied the standard rule
that the licensee's obligation to exploit a work is good faith, not
best efforts.45 But in Advent Systems, the stock intellectual
458. The leading case is Zilg v. Prentise-Hall, Inc., 717 F2d 671 (2d Cir. 1982), which
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equipment was lacking, and so this rough beast of a decision, its
hour come round at last, ravaged both copyright and sales law as it
slouched towards Bethlehem to be born.459 Advent Systems is more
than inapt. It is a monstrosity.
460
b. In re DAK Industries, Inc.
461
A close runner-up for the prize of most nonsense in a single
decision is In re DAK. Microsoft granted DAK a worldwide,
non-exclusive license to make, adapt and distribute copies of
Microsoft WORD. Microsoft delivered a single copy of WORD on a
master disc; the license authorized the manufacture of additional
copies. DAK agreed to pay a royalty for each copy of WORD sold,
along with a fixed "minimum commitment" fee as an advance
payment against potential royalties. These minimum commitment
fees are absolutely common in book, music, motion picture, and
software licenses, because they give a licensee financial incentive
dealt with the obligation to publish a manuscript under an exclusive license that did not set
forth the standard of performance. The trial court read the contract as requiring "best efforts
to promote the book fully." Zilg, 717 F2d at 679. The court of appeals reversed, noting that
the author neither bargained for nor acquired an explicit "best efforts" promise from the
publisher.
The court held that the promise to publish
implies a good faith effort to promote the book including a first printing and
advertising budget adequate to give the book a reasonable chance of success in light
of the subject matter and likely audience. . . . [Once this obligation is fulfilled,] a
business decision by the publisher to limit the size of a printing or advertising budget
is not subject to second guessing by a trier of fact as to whether it is sound or valid.
Id. at 717 F2d 680. See also Video Trip Corp. v. Lightning Video, Inc., 866 F2d 50 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that the obligation to render accountings arose from the implied covenant of
good faith); Doubleday & Co., Inc., v. Curtis, 763 F2d 495 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a
publisher's decision not to publish a manuscript required the exercise of honesty and good
faith); Alternative Thinking Sys. v. Simon & Shuster, 853 E Supp. 791 (S.D. N.Y. 1994)
(following Doubleday); Kleenblatt v. Business News Publ'g Co., Inc., 678 F Supp. 698 (N.D.
l. 1987) (holding that the publisher's duty to cooperate in the marketing efforts was based
on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Arnold Productions v. Favorite Film
Corp., 298 F2d 540 (2d Cir. 1961) (obligation to use "best efforts" specifically bargained for);
D.S. Magazines, Inc. v. Warner Publisher Services, Inc., 640 F Supp. 1194, 1207 (S.D. N.Y
1986) (duty to use "best efforts" met by reasonable efforts to meet its duty to act in good
faith).
459. With apologies to the poet W.B. Yeats.
460. And it has spawned an ugly brood. In Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Electronic Data
Sys., 817 F. Supp. 235 (D. N.H. 1993), a district court cited Advent Systems without analysis
for the proposition that "software has been held to fall within the definition of 'good' under
the Code." Colonial Life, 817 F Supp. at 239. In Micro Data Base Systems v. Dharma Sys.,
Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998), the usually level-headed Seventh Circuit rhapsodized that
Advent Systems and Colonial reach "the right result" and therefore applied Article 2 to
services under a software development contract. Micro Data Base, 148 F3d at 753.
461. 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995).
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to exploit the work. DAK declared bankruptcy before paying the
entire minimum commitment, although it continued to sell copies.
The issue was whether royalties from post-filing exploitation were
an administrative expense, payable to Microsoft, or should be
credited against the unpaid commitment, which, as an unsecured
debt, would be junior to the secured creditors.
Now, this was a bankruptcy case. It goes without saying that
bankruptcy court is inclined to leave as much money as it can in
the estate. Thus, the DAK court not unexpectedly decided that,
because the obligation to pay the entire commitment fee arose
before the filing, it was pre-petition debt regardless of whether
some installments were due post petition.462 The case could end
right there. But apparently uncomfortable with this statement, the
DAK court jumps down the rabbit hole into Wonderland.
The court begins thus: "Second, the pricing structure of the
agreement indicates that it was more akin to a sale of an
intellectual property than a lease for use of that property."46 What?
This was a non-exclusive license. Section 101 of the Copyright Act
is explicit that a transfer of copyright ownership does not include a
non-exclusive license. This transaction could not have possibly
been a "sale" of intellectual property.
But the court goes on: "The amount of the minimum
commitment, as well as any additional payments, was based on the
quantity of units DAK obtained, as in most sales arrangements, not
upon the duration of 'use' of the property, as in most rental
arrangements."4 4 Huh? DAK only obtained one unit, a master disc.
It was DAK who made the copies pursuant to the license, not
Microsoft. 465 This authorization flows precisely from the copyright
under Section 106(1). Unlike a sales arrangement, Microsoft was
not an output supplier delivering a quantity of manufactured goods.
DAK was making the quantity of units it needed, and the duration
of the license to use the Microsoft master disc was the essence of
the deal.
But the court won't stop: "Third, as in a sale, DAK received all of
its rights under the agreement when the term of the agreement
commenced." Of course DAK received all of its rights when the
term commenced. If it made or sold any copies without having
received its rights, it would be a copyright infringer. In fact, if this
462. In re DAK, 66 F.3d at 1095.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 1092.
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were a "true sale" under Article 2, then DAK would have received
its rights - title to the copies - only after Microsoft delivered the
master copy, exactly the opposite of this reasoning.
Agonizingly, the court continues: "Fourth, it is more accurate to
describe this agreement as granting DAK a 'right to sell' rather than
'permission to use' an intellectual property." This is harrowing.
Section 106 grants a copyright owner the exclusive right "to do or
authorize any of the following: ... (3) to distribute copies . . .of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale."466 Granting DAK the
"right to sell" by giving "permission to use intellectual property"
was precisely what the license was all about.
So why does this happen? Because the DAK Court had the
wrong image in mind. It insisted on seeing a software license as
nothing more than a sale of goods. This meant it had to find a
tangible product to focus on, and so it tried to categorize the
transaction as on output deal in which a manufacturer supplies
quantities of finished product to a reseller. Its refusal to see the
intangible copyright in WORD as separate property lead it to
ludicrously inapt results.
c. In re Amica, Inc.
467
Another standout judicial creep show is In re Amica. It gets so
many things so wrong that for this reason alone it is difficult to
classify. The case involved an attempt by a bankrupt developer to
recover its software from a non-performing licensee. The developer
entered into a license which "irrevocably transfers to [the licensee]
all of its rights, title and interest in ant to the Program and its
documentation, including copyright in the programs and the
documentation with respect thereto, and all trademarks."468 The
developer also agreed to correct bugs and errors during the six
month period following execution of the license.4 9 The licensee
granted back to Amica a limited, non-exclusive license allowing the
developer to perform pre-existing obligations under another
license.470 The licensor declared bankruptcy and sought to cancel
the license because the licensee did not adequately perform in
marketing the software.
466. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
467. 135 B.R. 534 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1992).
468. In re Amica, 135 B.R. at 557. Helpfully, the decision sets out the license
agreement in its entirety.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 559.
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Now, what we have here is a garden variety exclusive publication
license. An author - could be a software developer, or a novelist,
or a screenwriter, or a musician - creates'a copyrighted work and
grants a publisher - could be a software publisher, or a book
publisher, or a movie producer, or a music publisher - exclusive
publication rights. Under the Copyright Act, the publisher becomes
the owner of the copyright interest in the work within the scope of
the license.47' The publisher wants some improvements to help the
marketability of the work - correcting bugs in a program, editing
galleys of a novel, rewriting the screenplay to accommodate stars
or budget, rescoring the music - and naturally retains the author to
modify the existing work.472 Authors usually insist on it. This does
not mean that the publisher relinquishes ownership of the original
work. What the publisher is doing is commissioning the creation of
a new derivative work. Confirming that this is what everyone
understood, the software publisher grants back a non-exclusive
license to the author to fulfill a pre-existing license, something that
it had to do to keep the author from infringing the licensee's
exclusive rights. All very straight forward, except to a bankruptcy
court trying desperately to squirm out of the deal.
The correct approach would have been to ask whether the
licensee's obligation to exploit the work was a material covenant
whose breach allowed cancellation. Unfortunately, cancellation
would have been barred by express language that the transfer
"shall not be subject to termination or revocation under any
circumstances except [as allowed] (under the Copyright Act)." 473 It
is common in copyright transfers to restrict the licensor's ability to
cancel to preserve the licensee's investment in the marketing. The
reference to "termination" was obviously a cautious drafter's
reminder that, despite this language, the transfer could be
terminated after 30 years under Section 203 of the Copyright Act.474
So what did the Amica court decide to do? It declined to read
the quoted provisions as an immediate transfer and instead
471. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(d) (1994).
472. For one example of this among thousands, see, e.g., Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630,
634 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving a joint venture where author hired to rewrite magazine articles
to produce new work.)
473. In re Amica, 135 B.R. at 542; see Fosson v. Palace (Waterland), Ltd., 78 F.3d 1448,
1454-55 (9th Cir. 1996) (licensor's waiver of the right to cancel enforceable).
474. Why was this reference added? Undoubtedly, the attorney for Amica thought this
would protect Amica against a claim for breach of contract should the license be terminated
by exercise of the statutory right. It hardly indicated an intent to make the immediate
vesting of the license conditional.
2000
Duquesne Law Review
concluded that "title in and right (including copyright rights) to the
defined 'Product' were intended to pass only after the Program
modifications were created by Amica and paid for by BBS."
475
Maybe that is what the contract meant. Maybe the parties did
intend that the copyright interest would not pass until the
happening of certain conditions precedent after execution of the
license. Although on the face of it this is farfetched, had the court
stopped there, the decision would be bearable. But apparently
realizing that its contractual interpretation was not overly
persuasive, the Amica court decides to buttress its finding with an
unfortunate foray into Article 2.
First, the Court opines that "title" to the software never passed
to the licensee because, under Article 2-401(2), "title to goods
passes when the seller completes performance of physical
delivery."476 It then decided that the obligation to make
modifications to the computer program constituted an agreement
for "future goods" and that "[w]hen future goods must be created,
title does not pass until those goods are finished and shipped to
the buyer."477 Concluding that the modifications were never
completed, the court decided that "title" to the entire computer
program never passed. 478 But this was not a contract to create
"future goods." It was an immediate transfer of a copyright in an
existing work, along with an obligation to create a new derivative
work. At the very best, what may not have passed is an interest in
the derivative work, but this would hardly divest ownership of the
original work. The assumption that Article 2401(2) conditions
vesting of ownership in a copyrighted work on delivery of a
physical copy is directly contrary to the preemptive rules in
Sections 202 and 205 of the Copyright Act.
Second, just to be safe, the court latched onto Article 2-401(4)'s
proviso that upon a buyer's rejection of goods, title reverts to the
seller by operation of law. It decided that because the licensee did
not accept the corrections (derivative work), "title" to the entire
program reverted to the licensor.479 But this reasoning again
475. In re Amica, 135 B.R. at 543.
476. Id. at 552.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 542 (Finding No. 30) and 553.
479. Id. at 552. Amica also said: "even if this Court's view of the Agreement ... was
incorrect and title or rights to the PCH software and modifications passed upon signing the
Agreement, then such title and rights reverted to Amica by virtue of the default by BBS in
complying with its essential obligations under the Agreement." Id. Since such reversion was
barred by the express waiver of a termination right, the court meant that this reversion
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assumes that the transfer of title to a copy dictates what happens
to ownership of the copyright. It also fails to acknowledge the
contrary authority that cancellation is not automatic, but rather
requires an election of remedies. 48°
To see the flaw in this reasoning, note that the licensor agreed to
deliver a memorandum of transfer for recording in the Copyright
Office. 481 The decision does not tell us whether this was recorded,
but assume it was. If Amica's reasoning is correct, then despite
Section 204(d) of the Copyright Act, the licensee's ownership
interest would not "really" have vested until delivery of the copy
and would have reverted upon the rejection of the copy, despite no
recording to that effect. More perceptive courts have duly noted
the folly in this reasoning.48
2
d. Neilson Business Equipment Center, Inc. v. Monteleone48
Dr. Monteleone entered into an agreement to acquire both
hardware and software for his medical office. When the computer
system did not work, the good doctor sued for breach of implied
warranties. The software vendor claimed that the contract actually
had three distinct subparts - hardware, software, and services. It
claimed that the hardware was the only element that could be
classified as "goods," and because there was nothing defective
about the hardware, Dr. Monteleone's claims must fail.484 The court,
however, concluded that the contract was for a "turnkey computer
system which may properly be classified as a package constituting
goods."48 As the court put it: "Dr. Monteleone did not intend to
contract separately for hardware and software. Rather, he bought a
computer system to meet his information processing needs. 
"4 6
Unfortunately, despite what Dr. Monteleone may have intended, a
separate contract for hardware and software is exactly what he
faced under Section 202 of the Copyright Act. Under that provision,
the contract to sell the hardware could not affect a license of the
copyright.
happened by law under Article 2-401(4), not as a result of a material breach of a contract
allowing cancellation.
480. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text for authorities so stating.
481. In re Amica, 135 B.R. at 557.
482. See, e.g., Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F Supp. 425, 432 (S.D. N.Y
1996); In re SSE Int'l Corp., 198 B.R. 667, 671 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996).
483. 524 A.2d 1172 (Del. Super. 1987).
484. Neilson Bus. Equip, 524 A.2d. at 1174.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 1174-75.
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e. System Design & Management Information, Inc. v.
Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union487
This case has a curious twist; it was the software vendor who
was looking to invoke Article 2. Here, unlike Moteleone, the
hardware and the software came from different parties, and the
claim was for dysfunctional software. The software license was
never signed, and the court concluded that the claim against the
software developer was barred by Article 2-201. As discussed
above, it is appropriate to apply a state statute of frauds to a
non-exclusive copyright license, just not the one in Article 2. The
court decided to do so by imagining that the computer program
merged in the copy, and opining that the "sale of the software" was
the "predominant purpose" of the transaction. 488 It decided that
applying Article 2 was appropriate because this " . . . simplifies
commercial transactions . . . [and] provides a uniform rule for
courts to follow." 48 This is a compelling argument. The public
needs a uniform law for computer information transactions. Just
not Article 2. The correct law is UCITA.
f. Synergistic Technologies v. IDB Mobile Communications,
Inc. 49
This case illustrates the danger in a mechanical application of
the predominant purpose test. When software for a satellite digital
switching system failed, the licensee hired another company to
repair the source code, and the licensor sued for copyright
infringement. The issue was whether the licensee had obtained
ownership of a copy sufficient to invoke Section 117. The court
decided Article 2 was the answer:
In a contract providing for both goods and services, such as
the contract in this case, the Court must look to which aspect
of the contract predominates. Here, more than three quarters
of the monies paid.., were for computer hardware .... The
487. 788 P.2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990). This opinion stated as follows:
Therefore, the sale of the software is predominant. SDMI remains the owner of the
accounting system as intellectual property. Credit Union purchased only a
reproduction or the result of the programmer's skill. Credit Union is interested only in
the outcome of nmning the program and whether the program will perform the
functions for which it was purchased.
Id. at 882. How could there be a "sale" in a non-exclusive license?
488. System Design, 788 P.2d at 881-82.
489. Id. at 882.
490. 871 F. Supp. 24 (D. D.C. 1994).
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remaining monies were paid for computer software .... While
services were plainly an important part of the contract, the
Court finds that "goods" in the form of computer hardware
and software predominate. Accordingly, the contract is
governed by the UCC.491
So under Article 2401, title to a copy passed to the licensee. The
test for applying Article 2, then, according to Synergistic
Technologies, comes solely by sliding the price toggle. While that
worked in this case, one may well ask what happens in the next
case if the license says that three-quarters of the fee is allocated to
the software? A licensee may suddenly find significant problems in
the exercise of the Section 117 privileges. Such easily manipulated
results benefit no one.
Unlike the above cases, the Federal Circuit, in DSC
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications,4 92 utilized a
more sophisticated analysis. This case also raised the issue of
whether the licensee had obtained sufficient ownership of a copy
to activate the Section 117 privilege:
Not only do the agreements characterize the RBOCs [Regional
Bell Operating Companies] as non-owners of copies of the
software, but the restrictions imposed on the RBOCs' rights
with respect to the software are consistent with that
characterization.... Each of the.., agreements limits the...
right to transfer copies or... details of the software to third
parties. . . The agreements also prohibit the RBOC's from
using the software on hardware other than that provided by
DSC.... The fact that the right of possession is perpetual, or
that the possessor's rights were obtained through a single
payment, is certainly relevant to whether the possessor is an
owner, but those factors are not necessarily dispositive if the
possessor's right to use the software is heavily encumbered by
other restrictions that are inconsistent with the status of
owner [or a copy]. 93
As Pulse Communications understood, mechanical application of
the "predominant purpose" test along the one-dimensional price
axis is the wrong approach for computer programs.
491. Synergistic Technologies, 871 F Supp. at 29 n.7.
492. 170 E3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
493. DSC Communications Corp., 170 F3d at 1360-61.
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3. Later Circular Reasoning Cases
Several cases, rather than analyzing whether Article 2 in fact
applies to software transactions, merely assume this to be so. As
Bertrand Russell once remarked: "The method of postulating what
we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages
of theft over honest toil."494 Let us look at the cases that indulge in
this circular maneuver.
a. Step-Saver Data Systems Inc. v. Wyse Technology
495
One of the major cases cited for the proposition that software
transactions are subject to Article 2 is the famous, or if you prefer
infamous, decision in Step-Saver. Sorry to disappoint. The emperor
has no clothes. Here is the Step-Saver court's entire analysis on
why Article 2 applied to the contract in question: "All three parties
agree that the .. .program is 'goods' within the meaning of UCC §
2-102 & 2-105."496 This is hardly persuasive. At best, it represents an
agreement by these parties in this case to opt-in to Article 2. This
does not mean that Article 2 applies to all software transactions
between all other parties all the time.
b. Arizona Retail System v. Software Link
497
Arizona Retail should really be called Step-Saver-Lite because it
involved the same defendant and the same shrinkwrap license.
What was the court's reasoning? "In all material respects, the
subsequent purchases in this case are equivalent to the purchases
in Step-Saver."498 One can image Galileo's Inquisitors using the same
justification for refusing to look through his telescope. If it was
good enough for Aristotle ...
c. ProCD v. Zeidenberg499
Although often contrasted with Step-Saver, for reasoned
application of Article 2, ProCD is little better. It held:
Following the district court, we treat the licenses as ordinary
contracts accompanying the sale of products, and therefore as
494. KLINE, supra note 426, at 218.
495. 939 F2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
496. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at .94 n.6.
497. 831 F Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
498. Arizona Retail Sys., 831 F. Supp. at 766.
499. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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governed by the common law of contracts and the Uniform
Commercial Code. Whether there are legal differences
between "contracts" and "licenses" (which may matter under
the copyright doctrine of first sale) is a subject for another
day.W
There is one difference in ProCD. The software was a database
program containing uncopyrightable telephone listings, and the case
involved breach of a license to use the uncopyrightable data.
Technically, the contract issue was a purely state law question of
whether Article 2 applies to a license of a database. 501
d. M.A. Mortenson v. Timberline Software502
In this case, a Washington appellate court followed ProCD in
upholding the enforceability of a software shrinkwrap license under
Article 2. Why did Article 2 apply? "The parties apparently agree
that Article II of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") applies to
the licensing of computer. We accept, without deciding, this
proposition."5 In other words, the parties again agreed to "opt-in"
to Article 2. This case involved an upgrade to a software program
that did not work as expected, producing a $2 million underbid.
When the licensee sued for breach of warranty, the licensor
pointed to the warranty disclaimer in the shrinkwrap. The licensee
countered that the shrinkwrap was unenforceable under Step-Saver
because the initial negotiations only involved the license fee and
number of copies without discussion of the license terms, and the
order was confirmed in a purchase order. The court disagreed,
noting:
The licensee's arguments ignore the commercial realities of
software sales. Reasonable minds could not differ concerning
a corporation's understanding that use of software is governed
by licenses containing multiple terms .... [T]he facts do not
support the conclusion that the purchase order constitutes an
integrated contract.5°4
Moreover, the licensor's failure to bring up the license terms
500. ProCd, 86 E3d at 1450.
501. There was also the claim that the Copyright Act preempted the license, which
ProCD rejected as well.
502. 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1999).
503. M.A. Mortenson, 970 P.2d at 807.
504. Id. at 808.
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during price-quantity discussions was hardly surprising. The
licensor knew that the licensee had a license for a prior version of
the software and that it licensed other software. As such, the
licensee was on notice of the existence of the shrinkwrap license,
and it installation and use were an assent to the shrinkwrap.
5°5
Unlike Step-Saver, the licensee did not refuse to sign the original
license, and the licensor made delivery anyhow.
5°6
e. Hospital Computer Systems, Inc. v. Staten Island
Hospital
5°7
Staten Island Hospital involved the all too familiar situation of a
software development degenerating into the usual round of
finger-pointing under the rubric of "breach of warranty" and
"waiver of breach." Curiously, after extensively analyzing the
waiver issue under New York common law, when it came to the
damages phase, the court said: "[The licensee] has asserted that he
NYUCC governs the contract remedies that are available to it. [The
licensor] has not disputed this assertion. The Court agrees that the
damage remedies in the NYUCC controls [sic]."aS This does not
mean that Article 2 ipso facto applies to every other software
license.
f. RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc. °9
RRX Laboratories involved a software package that allegedly
"never functioned as intended."510 The license limited the vendor's
liability to the contract price, so the question was whether the
licensee could resort to Article 2 to invalidate the limitation and
grab consequential damages. The court began in the usual place by
looking to the definition of a "good" in Article 2-105, and resorted
to the usual test of whether the license was a "good" or a "service."
505. Id. at 809.
506. Id. at 810. This decision was affirfned by the Washington Supreme Court based on
the same rationale. See M.A_ Mortenson v. Timberline Software, 998 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash.
2000) (stating that "[t]he parties agree in their briefs that Article 2 applies to the licensing of
software, and we accept this proposition"). The Washington Supreme Court noted UCIT s
existence in a footnote, without comment. Id. at 310 n.6.
507. 788 F. Supp. 1351 (D. N.J. 1992).
508. Hospital Computer Sys., 788 F Supp. at 1361. In support of this proposition, the
court cites only Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d
341 (Civ. Ct. 1988); see infra notes 512-514 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Communications Groups.
509. 772 F2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
510. RRX Indus., 772 F2d at 546.
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511 The court opined, without further analysis, that "the sales
aspect of the transaction predominates," and decided that Article 2
applied.
g. Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner
Communications, Inc.
512
In yet another adventure in the New York court system, a
software developer sued for the final installment due on a
development contract, and the licensee sought to defend its
pocketbook behind the ramparts of warranty. The court began by
noting that "[s]oftware . . . is a widely used term with several
meanings," including programs and computer language listings,
magnetic cards, or paper cards programmed to instruct a computer,
and programs used in a computer.513 One might say the same thing
about, says, a "novel." Sometimes it means a copyrightable "literary
work," other times its embodiment in a "book" or a "periodical."
What about a "film?" Sometimes it means a copyrightable motion
picture, other times its embodiment in celluloid or a videocassette
or a DVD. Or an "album." Sometimes its means a copyrightable
sound recording or music. Other times its means a phonorecord or
a music CD. That popular usage may fail to distinguish between the
copyrightable work and the physical embodiment does not excuse
courts that make the same mistake. Nonetheless, the court
reasoned: "it seems clear that computer software, generally, is
considered to be a tangible, moveable item, and not merely an
intangible idea or thought, and therefore qualifies as a 'good' under
Article 2." 514
h. Chaltos System v. National Cash Register Corp.
515
As discussed above, in this case "[b]oth parties . . . concede[d]
the applicability of the U.C.C." 516 to the lease of a computer
system.
511. California law applied to the transaction, so the actual reference was to the
California Commercial Code.
512. 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Civ. Ct. 1988).
513. Communications Groups, 527 N.YS.2d at 344 (citations omitted).
514. Id. (citing in support without analysis RRX Indus., Chaltos, and Triangle
Underwriters).
515. 479 F. Supp. 738 (D. N.J. 1979), affd in part and remanded in part, 635 F.2d 1081
(1980), appeal after remand, 670 F.2d. 1304 (1982).
516. Chaltos Sys., 635 F2d at 1084.
2000
Duquesne Law Review
i. In re Amica, Inc.'7
Here is the court's reasoning for applying Article 2: "The terms
[sic] 'goods' [in Article 2-102] includes computer programs. RRX
Industries . . ."518 That's it.
j. Dreier Co., Inc. v. Unitronix Corp.
519
This case involves the sale of a computer systems consisting of
hardware and payroll software. After noting that there is a distinct
difference between the tangible hardware and the software to run
it, the Court concludes: "Nevertheless, most authorities agree that
the sale of a computer system involving both hardware and
software is a 'sale of goods' notwithstanding the incidental service
aspects of the sale; therefore Article 2 . . . applies," both to the
hardware and the software.520 While those cases certainly apply
Article 2 to hardware, they do not stand for the proposition that it
also applies to software.
k. Schroders, Inc. v. Hogan Systems, Inc.
521
This case involved a license of a software accounting package;
no hardware was involved. In applying Article 2, the court began,
"recent case law demonstrates a willingness of the courts to
construe software-hardware packages as falling within the purview
of Article 2."522 It continues, "[a]lthough the parties' agreement in
the instant matter did not involve the sale of computer hardware,
but simply a licensure of software, the arrangement should
nonetheless be construed to fall within the provisions of U.C.C.
Article 2."523 While it is doubtful that Triangle Underwriters stands
for the first proposition, it certainly does not stand for the second.
The court simply made up the applicability of Article 2 to a
software license.
1. Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software, Inc.5 24
This is another suit for unpaid license fees and breach of
517. 135 B.R. 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
518. In re Amica, 135 B.R. at 540.
519. 527 A.2d. 875 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1986).
520. Dreier Co., 527 A.2d at 879 (citing Chaltos and Triangle Underwriters).
521. 522 N.YS.2d. 404 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
522. Schroders, Inc., 522 N.YS.2d at 406 (citing Triangle Underwriters).
523. Id.
524. 510 So.2d 1337 (La. App. 1987).
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warranty in which the court simply assumed that Article 2 applied.
m. USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Systems, Inc.;525 Pentagram
Software Corp. v. Voicetek Corp. ;526 Vmark Software, Inc.
v. EMC Corp;5 27 Novacore Technologies v. GST
Communications Corp.
528
This series of four Massachusetts cases could certainly qualify as
Exhibit A for Cantor's law. The story begins when USM retains
Arthur D. Little Systems to develop a "turnkey" computer system.
Did Article 2 apply? "The parties assume that the [turnkey software
development] contract, providing for both the sale of goods and the
delivery of services, is subject to . . . Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code. . . . [Tlhat assumption is correct," said USM
Corp.5 9 So Article 2 applies because the parties assume it applies.
Another opt-in. This was enough to fool the court in Pentagram,
which averred that a turnkey system was within Article 2 simply
because USM supposedly said so.5 °
Then comes Vmark, a case about "[a] common but foreseeable
frustration of modem life - the failure of new computer hardware
or software to work properly."m' Said this court: "The parties and
the trial judge assumed, without discussion, that the parties'
computer software license agreement is governed by art. 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. . . . Although the issue has not been
definitively decided in Massachusetts, we accept the assumption."52
525. 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
526. 22 UCC Rep. Serv. 2d 646 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1993).
527. 642 N.E.2d 587 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
528. 20 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Mass 1998).
529. USM Corp., 546 N.E.2d at 894. There is a follow-up. After the decision was
rendered, the software developer declared bankruptcy, so USM sued the developer's E&O
carrier. But the policy only applied to consulting services, and the court had already decided
the contract was a "sale of goods." That was enough for the insurer. Not so fast, said USM
Corp. v. First State Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). While it was true that the
contract was a "sale of goods," services were involved too. Although the prior decision found
the defect existed in the system controllers - in the goods aspect of the contract - there
were defects in the services aspect too, so the insurer was liable. What is going on? This is
hardly a principled application of a consistent rule. The court was determined that USM
should prevail no matter what, and set about to manipulate the facts and the law to see that
it did. Is there any better evidence that a law that allows such free-wheeling manipulation is
incoherent?
530. Pentagram, UCC Rep. Serv. 2d at 648. The court also relied on Advent Systems.
531. Vmark, 642 N.E.2d at 590.
532. Id. at 587 n.1 (citing USM Carp.). The gravamen of the action was fraud and
misrepresentation, and as the court noted, "the applicable provisions of the U.C.C. are not
critical to our analysis." Id.
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Four years later, Novacore appears. "The parties agree that the
Agreement is governed by Article Two of the Massachusetts
Uniform Commercial Code . . . and that the computer software
product is best characterized as a 'good' pursuant to [UCCI 2-102,"
citing of course USM and Vmark.- Whether Article 2 applies to
software transactions absent party agreement to opt-in is still an
open question in Massachusetts.
n. Micro Data Base Systems v. Dharma Systems, Inc.A5
Dharma licensed its SQL Access program to MDBS and, for a
separately stated price, agreed to modify the program. Dharma
completed the work but refused to deliver disks of the modified
program until MDBS signed the license agreement, which MDBS
refused to do. So, does Article 2 apply to custom software licenses?
The usually perceptive Seventh Circuit had only this to say: "[W]e
can think of no reason why the UCC is not suitable to govern
disputes arising from the sale of custom software - [so] we'll follow
it."5 5 Sure beats honest work.
o. Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc.-6
This case raised the question of whether a distributor of software
became an owner of a copy sufficient to activate a first sale
defense. In deciding that a software transaction is under Article 2,
the court merely assumes this to be so, citing to Advent System
and Step-Saver.5
7
4. Modern Right Reasoning Cases
Not every court was confused by the wrong image. The proof is
a series of decisions by modern courts prepared to look closer at
the real nature of a software transaction and applying correct legal
reasoning.
533. Novacore, 20 F Supp. 2d at 169, 183.
534. 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998).
535. Micro Data Base, 148 F.3d at 654. Because this was a diversity decision, the
specific issue was whether under New Hampshire law, Article 2 applied to a software
development contract. For this proposition, Micro Data Base relied on the decision of the
district court in Colonial Life Ins. v. Electronic Data Sys., 817 F Supp. 235, 239 (D. N.H.
1993).
536. 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997).
537. NoveU, Inc., 25 F. Supp.2d at 1222.
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a. Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Systems, Inc.38
Right images make right results easy. This case shows that.
Berthold licensed Adobe the nonexclusive right to distribute its
copyrighted software for computer typefaces in the Adobe Font
Library. Pursuant to the agreement, Adobe decided to discontinue
providing them. Berthold, while admitting that the Agreement
authorized Adobe's conduct, asked the court to use Article 2 to
impose an implied obligation to continue carrying the typefaces.
However, the UCC did not apply to this transaction because it
involved a license, not a a sale of goods. With the right image in
mind, the court's answer was easy:
"Sale" is defined as 'the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price.' A pure license agreement, like the 1997
agreement, does not involve transfer of title, and so is not a
sale for Article 2 purposes.3 9
b. Adobe Systems Inc. v. One Stop Micro. 40
This is another stunning refutation of the "sale" categorization for
mass market software licenses. Adobe provided its popular "Adobe
PageMaker" and related software for personal computers under
various shrinkwrap licenses. Some versions were licensed for the
educational market under advantageous price terms. One Stop
admitted to adulterating numerous educational versions by cutting
open the box, opening the shrinkwrap and removing the
"educational use only" labeling. When Adobe sued for copyright
infringement, One Stop claimed the transaction was really a "sale,"
making its conduct protected under the "first sale" doctrine. The
court concluded that "[tihe numerous restrictions imposed by
Adobe indicate a license rather than a sale because they undeniably
interfere with the reseller's ability to further distribute the
software."541 In so holding, the court accepted expert testimony that
"[t]he industry uses terms such as 'purchase,' 'sell,' 'buy,' etc....
because they are convenient and familiar, but the industry is aware
that all software, including Adobe's software, is distributed under
license."542
538. 101 F Supp.2d 697 (E.D. Ill. 2000).
539. Bertho/d ypes, 101 F. Supp.2d at 703 (citation omitted).
540. 84 F. Supp.2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000).




c. Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems, Inc.13
This case involved a claim for breach of a software development
agreement and misappropriation of trade secrets. The defendant
said that because the software was provided with a circuit board,
the contract was a "transaction in goods" within Article 2 and
hence barred by the Article 2 statute of limitations. In finding that
the longer state statute applied, the court held that "[b]ecause the
predominant feature of the [license agreement] was a transfer of
intellectual property rights, the agreement is not subject to Article
2 of the UCC."5" In so going, it gave the following insightful
illustration:
This conclusion may follow more obviously from the following
hypothetical analogous set of facts: Suppose the parties here
are book publishers, that Architectronics gives CSI a written
outline for a new novel, and that CSI agrees to write the
novel. An agreement provides that CSI will own the copyright
to the novel, but will grant Architectronics the exclusive right
to reproduce and distribute the novel. When Architectronics
sells copies of the book to consumers, the sale will be a
"transaction in goods" under the UCC. But in the agreement
between Architectronics and CSI, Architectronics is
contracting for intangible intellectual property rights, even
though it will receive a "hard" copy of the novel when CSI
finishes the project. The agreement to write the novel would
not be a "transaction in goods" under the UCC.145
Precisely. The copy is not the copyright.
d. In re SSE International Corp.
546
In this bankruptcy case, the issue was whether a security interest
in accounts attached to royalty proceeds from a license to furnish
know-how. The secured creditor argued that the know-how was
embodied in heat-resistant steel casings, that these were goods, and
that the license proceeds were really accounts generated by a sale
of goods. The trustee said the know-how was separate from its
physical embodiment, so the proceeds were general intangibles not
covered by the security agreement. A perceptive bankruptcy court
543. 935 F Supp. 425 (S.D. N.Y 1996).
544. Architectronics, 935 F Supp. at 432.
545. Id. at 432 n.5.
546. 198 B.R. 667 (Bankr. WD. Pa. 1996).
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held:
[B]ecause the subject of the "license" agreement in question
was the debtor's rights to its know-how and not merely a
reproduction of debtor's ideas and thoughts, the debtor
furnished . .-. intellectual property rather than goods. This
determination is made independent of whether the tangible
medium by which the debtor furnished such rights .
constituted a good.
547
This was exactly correct. The court did not confuse the
intangible know-how with its embodiments by assuming that the
know-how somehow merged in the castings. It did not waste time
on a superfluous and misleading predominant purpose analysis. It
understood that the intangible interest was separate property and
could not be treated in the same manner as the tangible medium
that embodied it. In so doing, it gave this example of the
foolishness of confusing the content with the container:
This holding prevents a strange, if not nonsensical, result that
could occur were this Court to hold that the debtor's
intellectual property rights in its know-how were goods merely
because they were embodied in a tangible medium that itself
constitutes a good. Because "[a] security interest in ... goods
• . .may be perfected by the secured party's taking possession
of the collateral," [UCCI 9-305, an entity could perfect its
security interest in the debtor's intellectual property, if it were
a good, by merely taking possession of a tangible medium,
such a written manual, embodying such intellectual property.
Perfection by such methods could have disastrous results,
however, because mere possession of the tangible medium by
the secured entity would undoubtedly fail to notify other
entities of such security interest, which is the point of
perfection in the frst place. Therefore (a) perfection of a
security interest in intellectual property must be by filing in
accordance with [UCC] 9-302(a), and (b) this principle further
supports the overwhelming authority for the proposition that
intellectual property is not a good. 4s
547. In re SSE Int' Corp., 198 B.R. at 670 (emphasis added).
548. Id. at 670 n.3.
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e. Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pennsylvania, Inc. 49
A Pennsylvania court was also undeceived by a class action
plaintiff arguing that cable television programming was a
"transaction in goods" under Article 2. The plaintiff claimed that
the cable system used electric signals to transmit the programming,
that electricity was a good,5 and hence Article 2 applied. The
court dispensed with the confused line of thinking thus:
[Tihe transmission of cable television programming is not a
"transaction in goods" as defined by [Article 2-105(a)] and
relevant case law. Although the audio and video signals which
the Cable Companies transmit move through the cable wires,
the Official comment to [Article 2-105] instructs us that the
definition of goods "is not intended to deal with things that
are not fairly identifiable as movables before the contract is
performed." . . . The signals transmitted through the cable
wires to the subscriber's home are not "fairly identifiable as
movables before the contract is performed." The Cable
Companies do not sell a tangible, separate identifiable good -
instead they supply a continuous stream of audio and video
signals.- 1
The court may also have added that the programming, being
copyrighted works, were not goods.
f Applied Information Management, Inc. v. Icart552
In Applied Management, a case previously discussed, the court
also understood that the copy cannot be confused with the
copyright. As it said with regard to a non-exclusive software
license:
[A]n agreement of this nature may convey rights and interests
in two, rather than only one, form of property: the developer
may transfer copyright rights in the software program
(intellectual property rights) and at the same time transfer
rights in the copy of the program through the material object
that embodies the copyrighted work (personal property
549. 671 A.2d. 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
550. Kaplan, 671 A.2d at 724.
551. Id. Kaplan also relied on Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v.
Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., 714 E2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that cable
television systems provide services and not "goods" for purpose of the Clayton Act).
552. 976 E Supp. 149 (E.D. N.Y. 1997).
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rights).55
So what do all these decisions mean? Nothing more than that
many able courts had the wrong image in mind, and were led into
error. More modem courts, using the correct image, were not. In
Galileo's time, the wrong image of solar system mechanics caused
ever more tedious complications as people tried to contort
observed facts into their spherical mechanics. No amount of
adjusting and accommodating would ever do, however, because the
underlying image was wrong. A whole new system was required.
The same is true now about applying Article 2 to software
transactions. The underlying mechanics are simply wrong, and no
amount of folding, spindling or mutilating will ever make them
work.
B. What Law If Not Article 2? - Revisited
Let us revisit the question asked earlier: what law should apply
to software transactions? Again consider a retail transaction in
LINUX, only make the example ever sharper and use the facts in
Step-Saver. Assume a licensee calls Red Hat Software, orders a
copy of LINux over the phone, and sends a purchase order
confirming price and quantity. Assume Red Hat Software sends an
invoice confirming price and quantity but nothing else. The copy of
LINux arrives with a shrinkwrap copy of the GNU Public License.
What contract law applies to this transaction?
Some would argue that Article 2 applies, and that under Article
2-207 the shrinkwrap license is unenforceable in its entirely, or at
least insofar as it waives implied warranties and restricts any
privileges under copyright law. But what other results must also
follow?
Under the GNU Public License, the waiver of implied warranties
was an essential condition to the copyright owner's authorization
for making and distributing the copy of IANUx. If this condition is
now eliminated from the contract, then such copying and
distribution was unauthorized and the copy is infringing. Step-Saver
admitted this, but in that case found there was no infringement
because the copyright owner, seizing defeat from the jaws of
victory, admitted to an implied license. 5 4 But this is not and cannot
be the universal case. Even if the customer somehow became the
553. Applied Info. Management, 976 F Supp. at 150.
554. Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 96 n.7.
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owner of the copy, the customer would have at best only the
limited privileges under the Copyright Act. But LINuX is an
operating system. An essential purpose of using LINUX is to make
adaptations, and to distribute copies of the new versions. Without
the shrinkwrap, those uses are also infringing.
It gets worse. If Article 2 applies and invalidates the shrinkwrap,
then just what are the terms of the license for LINux? If the default
rules in Article 2 apply, then mere delivery of the copy of LINUX
would create a contract under Article 2-206, something which
Section 202 prevents. The scope of the license would be
determined by course of dealing and usage of trade under Article
2-208, not federal law as required by the Copyright Act. Under
Article 2-210(2), the license to use LINUX would be assignable,
contrary to preemptive federal law. The owner of the CD could
resell the CD under Article 2, even though under Section 109 there
would be no first sale privilege because without the license the
copy was unauthorized. The owner of the CD could rent it even
though such rental would be prohibited without consent of the
Linux Organization under Section 109(b). Under Article 2-309(2),
the contractual uses should be terminable at will, which may, or
may not, be the copyright rule.
Without an enforceable warranty disclaimer in the shrinkwrap,
Article 2-314 would apply an implied warranty of merchantability
on content - i.e., the LINux program itself - raising First Amendment
issues. If the copy was provided to the retail outlet on
consignment, then the licensee's creditors would have a interest in
LINUX superior to o that of the Linux Organization under Article
2-326, despite their failure to comply with the mandatory writing
requirements for such a lien in Section 204(a). Under Article 2-401,
there should have been a mandatory transfer of "title" (ownership)
to the worldwide copyright in LINUX by operation of law, which is
certainly not the case. Under Article 2-401(2), the Linux
Organization could not commence an infringement action to protect
its rights unless and until it first conducted a foreclosure sale
under Article 9, directly contrary to Section 501.
Assume the licensee wanted LINUX on a DVD, and found a CD
had been purchased by mistake. The licensee should be able to
nonetheless load the CD on the licensee's computer while sending
the CD back to the vendor in exchange for a DVD. Not under
Article 2-401(3). Rejecting the CD would cause an automatic
revesting of title to the CD in the vendor, vitiating the Section 117
privilege and making loading the program unto the hard drive an
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infringement. Assume that the retail store had only been a bailee of
the copy. Under Article 2-403, it could still pass good title to the
copies to licensee, contrary to Section 109. Under Article 2-502, by
merely paying for the copy, the licensee would have a special
property interest in its LINUX license, superior to creditors of the
Linux Organization, despite failure to comply with the requirements
of Section 205 or Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code. Under
Article 2-512, the licensee would have a right, prior to purchase of
the copy, to load IANux onto a computer for inspection, contrary to
Sections 106 & 117. Under Article 2-601, the licensee could reject
the entire license for any defect in the copy, ignoring the
mandatory separation of rights and copies in Section 202.
If the licensee rightfully rejected the copy, then under Articles
2-602 & 2-603, the licensee would have the right, and in some cases
even the duty, to resell the copies, even though such resale would
be infringing under Sections 106 & 109. Under Article 2-711, for a
rightful rejection, the licensee would have a security interest in the
Lmux license to the extent of any payments without the necessity
of complying with the writing requirements in Section 204(a). Does
any of this make sense?
Applying Article 2 to a software transaction - applying all of
Article 2 in the preemptive, systematic, and comprehensive manner
it is meant to be applied - even in the mass market, is a disaster.
1. UCITA?
The Uniform Computer Information Act has been crafted to meet
this challenge. I will not discuss all the details of the UCITA here,
since they covered elsewhere in this issue of the law journal. In
broad overview, however, there are at least three immediate
benefits of UCITA: standardization, uniformity, and innovation.
a. Standardization
The legal standards for information contracting are in disarray.
As this article has shown, the most basic conceptual underpinnings
for determining what contract law applies are a shambles. When
one considers emerging issues in e-comnierce, it gets even worse.
Does clicking an "I Agree" icon make an enforceable contract?
What about contracts made by electronic agents? What are the
rules for digital authentication? What happens in the case of
consumer error? Many e-commerce sites merely ask the customer
to fill in basic payment information. But this leaves many critical
2000
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terms up in the air. For example, absent specification, what is the
duration of a software license? How many users are permitted?
Can the software reside on more than one machine as long as it is
not used simultaneously? If copies are ordered, who pays the
shipment and insurance costs? What warranties, if any, apply? What
are the remedies for breach? Should the law presume that without
agreement on these points there is no deal? Or should it provide
default rules that apply where the parties have remained silent?
The default rules in Article 2 are wholly inadequate to answer these
questions. UCITA does.
b. Uniformity
Commercial contract law should be made by the states, not the
federal government. But e-commerce is national and even global.
To realize its potential, both suppliers and customers alike need for
a single, uniform law. Article 2 was crafted for an industrial wares
economy, not an on-line information one. To deal with e-commerce
we need a single set of uniform rules like UCITA.
c. Innovation
The law should encourage developers and innovators to bring
competitive and innovative new products to market by allowing
them to control their transaction costs in an appropriate manner.
Two examples are JAVA and LINuX. (JAVA is a program develod by
Sun Microsystems to run on any platform. 5) This makes it
particularly well-suited to the Web where computers run Windows,
UNIX, Mac OS, etc. The JAVA Software Development Kit can be
downloaded for free subject to Sun's shrink-wrap license,5 which
includes a waiver of implied warranties and consequential damages.
LINux, as already discussed (you probably believe ad nauseum if
you have reached this point) does the same. Both offer customers a
critical trade-off: valuable free software but on an "as is" basis. A
modem commercial law should support these possibilities. UCITA
does.
CONCLUSION
As the dramatic changes in the economy demonstrate, it is
essential to reconcile commercial law to copyright in computer
555. See JAVA, (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://javasun.com>.
556. See JAVA Software Deveopment Kit, (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://java.sun.conV
products/jdk/1.2/license>.
Vol. 38:459
Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software
information transactions. The commercial law doyens propose to
do so by "dumbing down" the copyright aspects of the transaction
until nothing is left but the sunset world of existing Article 2. The
copyright mandarins would pretend that commercial law does not
exist for copyrights, so that the information economy can evolve no
further than the tired sale of copies paradigm on which they were
weaned. Neither approach, however, meets the needs of the
dawning new world of on-line, global e-commerce. We need a new
image of information transactions that reconciles commerce and
copyright, incorporates the best of both, and provides a foundation
for future growth. Change may be difficult for those whose careers
depend on knowing what once was and proclaiming its eternal
prolongation. It was also difficult in Galileo's time. But the public
interest does not begin and end with the convenience of the
cognoscenti.
The fight against entrenched ideas and old illusions, it seems, is
a never-ending battle. Llewellyn fought the same fight against the
antiquarians of his day. He gave them this rejoinder.
The law of schools threatened at the close of the century to
turn into words - placid, clear-seeming, lifeless, like some old
canal. Practice rolled on, muddy, turbulent, vigorous. It is now
spilling, flooding, into the canal of stagnant words. It brings
ferment and trouble.
557
So it does today. It is a pity that as we enter the Twenty First
Century, the very means Llewellyn used to fight the evil in his day
- Article 2 - has become its instrument in ours.
We need to move on, to adopt a new commercial code specially
tailored to software transactions and in harmony with federal law.
This requires that we have the courage to see the world as it is, not
as we imagine it to be, and adjust our thinking accordingly. There
is only one choice. It is time now for the bar to demand, and the
courts to affirm, what we should have declared so long ago: Article
2 cannot apply to software transactions.
557. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L REV. 1222-23 (1931).
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APPENDIX A: GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 2, June 1991
Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 675 Mass
Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. Everyone is permitted to copy
and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but
changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
freedom to share and change it. By contrast, the GNU General
Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and
change free software-to make sure the software is free for all its
users. This General Public License applies to most of the Free
Software Foundation's software and to any other program whose
authors commit to using it. (Some other Free Software Foundation
software is covered by the GNU Library General Public License
instead.) You can apply it to your programs, too.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom,
not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure
that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software
(and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source
code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software
or use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you
can do these things.
To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid
anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender.the
rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you
if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether
gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that
you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the
source code. And you must show them these terms so they know
their rights.
We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the
software, and (2) offer you this license which gives you legal
permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the software.
Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make,
certain that everyone understands that there is no warranty for this
free software. If the software is modified by someone else and
passed on, we want its recipients to know that what they have is
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not the original, so that any problems introduced by others will not
reflect on the original authors' reputations.
Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software
patents. We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free
program will individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making
the program proprietary. To prevent this, we have made it clear
that any patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not
licensed at all.
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
modification follow.
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
0. This License applies to any program or other work which
contains a notice placed by the copyright holder saying it may be
distributed under the terms of this General Public License. The
"Program", below, refers to any such program or work, and a
"work based on the Program" means either the Program or any
derivative work under copyright law: that is to say, a work
containing the Program or a portion of it, either verbatim or with
modifications and/or translated into another language. (Hereinafter,
translation is included without limitation in the term
"modification".) Each licensee is addressed as "you". Activities
other than copying, distribution and modification are not covered
by this License; they are outside its scope. The act of running the
Program is not restricted, and the output from the Program is
covered only if its contents constitute a work based on the
Program (independent of having been made by running the
Program). Whether that is true depends on what the Program does.
1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's
source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you
conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an
appropriate copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep
intact all the notices that refer to this License and to the absence
of any warranty; and give any other recipients of the Program a
copy of this License along with the Program. You may charge a fee
for the physical act of transferring a copy, and you may at your
option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.
2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any
portion of it, thus forming a work based on the Program, and copy
and distribute such modifications or work under the terms of




a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices
stating that you changed the files and the date of any change.
b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that
in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any
part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
parties under the terms of this License.
c) If the modified program normally reads commands
interactively when run, you must cause it, when started running for
such interactive use in the most ordinary way, to print or display
an announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a
notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide a
warranty) and that users may redistribute the program under these
conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of this License.
(Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but does not
normally print such an announcement, your work based on the
Program is not required to print an announcement.)
These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole. If
identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the
Program, and can be reasonably considered independent and
separate works in themselves, then this License, and its terms, do
not apply to those sections when you distribute them as separate
works. But when you distribute the same sections as part of a
whole which is a work based on the Program, the distribution of
the whole must be on the terms of this License, whose permissions
for other licensees extend to the entire whole, and thus to each
and every part regardless of who wrote it. Thus, it is not the intent
of this section to claim rights or contest your rights to work
written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to exercise the right to
control the distribution of derivative or collective works based on
the Program. In addition, mere aggregation of another work not
based on the Program with the Program (or with a work based on
the Program) on a volume of a storage or distribution medium does
not bring the other work under the scope of this License.
3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on
it, under Section 2) in object code or executable form under the
terms of Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of
the following:
a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding
machine-readable source code, which must be distributed under the
terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium customarily used for
software interchange; or,
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b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three
years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your cost
of physically performing source distribution, a complete
machine-readable copy of the corresponding source code, to be
distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium
customarily used for software interchange; or,
c) Accompany it with the information you received as to the
offer to distribute corresponding source code. (This alternative is
allowed only for noncommercial distribution and only if you
received the program in object code or executable form with such
an offer, in accord with Subsection b above.)
The source code for a work means the preferred form of the
work for making modifications to it. For an executable work,
complete source code means all the source code for all modules it
contains, plus any associated interface definition files, plus the
scripts used to control compilation and installation of the
executable. However, as a special exception, the source code
distributed need not include anything that is normally distributed
(in either source or binary form) with the major components
(compiler, kernel, and so on) of the operating system on which the
executable runs, unless that component itself accompanies the
executable.
If distribution of executable or object code is made by offering
access to copy from a designated place, then offering equivalent
access to copy the source code from the same place counts as
distribution of the source code, even though third parties are not
compelled to copy the source along with the object code.
4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the
Program except as expressly provided under this License. Any
attempt otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the
Program is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under
this License. However, parties who have received copies, or rights,
from you under this License will not have their licenses terminated
so long as such parties remain in full compliance.
5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not
signed it. However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or
distribute the Program or its derivative works. These actions are
prohibited by law if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by
modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the
Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so,
and all its terms and conditions for copying, distributing or
modifying the Program or works based on it.
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6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on
the Program), the recipient automatically receives a license from
the original licensor to copy, distribute or modify the Program
subject to these terms and conditions. You may not impose any
further restrictions on the recipients' exercise of the rights granted
herein. You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third
'parties to this License.
7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of
patent infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent
issues), conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order,
agreement or otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this
License, they do not excuse you from the conditions of this
License. If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously
your obligations under this License and any other pertinent
obligations, then as a consequence you may not distribute the
Program at all. For example, if a patent license would not permit
royalty-free redistribution of the Program by all those who receive
copies directly or indirectly through you, then the only way you
could satisfy both it and this License would be to refrain entirely
from distribution of the Program.
If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable
under any particular circumstance, the balance of the section is
intended to apply and the section as a whole is intended to apply
in other circumstances.
It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any
patents or other property right claims or to contest validity of any
such claims; this section has the sole purpose of protecting the
integrity of the free software distribution system, which is
implemented by public license practices. Many people have made
generous contributions to the wide range of software distributed
through that system in reliance on consistent application of that
system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing
to distribute software through any other system and a licensee
cannot impose that choice. This section is intended to make
thoroughly clear what is believed to be a consequence of the rest
of this License.
8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in
certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the
original copyright holder who places the Program under this
License may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation
excluding those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in
or among countries not thus excluded. In such case, this License
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incorporates the limitation as if written in the body of this License.
9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new
versions of the General Public License from time to time. Such new
versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may
differ in detail to address new problems or concerns. Each version
is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program specifies a
version number of this License which applies to it and "any later
version", you have the option of following the terms and conditions
either of that version or of any later version published by the Free
Software Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version
number of this License, you may choose any version ever published
by the Free Software Foundation.
10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other
free programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to
the author to ask for permission. For software which is copyrighted
by the Free Software Foundation, write to the Free Software
Foundation; we sometimes make exceptions for this. Our decision
will be guided by the two goals of preserving the free status of all
derivatives of our free software and of promoting the sharing and
reuse of software generally.
NO WARRANTY
11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF
CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO
THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS"
WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY
AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD
THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST
OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW
OR AGREED TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER,
OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL,
SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE
PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA
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OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES
SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE
PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN
IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Appendix: How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the
greatest possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is
to make it free software which everyone can redistribute and
change under these terms.
To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest
to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
convey the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at
least the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is
found.
<one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it
does.> Copyright (C) 19yy <name of author>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
License, or (at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
See the GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Camambridge, MA 02139, USA.
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and
paper mail.
If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like
this when it starts in an interactive mode:
Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) 19yy name of author
Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for
details type 'show w'. This is free software, and you are welcome
to redistribute it under certain conditions; type 'show c' for details.
The hypothetical commands 'show w' and 'show c' should show
the appropriate parts of the General Public License. Of course, the
commands you use may be called something other than 'show w'
Vol. 38:459
2000 Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software 589
and 'show c'; they could even be mouse-clicks or menu
items-whatever suits your program.
You should also get your employer (if you work as a
programmer) or your school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer"
for the program, if necessary. Here is a sample; alter the names:
Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the
program 'Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written
by James Hacker.
<signature of TY Coon>, 1 April 1989 Ty Coon, President of Vice
This General Public License does not permit incorporating your
program into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine
library, you may consider it more useful to permit linking
proprietary applications with the library. If this is what you want to
do, use the GNU Library General Public License instead of this
License.

